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Abstract
This thesis investigates the relationship between the demand for private 
education and the distribution of income, state school quality, religion and po­
litical allegiance in England. Chapter 2 focuses on how the demand for private 
education, both secular and religious, is affected by the distribution of income. 
Theoretically and empirically, I find that private schools in general locate in 
areas with high income levels, high income inequality and low spending per 
pupil in state schools. However, religious (Muslim and Jewish) schools locate 
where the fraction of the relevant religious individuals is high and where the 
religious individuals axe relatively poor. Chapter 3 studies the relationship be­
tween the demand for private education and local state school quality, and how 
this varies with household income and preferences for education. Consistent 
with theoretical predictions, I find robust empirical evidence of a non-linear re­
lationship between the demand for private education and for local state school 
quality such that it is positive at lower income levels and negative at higher 
income levels. Finally, chapter 4 explores the relationship between religious 
and political allegiance and private schooling choices. I find that the rela­
tionship between religion and private education varies greatly across religious 
groups, and is strongest for non-mainstream denominations. The strength of 
the association between religious and political allegiance and private schooling 
depends significantly on the intensity of religious beliefs. However, the greater 
demand for private education among non-Christians does not appear to be 
driven primarily by religious motives but rather by stronger preferences for 
education. I also find that private school demand is significantly associated 
with respondents’ political allegiance.
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Chapter 1
Overview
Private sector alternatives to publicly provided education is a key policy issue. 
Proponents claim that private schooling frees up resources in the public sector 
and invigorates the public sector through increased competition. By contrast, 
critics worry that private schools attract the most able and wealthy pupils to 
the detriment of the viability of the state schools. Much of the focus in the 
economics of education literature has been on the effect of private education on 
educational outcomes. Instead, this thesis revolves around three main themes 
related to the demand for and supply of private education: the distribution of 
income, religion and ethnicity and the quality of the public sector.
Chapter 2 studies the relationship between the demand for and supply of 
private education, both secular and religious, and the distribution of income. 
I develop a simple theoretical model of private school demand where I show 
that private school demand is positively related to mean income levels as well 
as to mean-preserving increases in income inequality. Religious preferences for 
private schooling dampen the effect of mean-preserving spreads on demand. 
Furthermore, it follows from the model that mean income levels are lower in the 
religious relative to the secular private sector, even if the income distributions 
of secular and religious individuals are identical.
11
To test the predictions of the model, I estimate a count data model of the 
location of secular and religious (Muslim and Jewish) private schools, based 
on a unique dataset composed of micro level English school and income data, 
and of Census data. The results are consistent with the theoretical model: I 
find that private schools in general locate in areas with high income levels, 
high income inequality and low spending per pupil in state schools. However, 
religious schools locate where the fraction of the relevant religious individuals 
is high and where the religious individuals are relatively poor.
Next, Chapter 3 investigates the relationship between the demand for pri­
vate education and local state school quality, and how this varies with house­
hold income and preferences for education. As opposed to chapter 2 where I 
modeled private school demand as a discrete choice, I here let the choice be 
continuous and argue that this has important implications for the interaction 
between the public and private sector. The main features of the theoretical 
model are as follows: Households simultaneously choose residential location 
and educational quality. Local state school quality is determined by residen­
tial location and is cheaper per unit than private education, yet there are limits 
on the maximal quality levels available in the public sector. Households may 
divide their consumption of education between the public and private sectors, 
but they cannot relocate. In this context, we may find either a positive or 
a negative correlation between private school demand and local state school 
quality in a cross-section of households, depending on the distribution of in­
come. To test the model’s predictions, I construct a unique data set from 
14 years of British Social Attitudes Survey data on household characteristics 
matched to disaggregated school, house price and census data. Empirically, 
I measure state school quality by pupil performance on standardized tests. 
Consistent with the theoretical predictions, I find robust empirical evidence 
that the association between state school quality and private school demand
12
declines in household income such that it is positive at lower income levels and 
negative at higher income levels.
Finally, chapter 4 explores the relationship between religion, political alle­
giance and private schooling choices based on English survey data. Controlling 
for detailed household covariates, I find strong and robust associations. The 
relationship between religion and private education varies considerably across 
religious groups, and is strongest for non-mainstream denominations (Roman 
Catholic, Muslim, Hindu and Jewish). However, the greater demand for pri­
vate education among non-Christians does not appear to be driven primarily 
by religious motives but rather by stronger preferences for education. Coupled 
to the findings of Chapter 2, it appears that members of minority non-Christian 
religious denominations are segmented into low income members who are at­
tracted by own-religious private education, while richer members are attracted 
to secular private education. I also find evidence that political beliefs and 
allegiance affects private schooling decisions. Stating support for the Con­
servative party which views private education favorably is associated with a 
significantly higher propensity to choose private education. The converse holds 
for individuals who support the Labour party which takes a very critical stance 
towards private education. Furthermore, the association of private schooling 
with religion and political allegiance significantly strengthens in the intensity 
of religious beliefs (frequency of attending religious services, prayer, self-rated 
degree of religiosity or belief in God) and political allegiance (the degree of 
identification expressed with a political party), respectively. While further re­
search is required to make a stronger case that the statistical relations observed 
are causal, the results suggest that religion and political beliefs play important 
roles in non-trivial economic decisions.
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Chapter 2
Incom e Inequality and the  
D em and for Secular and 
Religious Private Education. 
Theory and Evidence from  
England
2.1 Introduction
In most countries, despite heavily subsidized or free public provision of edu­
cation, the private school sector is substantial. Individuals typically choose to 
pay for private education because they can get education of a higher quality or 
of a different type (for instance religious) than is available in the public sector.
Consumption in the private school sector may be desirable if the private 
sector is more efficient, or if the resulting competitive pressure on state schools 
enhances overall academic performance. From a redistributive perspective, to 
the extent private sector consumption by high-income individuals frees up re­
sources in the public sector, it may imply that universal public sector provision 
of education is effectively targeted to low-income individuals1. On the other
1 Altonji, Elder and Taber (2002a, b) find no strong evidence that religious private schools 
are more effective than secular state schools. Gibbons and Silva (2006) come to the same 
conclusion regarding state aided faith schools in England. The point of view that schools 
compete on quality and competition is beneficial for overall academic performance is ad­
vocated in Hoxby (1994, 2000, 2002), while it is questioned in Hastings, Kane and Steiger
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hand, if peer effects m atter for educational outcomes2 and private schools a t­
tract the most able and motivated pupils and teachers, private education may 
also have negative implications for the public sector. Finally, there is a sep­
arate set of concerns relating to the role of religious private schools. This is 
especially true of those affiliated with religious minority groups with beliefs 
and norms that in some cases conflict with those of the wider society, such 
as Muslims3 and conservative Christian denominations, which have relatively 
poor academic outcomes and are also the fastest growing private school sectors 
in England and the US, respectively4. It is therefore of interest to understand 
what determines private school entry and to what extent religious schools are 
different from other schools.
In this paper, I focus on the relationship between private school demand 
and the distribution of income. I develop a simple model of private school 
demand. Parents choose education for academic and, in the case of religious 
individuals, for non-academic reasons. Academic quality beyond a fixed public 
sector level and satisfaction of preferences for religious schooling can only be 
obtained, at a cost, in the private sector5. I investigate how private school
(2005), Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) and Rothstein (2005). The latter argument is made in 
Besley and Coate (1991).
2See e.g. Altonji, Taber and Huang (2004), Hsieh and Urquiola (2006), Gibbons, Steve 
and Shqiponje Telhaj (2006).
3 See The Economist January 20th 2005 and August 11th 2005.
4Author’s own analysis of English school data (see Figures 2.2-2.3), and the National 
Center for Education Statistics (2006) for the US. However, Muslim and conservative Chris­
tian schools also charge much lower fees than other private schools. There is no conclusive 
evidence on whether religious schools perform better or worse than other schools once selec­
tion and differences in resources is taken into account. On Catholic schools, see also Altonji 
et al (2002).
5 Examples of such non-academic reasons to choose private education first and foremost 
include religion. Religious schools constitute more than half of private schools in England, 
though not all are "truly religious". As will be argued below, I consider Muslim and Jew­
ish schools to be "truly" religious. Non-academic aspects of education are arguably also 
important motives when choosing schools that teach according to particular pedagogical 
philosophies such as Steiner, Montessori or Waldorf schools, international schools or schools 
that cater to particular expatriate communities using native language teachers. These lat­
ter schools types, along with Muslim and Jewish schools, are among the fastest growing in 
England, in terms of both school and pupil numbers.
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demand is affected by income inequality, and how this effect differs between 
secular and religious private education.
The three main findings of this paper are: First, private school demand is 
positively related to mean-preserving increases in income inequality. Second, 
religious preferences for private schooling reduce the effect of mean-preserving 
income spreads on private school demand. Third, mean income levels are 
lower in religious relative to secular private schools. The intuition is as fol­
lows: There exists a minimum income threshold that induces private sector 
consumption. When inequality rises, holding mean income constant, the frac­
tion of the population with income above this threshold rises if the threshold 
is sufficiently high (or private school demand sufficiently low). The marginal 
effect on private school demand of increasing inequality increases in the thresh­
old value (up to a point). Since there is an additional motive for private sector 
consumption for religious individuals, the secular income cutoff is higher for 
secular than for religious individuals. As a consequence, the marginal effect of 
increasing inequality is generally higher for secular than for religious private 
school demand. Furthermore, it follows that mean income levels are lower in 
the religious relative to the secular private sector.
To test the models predictions, I use the statistical model of count data 
developed by Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984) and Cameron and Trivedi 
(1986). Following the approach of Downes and Greenstein (1996), I investigate 
the relationship between the number of private schools in a small geographic 
area and the characteristics of schools and of the population in that area. 
Specifically, I investigate the location choices of secular and religious (Muslim 
and Jewish) English private schools at the postcode district level (on average 
95.000 inhabitants), based on a rich data set composed of micro level school 
and income data, and of Census data. Consistent with the model, I find that 
private schools in general locate in areas with high income levels, high income
16
inequality and low spending per pupil in state schools. This does not hold for 
religious schools. In particular, religious schools locate where the fraction of 
the relevant religious individuals is high and where the religious individuals 
are relatively poor.
There is sizeable literature modelling individuals’ choice between consum­
ing publicly provided private goods, such as education, in the public or private 
sector. A few examples are Stiglitz (1974), Besley and Coate (1991) and Epple 
and Romano (1996, 1998). My model most closely resembles that of Besley 
and Coate. This is a discrete choice model between free, publicly financed 
public sector consumption and private sector consumption where individuals 
can get their desired quality level at a cost. They focus on public sector quality 
levels that only induce the poor to consume in the public sector. I extend this 
model by introducing a continuous income distribution. This feature of the 
model makes it feasible to meaningfully explore the implications for private 
school demand, and the composition of demand, of changes to the income dis­
tribution. In addition, I add religious preferences for private education. With 
a few exceptions like Besley and Ghatak (2005), Dixit (2002) and Kremer 
and Sarychev (1998), the existing theoretical literature on education does not 
consider individuals’ preferences for other attributes of education than pure 
academic quality or academic achievement. The two former posit that worker 
motivation economizes on the need for explicit monetary incentives to elicit 
effort, while the latter is concerned with the costs of ideological and cultural 
segregation. The present paper does not consider these issues.
There is only a very small related empirical literature on private school 
location which basically consists of Downes and Greenstein (1996, 2002) who 
analyze location determinants of incumbent and new private schools, respec­
tively, in California 1978-796. While my results on private school demand are
6There also exists a small literature on charter schools. Glomm, Harris and Lo (2001) and
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largely consistent with their findings, this paper is an improvement and exten­
sion of the existing literature in this area. The data employed in this paper is 
considerably richer that employed in previous studies. This is particularly true 
of the quality and level of disaggregation of the data on income, religion and 
qualifications and labour market activity split up according to religion. More­
over, there is comprehensive data on private schools, from which the entry and 
exit, size and academic performance of both secular and religious schools can 
be identified with a high degree of reliability over a period of 11 years, which 
is also unparalleled.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces 
the model. Section 2.3 provides background information and describes the 
data. Section 2.4 presents the empirical approach to testing the predictions of 
the model. Section 2.5 discusses the empirical results. Section 2.6 reviews the 
robustness of the results. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 The M odel
In this section, I develop a simple theoretical model of demand for private 
education. There are two goods, a continuous income distribution, and re­
ligious and secular individuals facing a discrete choice between public sector 
consumption and secular or religious private education.
2.2.1 Set-up
For now, I shall ignore the distinction between secular and religious educa­
tion which will be introduced in section (2.2.3) below. Consider an economy 
with two goods, a numeraire x  and an indivisible good, education, of which
Mirikitani (2003) study charter school entry in Michigan and California in 1998 (regressing 
on school market characteristics in 1992), and in Texas 1996-2001, respectively. Filer and 
Munich (2001) study new choice-based schools in the Czech Republic.
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all individuals consume one unit. However, education is available at different 
levels of "quality" denoted by q. I am agnostic about what constitutes "school 
quality". Beyond assuming "school quality" to be a normal good, I make no 
assumptions regarding educational production functions, including how and 
why "school quality" matters for households7. I assume that income is con­
tinuously distributed with finite support between [$/, y] . In the public sector 
tax-financed education of a fixed quality level qg is provided free of charge, 
whereas individuals can consume education at their desired quality level q* in 
the private sector at a cost. Producers are assumed behave competitively and 
the market price of one unit of quality q is pq.
P references: Individuals have identical Cobb-Douglas preferences over 
educational quality, q, and other goods x  :
u (q, x ) =  qQx 1 Q (2.1)
2.2.2 Private School Dem and
Conditional on consuming in the private sector, solving for q* yields The 
utility of individuals with income y is thus maximized by consuming in the 
public sector if q^y1-0 exceeds yp~a4>, where 'ip = a  (1 — ct)1-Q. If there exists 
a value of income y G [y,y] at which an individual is indifferent between 
purchasing private education and using the public sector, then all individuals
7School quality might relate to spending per pupil or peer composition. The importance 
of school quality along these dimensions might relate concretely to performance in school, 
or on education or earnings later in life. Per pupil spending or a certain peer composition 
might also be valued by parents in its own right, even if it produces no tangible outcomes. 
It is further conceivable that "school quality" matters differentially for different households 
depending on the ability of their children. The relationship between private education 
investment decisions related to a child’s ability. Parents might feel that a child of high 
ability will do well almost regardless of the education it receives. On the other hand, it 
might also be that parents with particularly gifted children feel that there is a higher payoff 
to providing them with a superior quality of education. For instance, Gibbons and Telhaj
(2006) find evidence that higher-ability pupils gain more (in terms of test scores) from high- 
ability peers than do low-ability pupils.
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with income above
y =  qgp'ij) “ (2 .2)
demand private education8. This result says that we expect selection into 
private education by income. It is driven by the quality of education being 
a normal good while the quality of public provision is fixed. Furthermore, a 
lower quality level in the public sector qg encourages private school demand.
2.2.3 Private School Dem and and Income Inequality
Consider the impact on overall private school demand of a mean-preserving 
spread of income. Suppose income is distributed according to the Pareto dis­
tribution with shape parameter 7 > 1 and scale parameter k . Private school 
demand, the proportion of individuals consuming in the private sector, is then 
given by:
D{qg,p-,S) = P (  y > y) =  (2.3)
for y , y  > k, > 0, where 5 =  (a, 7 , k). The shape parameter 7 is an inverse 
measure of the mean value of and dispersion income for 7 > l 9. A mean-
preserving spread of income can then be represented by a decrease in 7 subject
to mean income y = remaining constant. Substituting the scale parameter 
k, as a function of y into D  (qg,p ; 6) yields
( h V f T  < 2 i >
On this basis, I derive the following result on income inequality and private
8 This result holds if the utility given private sector consumption is increasing faster in y 
than given public sector consumption. Differentiating utility in each case, we have that this 
is true if a  > 0.
9For 7  <  1 , the expected value is infinite.
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school demand.
—i  1P roposition  2.1 I f  qgp > kiJj “e ^ 1, then a mean-preserving spread of in­
come increases private school demand.
Proof. See Appendix.
This result says that, as long as private school demand is sufficiently small, 
or equivalently the income threshold is sufficiently high, the following is true: 
When income inequality increases, holding mean income constant, there is an 
increase in the fraction of individuals with income above y, and a decrease 
in the fraction of individuals with income below y. Hence, a mean-preserving 
spread increases private school demand.
Note that the assumption of Proposition 1 requires the income cutoff to be 
greater than mean income y =  since e ~  > ^zy10. Barring extreme initial 
levels of income inequality, y > n e ^  means that less than 5 — 30 percent of the 
population consume in the private sector11. In practice, 7 percent of English 
pupils attend private school.
To illustrate this graphically, Figure 2.1 depicts private school demand, 
P  (y > y)i as a function of the income threshold y at two different degrees 
of inequality, but with the same level of mean income y = 3. When income 
inequality increases, holding mean income constant, there is an increase in the 
fraction of individuals with income above the intersection between the light 
and dark curves, and a decrease in the fraction of individuals with income 
below that intersection.
Finally, this result can be related to leading inequality measures such as
the Gini, which I use in the empirical analysis. Given the Pareto distribution,
10However, t t e ~  converges to as income inequality decreases, or 7  increases. In the 
limit, when 7  —> 00, both expressions are equal to k, the scale parameter
n If 7  =  1.5 and 3, respectively, the equivalent values of private school demand D  (y; 7 ,y)  
with y >  are 5 and 22 percent.
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as well as generalizations of the Pareto, such as the Singh-Maddala12, mean- 
preserving spreads imply increases to the Gini coefficient, and thus income 
inequality, except for implausible parameter values (see online appendix). I 
now consider how overall demand for private education can affect the magni­
tude of the impact of a mean-preserving spread.
_i 7 + -brP roposition  2.2 I f  qgp < if — > then the effect of a mean-preserving
spread of income on private school demand increases in the income threshold
y-
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 says that there is a monotonic increase in the impact of a 
mean-preserving income spread on private school demand as the threshold
_  1 + -Lt
increases (and thus demand decreases), up until a point y = £— 13 after
which it declines, though the impact remains positive14.
2.2.4 Religious versus Secular Education
Now consider the existence of two groups of individual types, secular (s) and 
religious (r). Individual types are distributed independently of income, but 
religious individuals obtain additional utility if they consume religious educa­
tion. It is only possible to do so in the private sector, where, independent of 
academic quality, there exists two types j  of education, secular and religious.
The possibility of obtaining religious education thus provides an additional
12. While the Pareto is only a rough approximation of actual income distributions, the 
Singh-Maddala (also known as Burr XII) generally outperforms other prevalent income 
distributions, see Kleiber and Kotz (2003: 209).
^  J .  -j— i - j .
13Note y <  ——-—  is a sufficient, but not necessary condition for for Proposition 2 to 
hold.
14y <  — means that more than 5 — 10 percent of the population consume in the
private sector, with the fraction increasing in 7 , that is, income equality.
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motive for private sector consumption for religious individuals. In accordance, 
the basic utility function may be extended as follows:
u (q, 9, x ) =  (9q)a x l~a (2.5)
where 9 is a match specific component of utility wThere 9 = R >  l i i i  = j  = r , 
tha t is if religious individuals get religious education, and 9 = 1 otherwise. For 
simplicity suppose that, conditional on quality, secular and religious education 
is equally costly to produce. The respective thresholds in the secular and 
religious sectors are:
Vs = q9P&“ and yr =  < %
Secular and religious private school demand, the proportion of each type 
consuming in the private sector, is then equal to
where 9S = 1 and 9r = R~l . That is, religious private school demand is 
higher than secular private school demand, or Dr > D s.
Corollaries 1 and 2 follow from the religious income threshold that induces 
private sector consumption being lower than the equivalent secular threshold, 
yr < y si and, in the case of Corollary 1, from Proposition 3:
1  7 + -F rC o ro lla ry  2.1 I f  qgP'tp ° <  ^— , a mean-preserving spread of income in­
creases private school demand by more in the secular than in the religious 
private school sector
Note that it is possible that a mean-preserving spread increases secular 
private school demand while reducing religious private school demand if yr
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A  =
and ys lie on opposite sides of y =  ne-*-1.
C o ro lla ry  2.2 Mean income is lower in the private religious sector than in 
the private secular sector.
This implies that we should expect a less positive correlation of school 
location and the income levels of potential private school consumers in the 
case of religious private schools than in the case of secular private schools.
2.2.5 Extension
Suppose that school quality in some (unspecified) way depends on the mean 
income level of consumers. This may be due to peer quality, or due to the fees 
that it is optimal to set which in turn affects quality, but the mechanism is 
immaterial for present purposes. As before, religious and secular individuals 
share the same Pareto income distribution. The mean income level in private 
school sector m is given by 7rm =  E[y\y  G 0 m] where @m is the set of income 
types consuming in sector m. However, if demand for high quality education 
dominates the demand for religious education for high income religious indi­
viduals, the lower mean income levels in religious private schools schools may 
lead the religious individuals with income above some thresholds, say, yr and 
yr to consume public or secular private education, respectively, rather than 
private religious education. Hence, relative to the previous scenario, mean 
income levels in religious private schools further decreases.
To put this formally, equilibrium is then a set of income thresholds:
yliVrVr  and y*s (2.7)
and a corresponding set of mean income levels 7 in each sector m  such 
that:
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(i) tt*t = E  [y\y*r < y  <y*\
(ii) n*s = p ( l - F  ( y ^ j E  y\y > y ^  +  (1 -  p) (1 -  F  (y*a)) E  [y\y > y*s]
(in) *1 = p ( F  ( ft)  E[y\y < f t ] +  F  ($;,$*,?) E  y\y*r < y < yT )
+  (1 -  p)F(y*s)E[y\y  < y*s\
(2 .8 )
where p denotes the fraction of religious individuals in the population, the 
cumulative distribution function of the Pareto distribution is F  (x) =  1— (^) 7, 
and let F  (x , z) denote (F (z ) — F  (x)) and yr = y*s if yr > y*.
An interesting implication of this extension to the model is that if yr and 
yr are relatively low, mean income in the religious sector may be lower than 
the mean income level of the population at large. If additionally p is relatively 
low and yr and ys are relatively high, mean income may also be lower in the 
private religious sector than in the public sector. This is true under the initial 
assumption that the religious and secular income distributions are identical, 
but may also hold if religious individuals are on average richer than secular 
individuals. These outcomes are not possible in the basic version of the model, 
where mean income levels in the religious private school sector always surpass 
mean income levels in the public sector as well as the population average.
I now turn  to investigate whether the theoretical results hold up empirically. 
I start by discussing basic background information and descriptive statistics 
of relevance to studying private education in England, before proceeding to 
confront the predictions of the model with more rigorous empirical analysis.
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2.3 Data, Background Information, and D e­
scriptive Statistics
In this section, I briefly describe the main data sources and provide some 
background information on English private education as well as descriptive 
statistics on the distribution of income, and on religion and socioeconomic 
characteristics of different religious groups in England. The D ata Appendix, 
section 6, provides a more detailed description of the data sources.
2.3.1 Private Schools
The school data stems from the Department of Education and Skills. School 
level data on all, public and private, schools in England is available for the 
period 1993-2005. It is also possible to derive information about religious 
affiliation of private school through this data source.
Roughly 7 percent of English pupils attend private15 schools16. While pri­
vate schools must register with the state Department for Education and Skills 
and comply with some basic regulations17, they are free to set fees and ad­
15Private schools are generally called "independent schools" because of their freedom to 
operate outside of government regulation. I will stick to the term private schools. Indepen­
dent secondary schools are often - somewhat confusingly - called "public schools", though 
this term is primarily used of the older and more prestigious schools, like Winchester, Eton, 
and Harrow.
16Based on data from the Department of Education and Skills, 1996-2006. This data stems 
for the Department of Education and Skills. School level data on all, public and private, 
schools in England is available for the period 1993-2005. See Appendix B for more detailed 
description of the data
In comparison, the equivalent figure is around 4 percent in Scotland, 6 percent in Sweden, 
10 percent in the US, 12 percent in Denmark and 17 percent in France. However, such 
comparisons should be made with caution. In England, private schools receive no state 
funding.
17 The regulations setting out the standards that all independent schools in England must 
satisfy as a condition of registration registration cover the quality of education provided, 
the spiritual, moral, social and cultural development of pupils, the welfare, health and 
safety of pupils, the suitability of proprietors and staff, the premises and accommodation, 
the provision of information and the way in which complaints are handled. See further 
http: /  /  www.legislation.gov.uk/si /  si2003/20031910.htm.
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missions rules18. The overall fraction of pupils in private education has been 
very stable over the past decade (see Figure 2.2, panel 2). There is, however, 
a great deal of regional variation: Only 3 percent of pupils in the North East 
attend private schools as opposed to 11 percent in London. Also within Lon­
don there is much variation with some Local Education Authorities (schools 
districts) having 25-50 percent of pupils educated in private schools, while 
the equivalent figure for other areas is 1-3 percent. Private schools in Eng­
land typically have strong academic profiles. While less than 5 percent of all 
schools are registered as selective, roughly 50 percent of private schools select 
on academic ability. In general, private schools substantially outperform state 
schools in terms of achievement on tests taken at age 15/16 where, on average, 
private schools have about 75 percent of their pupils "doing well" (obtaining 
5 or more A*-C grades in GCSE exams19), while this is only true, on average, 
for about 50 percent of pupils in state schools. Many charge fees that make 
them beyond the reach of the typical household. According to Graddy and 
Stevens (2003), the average annual fee for a child in a private secondary school 
is approximately 40% of median disposable income for UK households (20% 
at the 90th percentile).
About 30 percent of private schools are single-sex, with slightly more girls’ 
than boys’ schools, and 25 percent are boarding schools. As to their location, 
three quarters locate in areas which are designated as urban. In terms of
18By contrast, in Sweden, since a major reform in the early 1990s, private schools are 
funded by the state, cannot charge additional fees and cannot select pupils on any other 
basis than first-come-first-served. Denmark and the Netherlands each have more than a 
century a long history of subsidizing private schools while interfering very little in the way 
they are run. In France, many nominally private schools are Catholic, heavily subsidized by 
the government, while a large proportion of their English counterparts axe counted as part 
of the state aided sector. In America privately run schools can increasingly get state finance 
through vouchers or by registering as charter schools, but there are constitutional barriers 
to state financing of religious schools.
19 GCSE stands for General Certificate of Education and is normally taken in Year 11 
(15/16 years). In addition, children sit National Curriculum tests at 7, 11 and 14, the so- 
called key stage 1, 2 and 3, as well as public examinations at 18, the A-levels. Only GCSE 
and A-level data is available for private schools.
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school size, private schools on average have 285 pupils in 2005 (17 percent 
have less than 50 pupils). The average age range is from 5.5 to 14 years. 
While the numbers of private schools in operation are virtually constant over 
the past 11 years, there is a fair amount of turn over: Schools open less than 
5 years constitute 11 percent of all private schools. In many respects, the 
characteristics of these "new" private schools are quite different from the older 
schools. New schools are more likely to be affiliated with religious minorities. 
They are smaller, much less likely to be boarding schools, and more likely to 
locate in urban areas. New schools perform much worse than older schools - on 
average, only a third as many pupils do well in new schools 20. This suggests 
tha t the nature of schools entering the market might be changing over time, 
and that bad and unsuccessful schools exit, while good ones stay, but also that 
schools only gradually "mature" in terms of growing in size and improving 
their performance.
2.3.2 Religious Private Schools
I focus on Muslim and Jewish schools as examples of genuinely religious schools. 
There are several reasons for this: Although around 50 percent of private 
schools in England are nominally religious, in many cases, they are so primarily 
for historical reasons, generally do not pursue religious indoctrination of pupils
20In the the following, I report 2005 figures for schools open 5 years or less ("new schools") 
with equivalent figures for private schools open 5 years or more ("old schools") in parenthesis:
21 (31) percent single-sex, 4 (28) percent boarding schools, 84 (73) in urban areas, lowest 
age 9.2 (4.9), 5 or more A*-C GCSE grades 27 (77), 74 (9) percent "small" (<50 pupils), 
9 (88) percent "big" (>100 pupils). The admission procedures of almost 55 percent of new 
schools is indicated as unknown, while this is not the case for any schools more than 5 years 
old. This may mask some differences in this respect as well.
A negative correlation between private school performance, on the one hand, and school 
age and size, on the other hand, is also present if one considers only schools in existence over 
longer time periods and compares their characteristics in the early period and in the later 
period. Controlling for various other characteristics, school age and size retain a significantly 
negative impact on school performance in OLS regressions.
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and do not preclude pupils of other faiths attending if they wish21. Religious 
schools set up by minority groups, especially in recent years, are more likely 
to be genuinely religious. Aside from Christian sub-denominations, Muslims 
and Jews are the only minority groups with a non-negligible share of private 
schooling. Muslims and Jews accounting for 5.2 and 2.6 percent of all private 
schools, respectively. By contrast, Buddhist, Hindu and Sikh schools all to­
gether make up around 0.2 percent of private schools22. Second, to the extent 
that religious affiliation is not 100 percent reliably identified in the data, Mus­
lim and Jewish schools are easier to spot, since almost 90% of these schools 
have uniquely “Muslim” or “Jewish” name components and can therefore be 
identified as being Muslim or Jewish simply from looking at their name (see 
D ata Appendix, section ), whereas many schools have “Christian”-sounding 
names without being religious, or Christian schools have names that do not 
clearly distinguish them from secular schools23. Third, Muslim and Jewish 
schools are special due the fact that the potential customers are fairly well 
identified. While it is common for individuals from other religions or without 
religious orientation to attend, for instance, Catholic schools, it appears un­
likely that non-Muslims or non-Jews would attend Muslim and Jewish schools. 
Information on the specific characteristics of these potential customers, com­
pared to the rest of the population, is available in the 2001 Census where, for 
the first time in England, data is provided split up according to religion. How­
ever, all Christians are lumped together as one group so that, say, separate
21 It has been noted that religion is not as important an aspect in the majority of parents’ 
decision to send their child to an independent school as it is in the United States, due to 
the requirement of state schools to timetable periods of Christian worship, (wikipedia)
22See further Appendix Table A l. According to the 2001 Census, Christians make up 73 
percent of the population, while Muslims and Jews constitute 2.5 and 0.5 percent, respec­
tively. (Buddhists, Hindus and Sikhs together make up 1.6 percent). See further Appendix 
Table A2.
23Moreover, there are around 350 private schools that are "Christian", but not affiliated 
with either the Church of England or the Roman Catholic Church, which may cover a wide 
and unspecified variety of Christian orientations which make it a less well defined group.
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characteristics for Catholics, Methodists and Evangelical Christians cannot be 
identified. Finally, aside from Muslim religious education in particular being 
of topic of high policy relevance in recent years, the Muslim school sector is 
additionally interesting on account of displaying growth rates of the number 
of schools, pupil numbers, and school performance which are unparalleled by 
any other private school sector (see Figures 2.2 and 2.3).
In terms of how Muslims and Jews compare in socioeconomic terms to 
other religious groups, Muslims and Jews are generally better qualified than 
Christians, and the population at large. Jews are somewhat better qualified 
than Muslims. In terms of labour market activity, however, both Muslims 
and Jews are more likely to be economically inactive. Muslims, in particular, 
distinguish themselves by having more than 4 times as large a fraction of 
individuals who have never worked or who are unemployed as the general 
population (Table 2.4).
2.3.3 Income Distribution
In the following, I will make few observations on the distribution of income 
across postcode districts and socioeconomic differences between of members of 
different religious orientations in England of relevance in interpreting results. 
Income data is obtained from the New Earnings Survey, a one percent sample of 
the working population, for the years 2000-2004. Table 2.2 presents summary 
statistics at the level of postcode districts. The income distribution measures 
are computed based on a one percent sample of the working population with 
on average 110 observations per postcode district. On average, the postcode 
district level Gini coefficient is 0.4, ranging from 0.2 to 0.8. Individuals at 
the 75th income percentile earn roughly 3 times as much as those at the 25th 
percentile. The income share of the bottom 40 percent is 15 percent.
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2.4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, I confront the predictions of the model with the estimated 
determinants of the demand for private education. I first study the demand for 
all private education, and then separately investigate the demand for Muslim 
and Jewish private education24. I make the assumption that the idiosyncratic 
preferences 6 regarding non-academic aspects of education (religion) among 
Muslims and Jews are both stronger on average and more dispersed (lower 7 ) 
than  the those of the population at large. I estimate the relationship between, 
on the one hand, the number of private schools25 and, on the other hand, state 
school and population characteristics in postcode districts26. I assume that the 
supply of private education is perfectly elastic. As unit of analysis to measure 
"school markets", I use the postcode district. This is primarily for data reasons, 
since the relevant data is available at this geographical level. Previous work 
suggests that the choice of market definition has little influence on results. For 
instance, Downes and Greenstein (2002) find that characteristics of neighboring 
districts matter, but their influence is small. It appears that the supply of and 
demand for private education primarily responds to very localized conditions. 
Furthermore, it may be that area characteristics on average tend not to change 
much across geographic space. Finally, although English families are allowed to 
apply to schools outside their LEA of residence, only roughly 5 percent of pupils 
in the state sector attend schools outside their home school district (LEA)
241 have argued above in section (2.3.2) why I focus only on Muslim and Jewish schools 
as examples of genuinely religious schools.
25 The number of pupil places might have been used instead of the number of private 
schools. The focus of the empirical analysis was initially on the location patterns of private 
schools and it was not apparent that reliable pupil numbers were availe for private schools. 
This is the reason that the number of schools were used. While school size is highly hetero­
geneous, there are no strong reasons for expecting the explanatory variables to be correlated 
with school size and the results to be biased in any particular direction. However, I will 
complement these results with analyses using pupil numbers instead in forthcoming work.
26Postcode districts contain on average 95,500 individuals, but there is a large variation 
in size with a standard deviation of 78,750.
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(figure based on Gibbons, Machin and Silva, 2006). I exclude special schools 
but have not excluded private boarding schools from the analysis, although 
strictly speaking they should be left out since their pupils may come far away 
from their geographical location27.
2.4.1 Empirical M ethod
Out of a total of 2035 postcode districts, less than half have private schools 
located in them. Of the latter postcode districts, more than half only contain 
one single private school, while a further third of postcode districts contain 
two or three private schools and a final 15 percent contain 4 or more private 
schools. Only 71 and 19 postcode districts contain any Muslim and Jewish 
private schools, respectively (see Table 2.2). Since the dependent variable oc­
curs in non-negative integer amounts, OLS is thus inconsistent. One of the 
methods created to deal with such issues is count data models developed by, 
most notably, Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984) and Cameron and Trivedi 
(1986)28. As argued by Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984), the Poisson distri­
bution is a natural first assumption for phenomena with non-negative integer 
outcomes29. For large enough integers, a continuous approximation often suf­
fices. But for small integers, of which zero is a frequent outcome - as is the case 
in the present data set - a specification tha t models the counting properties of 
the data is preferred. As the probability of small counts is high, the discrete-
27Boarding schools comprise roughly 25 percent of private schools. They will be excluded 
in future work.
28Previously, the "zero value" problem has been tackled by choosing observations so as 
to minimise the number of observations with zero value, and by setting zeroes to one and 
adding a dummy variable to allow the equation to choose implicitly another value between 
zero and one (Hausman, Hall and Griliches; 1984).
29The Poisson distribution is the approximate distribution of the number of ones from 
a large number of Bernouilli trials, each with a small probability of one and it is often a 
reasonable description for events which occur both "randomly and independently" in time. 
Although the independence assumption may be challenged for school entry, I will assume 
that this does not fundamentally compromise the approach.
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ness of the probability distribution is an important feature. Moreover, count 
data axe distinct from general ordered discrete data in the sense that counts 
have cardinal meaning and their conditional mean holds interest30. Denote 
77a  as the observed event count for unit i during the time period t. Then the 
basic Poisson specification is pr (nit) = Given the Poisson parameter
A, we have log A =  X(3, where (3 is a parameter vector to be estimated and 
X  is a vector of regressors which describe the characteristics of an observation 
unit in a given time period. Note that while the likelihood is constructed un­
der the Poisson assumption, the resulting estimates are robust with respect to 
distributional mis-specification. The parameters (3 are consistently estimated 
provided that the conditional mean is correctly specified. However, the Poisson 
distribution does not in general fit the data well. In particular, most data are 
characterized by “overdispersion” (the variance to mean ratio increases in the 
Poisson parameter A). The negative binomial, a generalization of the Poisson, 
is the leading alternative.
2.4.2 Baseline Specification
Based on the theoretical model, we expect private school location to be pos­
itively related to mean income levels and to the spread of the income distri­
bution, holding mean income constant (Proposition 1). For religious schools, 
assuming lower 7 , the model predicts that location is less strongly related 
to income inequality than is the case for secular schools (Corollary 1). The 
model further predicts that religious schools locate in poorer areas than secular 
schools (Corollary 2)31. Finally, the model predicts private school location to
30 Authors usually motivate this probability mass function as a limit of the binomial prob­
ability mass function rather than from a latent regression model such as the ordered prob­
ability model (see Ruud, 2000: 761).
31 That is, religious individuals consuming private education are relatively poorer than 
secular individuals consuming private education.
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be negatively related to state school quality (per pupil spending).
To investigate the relationship between the number of private schools and 
school and population characteristics in postcode districts, I estimate the fol­
lowing count data model32:
Njj =  /3Xi 4- oij +  €jj (2*9)
where iVy is the count of some type of private schools (secular or religious) in 
neighborhood (postcode district) i and region j .  X  is a vector of school and 
population characteristics in area i (averaged over the period for which I have 
data  for each particular variable)33.
In the baseline specification, X  includes measures of mean income (the frac­
tion of households with higher level qualifications34), the spread of the income 
distribution (the Gini coefficient), state school quality (per pupil spending), 
market size (log pupil numbers in postcode district). <£■ are regional fixed ef­
fects35 and €ij is the error term. In regressions of Muslim and Jewish private 
schools, I also include controls for the fraction of population that belongs to 
the corresponding religion, and population characteristics for households be­
longing to that particular religious orientation rather than general population 
characteristics. The characteristics of the population not belonging to the reli­
gion in question should not m atter since they are not potential customers36. I 
investigate the robustness of the reported results to the use of other available
measures of these variables and the inclusion of additional variables in section
32 Since I do not exploit time variation, I omit time subscripts.
33 All variables are averaged at the postcode district level, except per pupil spending which 
is only available at the school district/LEA level. See further Data Appendix, section 6 on 
the data employed and construction of variables.
34 This proxy turns out to dominate the direct measure of mean income as measured by 
the NES data (based on a 1 percent sample of the population) in regressions.
35Regions include: East Midlands (omitted), East of England, London, North East, North 
West, South East, South West, West Midlands, Yorkshire and The Humber.
36 Unless differences in peer composition in the different sectors matters for parental choice.
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(2.6).
2.5 Results
The results presented below are based on the negative binomial distributional 
regressions, but Poisson regressions give very similar results37.
2.5.1 Location D eterm inants of all Private Schools ver­
sus Religious Private Schools
Table 2.5, column (1) presents results for all private schools. Consistent with 
the model, I find that, as a whole, private schools are significantly more likely 
to locate where mean income (as measured by the percentage of the population 
with higher level qualifications), and income inequality (as measured by the 
Gini coefficient), controlling for mean income, are relatively high, and where 
state school quality (as measured by spending per pupil) is relatively low. The 
coefficients on the income variables are highly significant 38. The interpretation 
of the coefficient on per pupil spending is not entirely straightforward since 
spending is in part determined on the basis of the level of disadvantage of 
an area. As such the negative coefficient may also be reflecting that private 
schools tend to locate where there are few disadvantaged pupils, that is in 
more affluent areas.
Columns (2)-(3) display results for Muslim schools39, (4)-(5) for Jewish
37The independence assumption inherent in count data approach might be problematic 
since the entry of a new school may not be independent of how many schools have already 
entered. I have tried a variety of other distributional assumptions than the negative binomial 
such as Poisson, ordered probit, simple logit/probit (whether schools in area or not). The 
results are largely unchanged.
38 Spending is indeed positively correlated with the percentage of pupils in state schools 
with special educational needs (0.24), eligible for free school meals (0.48), who are non-white 
(0.56) and who have English as additional language (.65). At the same time, spending is 
also correlated with the percentage of individuals with high level qualifications (0.57).
39This includes both private and “voluntary aided” (VA) Muslim schools. There are only
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schools. The location determinants of Muslim and Jewish private schools re­
semble each other quite closely and in addition differ markedly from those other 
private schools. Muslim and Jewish schools are less likely to locate where there 
is a relatively high fraction of highly qualified individuals belonging to the re­
ligion in question, i.e. of the type that are potential customers at these schools 
(columns (3) and (5)). This is true although the coefficients on the percent 
of the general population with higher qualifications is positive and significant 
(columns (2) and (4)). This underscores the importance of the availability of 
data specific to the religious group in question, which has not been available in 
other studies. The negative coefficient on mean income/qualifications is com­
patible with the extension to the basic version of the model, which suggests 
that the initial discrepancy in mean income levels in the religious and secular 
private school sector will deter the richest religious individuals from attending 
religious private education, thus further decreasing mean income levels in the 
private religious sector, possibly below mean income levels of the population at 
large40. In addition, as opposed to the results for all private schools, the coeffi­
cient on income inequality is insignificant. This is consistent with the model’s 
prediction that the demand for religious private education is less sensitive to 
income inequality than private schools at large.
Finally, there is a significant, positive coefficient on per pupil spending. 
Again, this finding may reflect that Muslim and Jewish schools tend to locate 
where there are high levels of disadvantage which result in higher per pupil
4 VA Muslim schools, and these are all former private Muslim schools which have recently 
achieved VA status.
40This finding is consistent with Iannacone’s (1998) argument that religious communities 
tend to have a stigma attached to prevent free-riding which make them attractive only to 
lower income individuals with poor outside options. This interpretation also reconciles these 
findings with those in Munk (2007b). Using survey data, I find that Muslims and Jews are 
more likely to use private education at higher income levels. However, I cannot distinguish 
between religious and secular private education. It appears quite plausible that Muslims and 
Jews’ high demand for private education at the higher income levels is for secular, rather 
than Muslim or Jewish private education.
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spending to compensate for this. Finally, the Muslim and Jewish shares, re­
spectively, of the population are very important predictors of school location, 
confirming that such private target (or attract) a well defined segment of the 
population.
2.6 Robustness Checks
In this section I review the robustness of the above results to various concerns.
2.6.1 Employed M easures of Variables 
Incom e Inequality
Table 2.6 presents results using a variety of different measures of income in­
equality: standard deviation of logs, the Gini coefficient and the ratio of the 
75th and 25t/l income percentiles all calculated at postcode district level using 
NES data. While there concerns regarding the numbers of observations avail­
able to construct the income inequality measures41, it is reassuring that they 
come out strongly significant in almost any specification42. Moreover, various 
other measures of income inequality, both using the same data, and using very 
different data to proxy income inequality (House price data, Nationwide, and 
data from a private consultancy, CACI based on sending out questionnaires 
and extrapolating from Census data), also come out strongly significant in a 
range of different specifications, except the measure based on the CACI data 
is not significant in all specifications.
I have also included log mean income or the percent of the population
41 As mentioned above, on average there are 110 income observations per postcode district 
in the New Earnings Survey (standard deviation: 68). All postcode districts with less than 
10 observations have been dropped.
42 Due to lack of data (or sufficiently reliable data) in some postcode sectors, there are 
only 1955 postcode sectors in the regression, rather than the 2035 postcode sectors in which 
there are schools.
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earning more than a specific earnings threshold (£40,000 which is above 10th 
income percentile overall), but these are highly correlated with the percentage 
of highly educated individuals (a correlation coefficient of.68 for both log pay 
and fraction earning above 40K).
To accommodate concerns regarding the reliability of the income measures, 
1 have run the regression using only postcode districts in which there were more 
than 50 income observations from which to construct the inequality indices. 
This reduces the sample size from 1955 to 1555, but the results are largely 
unchanged.
School Quality
As mentioned above, there are qualifications regarding viewing per pupil spend­
ing as a measure of state school quality. Table 2.7 reports results using various 
alternative measures of state school quality.
In columns (3)-(5), I include measures of pupil performance in state schools 
at GCSE level (age 15). Column (3) reports results including a measure of the 
fraction of pupils achieving 5 or more good results in these exams, whereas 
columns (4)-(5) look at the fraction of pupils achieving no passes, in column 
(4) averaged over the period 1996-2004, and in column (5) only for the year 
1996 to partially accommodate endogeneity concerns regarding these variables, 
namely the possibility that the presence of private schools (entering after that 
date) affect state school performance due to competitive pressure.
None of these variables have any significant effect43, although the sign of 
the latter is consistent with the prediction of the model (private schools enter 
where more state school pupils achieve poorly, controlling for income and edu­
cation characteristics). Columns (6)-(7) shows results using another commonly
43When both the fraction of high and low achieving pupils are included, the effect is 
significant owing to collinearity.
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used measure of school quality, the pupil-teacher ratio, with and without con­
trolling for spending (correlation with spending -.24). In both regressions, the 
coefficient on the pupil-teacher ratio comes out with the opposite sign to what 
would be predicted. That is, fewer pupils per teacher (normally seen as en­
hancing school quality, all else equal) is associated with a higher probability 
of private schools locating in an area. This may be because, in an attem pt 
to compensate for disadvantage, low pupil-teacher ratios in England are asso­
ciated with bad neighborhoods44. Nevertheless, this result is a bit puzzling. 
Finally, I add two measures of local area disadvantage, pupils with special edu­
cational needs and pupils eligible for free school meals, in addition to per pupil 
spending, in columns (8)-(9). These may be thought of as adversely affecting 
state school quality. Neither of these is significant, although the latter has the 
predicted sign45.
Finally, I split up the data into postcode districts that are located in 
metropolitan areas (London, Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, Bradford, Leices­
ter and Liverpool) versus those that are not in (11)-(12). While all other 
coefficients barely change, the coefficients on the spending variable become in­
significant. The fact that it becomes positive in non-metropolitan areas might 
suggest tha t private schools compete less on quality with state schools in areas 
with poorer infrastructure.
2.6.2 T iebout Bias
A further concern in interpreting the results is the possibility of reverse cau­
sation. In particular, the results may not only reflect that private schools 
seek out particular population characteristics when making their location de-
44However, this does not obviously appear from the correlation table.
45 Pupils eligible for free school meals is essentially another measure of mean income of an 
area and as such already captured by log mean income and the fraction of the population 
with high qualifications.
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cisions, but also that households may move to locate near to particular private 
schools. In the case of secular private schools, this may be more likely to oc­
cur in non-metropolitan areas with a limited supply of private schools than in 
metropolitan areas with a larger supply of both public and private schooling 
within relatively short travel time. Table 2.6, columns (11) and (12), suggest 
that only the coefficient on per pupil spending differs between metropolitan 
and non-metropolitan areas. If Tiebout bias was a big issue, we might have 
expected bigger differences in these results. It might also be plausible that 
religious individuals move to particular areas in part to attend Muslim and 
Jewish schools. Table 2.2 indicates the geographically very concentrated na­
ture of particularly Jewish private schooling. Almost half out of the 53 Jewish 
private schools are located in just two postcode districts. Unfortunately, there 
is no available data which would allow investigating whether population move­
ments have occurred before after the entry of private schools46. However, while 
schools may be important features of religious communities, it appears more 
plausible that they follow, rather than precede, community formation.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper studies the relationship between the demand for private education, 
both secular and religious, and the distribution of income. I develop a simple 
theoretical model of private school demand, where I show that private school 
demand is positively related to mean-preserving increases in income inequality 
and that religious preferences for private schooling dampen the effect of mean- 
preserving spreads on demand. Furthermore, it follows from the model that 
mean income levels are lower in the religious relative to the secular private
46 UK population censuses are released every ten years. This paper uses the 2001 Census 
which was the first to contain information on religion. The 1991 Census contains information 
on ethnicity, but not religion.
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sector.
To test the predictions of the model, I estimate a count data model of the 
location of secular and religious (Muslim and Jewish) English private schools, 
based on a unique dataset composed of micro level school and income data, 
and of Census data. I obtain results that are consistent with the theoretical 
model. In particular, I find that private schools in general locate in areas with 
high income levels, high income inequality and low spending per pupil in state 
schools. This does not hold for religious schools. In particular, religious schools 
locate where the fraction of the relevant religious individuals is high and where 
the religious individuals are relatively poor. It thus seems that - as opposed 
to secular private schools - religious private schools tend to attract relatively 
poor members of their own religions while wealthier religious individuals prefer 
secular private schools. Possible policy implications of these finding include 
that relatively poor religious individuals are likely to benefit if such schools 
are subsidized by the state. However, subsidies may encourage even poorer 
religious individuals to attend them and further deter wealthier religious in­
dividuals. As such they may be likely to encourage segregation among poor 
and less educated members of religious minority groups. It remains for future 
research to study whether or not such schools improve the educational and 
socioeconomic outcomes of such religious minorities.
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2.8 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 . The marginal impact on private school demand of 
reducing the dispersion of the income distribution (increasing 7 ) while holding 
mean income constant is given by
d_
<97
D'(qg,p-,S) = A-» — In A
. 7 - 1
(2 .10)
where A =  7  m *! — = £ > 1 (since the distribution is only defined for
( 7 - I )  y  k  V J
y > k). The marginal effect of increasing 7 is therefore zero at at level of private 
school demand given by all income levels greater than y' = j y  : -j^D ' (qg,p; 6) = 0 j 
n e ~  with D' (?/'; 5) = (qg,p ; 6) < 0 follows from second-order sto­
chastic dominance with single crossing47■
Proof of Proposition 2 . Now consider the difference in impact on changing 
inequality depending on the income threshold:
d2 1 /  /  1
D ' (qg,p;  <5)  = ----------------t —  I  1 +  7  (  - — 7  —  I n  A
qnpw<* A' \  \ 7  1d j d y  g i p ^ X 1
For 7 > 1> D'(qg,p\S ) > 0 if A =  \  and ^ D ' { q g,p;8) <  0
otherwise. ■
47If F  (•, r i ) , or F  (•, ri) is a mean-preserving spread of F  (•, r2 ) , Vri < 7*2 and the c.d.fs 
cross more than once, or are partly overlapping, there may be a number of intervals where 
^ F \y  <  0 and where -§pF\y >  0. -§pF\y <  0 for all y G (0, 2/*].
If there exists a unique y* — {y  '■ -§pF\y =  0}, then -§^F\y <  0 for all y <  y* and -§^F\y >  0 
for all y >  y*
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Figure 2.1: Demand for Private Education. 7=3, n= 1 versus 7=1.5, k,=2
o.i --
0.0
ncome t]
Note: Private school demand is given by D ( y ; j :y) = . The
light curve represents an income distribution with high inequality (low 7 : 
7 = 1.5, k = 1), while the dark curve represents lower inequality (high 7 :
7 =  3 , k =  2).
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Figure 2.2: Evolution o f  Private School and Pupil Numbers, 1995-2005
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Sources: ASC files 1995-2005 (pupil numbers) matched to Edubase 2005 (religious denominations) as well as authors own identification of Muslim and Jewish 
schools for websites and searching for Muslim/Jewish name components in school names.
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Figure 2.3: Average GCSE Performance o f Different Types ofPrivate Schools, 1993-2005
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denominations) as well as authors own identification of Muslim and Jewish schools for websites and searching 
for Muslim/Jewish name components in school names.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics by Postcode District
mean sd min max
Market size
All schools in postcode district 11.5 6.7 1 . 0 50.0
Pupils in postcode district 3,915.3 2,618.0 58.2 18,948.3
Number of private schools in postcode district 0.9 1.5 0 . 0 23.0
Percentage of pupils in private schools 7.4 14.7 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0
Percentage of pupils in private schools (in postcode districts with 13.6 17.7 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0
such schools)
State school characteristics
Percent of pupils achieving more than 5 A*-C GCSEs 45.8 15.4 4.3 99.9
Percent of pupils achieving no GCSE passes 4.8 3.4 0 . 0 2 2 . 0
Pupil teacher ratio 21.7 1 . 6 13.3 36.3
Percentage of pupils with special needs without statements 16.6 4.3 5.0 38.0
Percentage of pupils known to be eligible for free school meals 16.5 1 2 . 1 0 . 2 73.8
Spending pr pupil LEA 1995-2003 (£1000) 3.4 0.5 3.0 10.4
Income variables
Observations pr postcode district 109.9 67.8 1 0 . 0 574.0
Average annual gross pay (£1000) 18.5 7.4 9.7 127.0
Log of average annual gross pay 9.8 0.3 9.2 1 1 . 8
Relative mean deviation 0.3 0 . 1 0 . 1 0.7
Coefficient of variation 0.9 0.4 0.3 8.7
Standard deviation of logs 1 . 0 0 . 2 0.4 2 . 2
Gini coefficient 0.4 0 . 1 0 . 2 0 . 8
75th income percentile (£1000) 23.5 6.5 1 2 . 0 99.6
25th income percentile (£1000) 8 . 2 2 . 2 1.9 27.9
Income share of bottom 40 percent 15.3 2.9 3.6 30.1
Sources: ASC (1996-2004) and Edubase (2003 and 2004) files from Department of Education and Skills (DfES). 
Spending comes from separate files provided by the DfES. New Earnings Survey (NES) from Office of National 
statistics
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Table 2.2: Geographical Dispersion of Different Types of Private Schools
Number of schools in postcode All private
district schools Muslim* Jewish
1 512 49 11
2 225 1 2 2
3 106 7 2
4 76 2
5 32 1
6 15 1
7 1 2 1
8 5
9 2
1 0 2
11 1 1
1 2 1
13 1
14
15
16 1
23 1
Presence in # of postcode 991 71 19
districts (percent) (48.7) (3.5) (0.9)
Percent of schools 1 0 0 5.2 2 . 6
Percent of pupils 1 0 0 2.5 1.9
Total schools 2058 1 1 2 53
Notes: The table includes counts per postcode district and reads: 512 postcode districts 
with one private school located in each of them, 225 with two, etc. Source Edubase 
2004 files with corrections/additions to assigned denominations/types. Total postcode 
districts: 2035. There are 6 Voluntary Aided (state funded) Muslim schools which all 
started as private schools and are therefore included.
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Table 2.3: Pupil Numbers of Different Types of Religious Schools
All Christian Jewish Muslim
Other
Christian*
Buddhist, 
Hindu and 
Sikh
Population Census 73 0.5 2.5 1 . 6
shares BSASt 55.5 0.5 1.3 15.4 0.9
London (Census) 58 2 . 1 8.5
2004 pupils Numbers
Private 549,342 229,898 10,563 13,705 85,661 1,262
Private + "aided"* 1,796,211 1,417,843 23,693 14,851 99,325 1 , 8 8 6
Percent
Private 41.8 1.9 2.5 15.6 0 . 2
Private + "aided" 78.9 1.3 0 . 8 5.5 0 . 1
Census Pupil population share
Private 57.3 384.6 99.8 14.4
Private + "aided" 108.1 263.8 33.1 6 . 6
BSAS Pupil population share
Private 75.4 427.3 189.0 101.3 25.2
Private + "aided" 142.3 293.1 62.6 35.9 11.5
1996 pupils Numbers
Private
Private + "aided"
510,791
1,699,475
221,739
1,363,710
8,303
18,097
6,325
6,510
73,669
85,628
1,004
1,066
Percent
Private
Private + "aided"
43.4
80.2
1 . 6
1 . 1
1 . 2
0.4
14.4
5.0
0 . 2
0 . 1
Census Pupil population share 
Private
Private + "aided"
59.5
109.9
325.1
213.0
49.5
15.3
12.3
3.9
BSAS Pupil population share 
Private
Private + "aided"
78.3
144.7
361.2
236.6
93.8
29.0
93.7
32.7
2 1 . 6
6.9
Sources: Department for Education and Skills Edubase 2004 and ASC files 1996-2004, Census 2001 and British 
Social Attitudes Survey. Notes: "Aided" schools includes Voluntary Aided, Voluntary Controlled and 
Foundation schools. Other Christian includes all non-Roman Catholic and non-Church of England respondents, 
f BSAS figures averaged from 1992-2002.
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Table 2.4: Religious Affiliation, Qualifications and Labour Market Activity
Variable All Christian Muslim Jewish Hindu Sikh Buddist Any other No religi<
Percentage of population 1 0 0 73 2.5 0.5 0 . 8 0.5 0.3 0.3 14.4
0 . 0 (9.7) (5.5) (1.8) (2 .1) (1.8) (0.3) (0 .2) (4.0)
Qualifications
No qualifications 25.3 27.5 24.1 19.2 13.7 2 0 24 18.3 17.5
(5.7) (6 .0) (13.1) (2 0 .0) (15.3) (2 1 .2) (13.3) (9.9) (5.0)
Low qualifications 32.2 31.6 24.7 31.2 26.9 31.4 31.5 41.4 36.8
(3.0) (2 .8) (13.5) (2 0 .6) (20.9) (23.9) (17.4) (1 0.0 ) (4.3)
High qualifications 15.1 13.9 22.3 28.7 40.3 25.9 33.4 29.3 20.7
(7.0) (6.7) (17.5) (22.9) (24.8) (28.9) (15.1) (12.3) (1 0.1)
Labour market activity
Economically active 48.4 47.5 42.9 50.9 55.2 52.1 58.5 59.5 56
(4.4) (4.5) (25.5) (30.9) (25.1) (32.7) (21.3) (14.4) (5.9)
Economically inactive 24.1 25.5 28.5 29.4 24.8 23.7 30.9 29.1 19
(3.8) (4.1) (13.9) (25.2) (2 1.0) (2 1 .6) (19.5) (1 2.1) (4.8)
Never worked or unemployed 2.5 2 10.4 3 5 4.3 5.6 3.5 2 . 8
(1.9) (1.3) (7.4) (8.7) (8.4) (9.1) (6 .1) (4.8) (1.6)
Source: Census 2001. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.5: Location Determinants of Private Schools 
(Dependent variable: Count of private schools in postcode district)
All Religious schools
0 )
Muslim Jewish 
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Percent of population with higher level 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.14**
qualifications [0.01] [0.03] [0.06]
Percent of Muslims/Jews with higher -0.08*** -0.06***
level qualifications [0.02] [0.02]
Percent of population Muslim/Jewish Q|2*** 0.09*** 0.57*** 0.47***
[0.02] [0.01] [0.12] [0.07]
Gini coefficient 2.15*** -1.08 1.31 3.09 5.4
[0.55] [2.75] [3.04] [6.20] [5.17]
Spending pr pupil LEA (£1000) -0.16** 0.29 0.76** 3.37* 2 9 2 **
[0.08] [0.28] [0.32] [1.98] [1.31]
Observations (postcode districts) 1955 1955 1679 1955 1272
Number of schools 2058 112 53
Pseudo R-squared 0.14 0.33 0.32 0.45 0.44
Notes: Negative binomial regression. Robust standard errors in brackets. All regressions include a control for 
market size (the log of all pupils in the postcode district) and regional fixed effects. Regions include: East 
Midlands, East of England, London, North East, North West, South East, South West, West Midlands, 
Yorkshire and The Humber. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. See Appendix B 
for details on data construction.
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Table 2.6: Robustness Checks: Alternative Inequality Measures
Dependent variable: Number of private schools in postcode district____________
0) (2) (T) W) (5) (6) (7)
Standard deviation of logs 
Gini coefficient 
75/25 quantile ratio 
Income share of top 40 percent 
Income share of top 75 percent 
House prices: 75/25 ratio
CACI: ratio of percent of households with income
above 40K to below 1 OK
Observations
Pseudo R-squared___________________
0.34*
[0.19]
1955
0.15
1.35***
[0.47]
1955
0.15
0.09**
[0.04]
1955
0.15
0.04***
[0.01]
1955
0.15
0 .02* * *
[0.01]
1955
0.15
6.84***
[2.40]
1883
0.15
0.04
[0.06]
1915
0.15
Notes: (1) Independent schools (excluding Muslim schools) that are still open; (2) All regressions include full set of controls 
(see Table 2.5) and regional fixed effects. The first 5 measures of income inequality are based on the New Earnings Survey 
data, while the two latter are based on Nationwide house price data and estimated neighborhood income from the CACI 
consultancy based on census data, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. * means significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
51
Table 2.7: Robustness Checks: Alternative School Quality Measures 
(Dependent variable: Count of private schools in postcode sector)
Metropolitan area 
Yes No
O) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (U) (12)
Neighborhood characteristics
Log mean income 0.78*** -0.31* -0.43** -0.39** -0.36** -0.23 -0.25 -0.33* -0 . 2 1 -0 . 2 -0.51 -0 . 2 1
[0.16] [0.17] [0.18] [0.19] [0.19] [0.17] [0.17] [0.17] [0.17] [0.17] [0.36] [0.19]
Gini coefficient 2.41***2.15*** 2.60*** 2.67*** 2  ^ 9 *** 1.8 6*** 1 9 5 *** 2 .2 1 ***2.19*** 2.38*** 3.51*** 1.6 6 ***
[0.64] [0.55] [0.65] [0.65] [0 .6 6] [0.58] [0.58] [0.57] [0.57] [0.56] [1.25] [0.62]
Percent of population with higher level 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08***0.08***0.08***0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** q Q9***
qualifications [0 .0 1] [0 .0 1] [0 .0 1] [0 .0 1] [0 .0 1] [0 .0 1] [0 .0 1] [0 .0 1] [0 .0 1] [0 .0 1] [0 .0 1]
Local state school characteristics
Percent of pupils achieving more than 5 0
A*-C GCSEs [0 .0 0]
Percent of pupils achieving no GCSE 0
passes [0 .0 1]
Percent of pupils achieving no GCSE 0 . 0 1
passes (1996) [0 .0 1]
Pupil teacher ratio -0.04* -0.05**
[0.03] [0.03]
Percentage of pupils with special needs 0
without statements [0 .0 1]
Percentage of pupils known to be eligible 0 . 0 1
for free school meals [0 .0 0]
Metropolitan area (London, Birmingham, -0 .2 2 **
Manchester, Leeds, Bradford, Leicester, [0 .1 0]
Liverpool)
Spending pr pupil LEA 1995-2003 0.28*** -0.16** -0 .2 1** -0.16 -0.33** -0.16** -0.03 0.16
(£1 0 0 0) [0.091 [0.08] [0 . 1 0 1 [0 . 1 0 1 [0.14] ro.osi [0 .1 1] [0.24]
Observations 1966 1955 1607 1607 1596 1949 1949 1949 1949 1955 268 1690
Pseudo R-squared 0 .1 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.19 0 . 1 2
Notes: Negative binomial regression. Robust standard errors in brackets. All regressions include a constant, regional fixed effects and controls for log pupil numbers. Pupil numbers 
are based on pupils enrolled in all state and private schools in the postcode district. State schools include all publicly run schools except nursery, special schools, pupil referral units. 
Regions include: East Midlands (omitted), East of England, London, North East, North West, South East, South West, West Midlands, Yorkshire and The Humber. * denotes 
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%
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Chapter 3
The Quality o f Public Education  
and the Dem and for Private  
Education. Theory and 
Evidence from English  
Household D ata
3.1 Introduction
Private sector alternatives to publicly provided education is a key policy issue. 
Proponents claim that private schooling frees up resources in the public sector 
and invigorates the public sector through increased competition. By contrast, 
critics worry that private schools attract the most able and wealthy pupils to 
the detriment of the viability of the state schools1, which in turn increases 
the demand for private education. The focus of much applied research on the 
relationship between public and private education has been to study how pri­
vate sector competition affects state school performance2 and whether private
Tn the UK, private schools are generally called "independent schools" because of their 
freedom to operate outside of government regulation. The term private schools will be used 
here. Private secondary schools are called public schools, though this term is primarily used 
of the older and more prestigious schools, like Eton. To avoid confusion with English public 
schools, I refer to schools operating in the public sector as "state schools".
2 The literature on how private sector competition affects public school performance in­
cludes Couch et al. (1993), Newmark (1995), Hoxby (1994), Altonji, Taber and Ching-I 
(2004); Hsieh and Urquiloa (2006) and Chan (2006).
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provision of education produces better outcomes than public provision3. How­
ever, very little is known about the association between state school quality 
and private school demand at the local level, and how this varies by household 
characteristics, such as the distribution of income or education levels. A major 
impediment is the paucity of high quality data which provides detailed infor­
mation about households characteristics and local school quality. This paper 
contributes to filling this gap.
I develop a simple theoretical model to study the association of the demand 
for private education and local state school quality. There is one time period 
which covers the entire primary and secondary educational cycle of the children 
in the household. Households simultaneously choose residential location and 
educational quality. Education can be obtained from the public and private 
sectors, and public and private education are perfect substitutes. The quality 
of local public education is determined by residential location. It is possible 
to obtain a higher quality of education in the private sector, yet it is also 
more costly. Motivated by stylized facts I assume that households can flexibly 
choose to split their consumption of education between the public and private 
sector, but they cannot relocate.
I find that there is a non-monotonic relationship between the demand for 
local state school quality and household income. Up until an income threshold, 
it is optimal to consume as much educational quality as possible in the public 
sector and top up with private sector education of a higher quality, but also 
higher unit cost. However, the contribution of local public sector educational 
quality to overall educational quality obtained in the household declines in the 
proportion of education consumed in the private sector, while the price remains 
constant. As income rises, the proportion of educational consumption in the
3See, for example, Rouse (1998), Figlio and Stone (2001) and Altonji, Elder and Taber 
(2002).
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private sector necessary to satisfy desired spending on education eventually 
becomes so large that the realized unit cost of education in the public sector 
exceeds that in the private sector. Beyond this threshold it is therefore optimal 
to consume in the private sector only and demand the minimal level of quality 
in the public sector.
The central empirical implication of the model is that, depending on the 
distribution of income, we may find either a positive or a negative correlation 
between private school demand and local state school quality in a cross-section 
of households. Compared with low income households, middle income house­
holds demand both more private education as well as a higher quality of lo­
cal state school quality, relative to general neighborhood quality. Conversely, 
high income households don’t consume in the public sector at all. High in­
come households therefore demand more private education, but less local state 
school quality.
In the empirical section, I use a unique and rich micro data set constructed 
from 14 years of English nationally representative household-level survey data 
which includes information on whether respondents have ever sent a child to 
private school as well as detailed respondent/household controls, including in­
formation on household income. I match this data by detailed information 
on respondents’ residential location to local school-level data on public and 
private schools as well as other neighborhood characteristics at the postcode 
district level. To measure state school quality, I focus on average public school 
test scores at age 15. In probit regressions using this data set, I find that state 
school quality is overall positively associated with household private school­
ing choices. However, consistent with theoretical priors, there is a strong and 
robust negative association between the interaction of household income and 
mean local state school test scores to private schooling choices such that a 
negative association is found at the top end of the income distribution. These
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findings are robust to different ways of measuring state school performance. I 
also find evidence that public school quality and private school demand is less 
positively related in households where a parent has attended private school and 
for households living in better school districts. An overall negative association 
between state school quality and private school demand is obtained in regres­
sions using different measures of private school demand based on pupil pop­
ulation data. However, I argue that, consistent with theoretical predictions, 
differences in the representation of different income groups in the alternative 
data sources provide the key to reconciling the empirical findings.
This paper contributes to a substantial body of empirical literature on 
household schooling choices. Closest in spirit to this paper is a study by Figlio 
and Stone (2001) which also uses detailed household-level data to look at the 
effect of community-level characteristics on enrollment patterns in public and 
private schools. However, the data set I use is superior. Most importantly, the 
information available to them on household location, and thus community-level 
characteristics, is much cruder. Through a careful matching procedure using 
a variety of geographical information, I am able to narrow down household 
location to an average population of 30,000, while their work is at a geograph­
ical level with an average population of 960,000. Consistent with the findings 
of this paper, they find that unattractive community features differentially 
leads to students from wealthier, better educated, and higher achieving fami­
lies leaving the public sector. Other studies on parental preferences find that 
preferences attached to schools’ mean test scores increases with student income 
and academic ability (Hastings, Kane and Staiger, 2005). Studies of the sup­
ply side of private schooling (Downes and Greenstein, 1996, 2002 and Munk 
2007a), find some evidence that private schools tend to locate near relatively 
poorly funded and/or performing state schools. Finally, this paper contributes 
to the theoretical literature modeling the choice between public and private
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education (e.g. Stiglitz, 1974; Besley and Coate, 1991; Epple and Romano, 
1996, 1998 and Munk 2007a). The main difference of this paper from other 
theoretical contributions is that I here treat private education as a continu­
ous, rather than a discrete, choice variable and explicitly tie residential and 
educational choices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents a 
simple theoretical model of residential and educational choices and illustrates 
possible relationships between local state school quality and private school de­
mand at the household level. Section 3.3 describes the data and presents basic 
summary statistics. Section 3.4 describes the empirical approach, and presents 
results at the household and postcode district level. Section 3.5 reviews ro­
bustness and section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The M odel
In this section I develop a simple theoretical model to analyze the demand for 
educational quality. I use it to illustrate variation in the association between 
the demand for private education and local state school quality at the house­
hold level by income and preferences for education. The model is motivated 
by the following three empirical observations:
1. It is possible to obtain education of a higher quality in the private sector 
than in the public sector, yet it is also more costly4.
2. A substantial fraction of households divide the consumption of educa­
tion between the public and the private sectors over the course of their
4 Private schools in England substantially outperform state schools (except Grammar 
schools) in terms of average achievement on standardized tests (See Figure 6.1). While 
public schools are nationally financed in England, private schools receive no state funding. 
The average annual fee for a child in a private secondary school is approximately 40% of 
median disposable income for UK households or 20% at the 90th percentile (Graddy and 
Stevens, 2003).
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children’s primary and secondary education5.
3. Residential mobility for families with school-aged children is low6.
Against this backdrop, consider the following approach to characterizing 
household choices.
3.2.1 Set-up
Households differ in disposable income and their preferences for educational 
quality, denoted A. There are three households income levels yi labelled 
i 6 {L, M, H } (low, middle and high). The economy has two goods, a nu­
meraire good x  and educational quality 7r. All households consume one unit of 
education which is available at different levels of quality and can be obtained 
in both the public and private sectors. For any given level of quality, pub­
lic and private education are perfect substitutes. Local state school quality 
qg (j) is determined by residential location j .  Residential location j  should 
be thought of as a set of geographic coordinates in proximity of which there 
are a number of state schools7. There is exogenous variation in public school 
quality across a continuum of locations j  € [0,1] such that qg (0) =  q and 
qg (1) =  q . State schools are financed through national taxation. Yet on top 
of the costs of locating in a district of a certain general quality (not modeled), 
there are specific additional costs associated with locating near good quality 
state schools. The additional cost of residing in location j  due to the quality of 
local state schools is given by cqg ( j)8. The highest level of educational quality
5 Empirical support for this observation is discussed in section 3.4.
6 The BSA survey includes a question on the number of years that respondents have 
lived in their neighorhood. This information is available for 30 percent of respondents in the 
baseline sample used in the empirical analysis. These have on average lived 20.1 years in their 
current neighborhood. The equivalent figure for the same sample restricted to respondents 
55 years or Older is 29.6 years.
7That is, j  does not refer to a specific neighborhood or distict. j  may vary within districts.
8 Note that I do not model real estate markets, c might be conceived of as a house price 
premium that reflects the quality of local state schools, conditional on general neighborhood
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available in the private sector is higher than the highest level available in the 
public sector % > qg. However, educational quality is more expensive in the 
private sector. The unit cost of quality in the private sector is given by p > c. 
For simplicity, I assume that there are no restrictions on location choices and 
that c is exogenous9. Sorting into districts depends on a range of factors that 
are exogenous to the model. However, the choice of residential location per se 
is not the focus of the model. Residential location only matters to the extent 
that it is associated with the quality of local public education. In the follow­
ing, for notational clarity, I therefore drop j  and simply refer to qg (j) as qg. 
However, it should be kept in mind that a choice of qg is implicitly a choice of
j •
H ousehold  decision-m aking: There is one time period which covers the 
entire primary and secondary educational cycle of the children in the house­
hold. Households simultaneously make residential location and educational 
choices for this time period. Households can split their consumption of edu­
cation between the public and private sector, but they cannot relocate. Let 
(i E [0, 1] denote the fraction of household educational consumption which 
takes place in the private sector10. I refer to households which consume in 
both the private and public sectors as mixed, and households consume in only
quality. Several studies have found that the quality of public schools increase house prices, 
including Black (1999); Gibbons and Machin (2003); Fack and Grenet (2007); and Machin 
and Salvanes (2007). However, costs associated with locating near good state schools may 
also be construed more broadly to include compromises made on other aspects of residential 
location to obtain proximity to good public schools, or search costs to identify the best local 
public schools, conditional on neighborhoods quality.
9Assuming that c is constant and exogenously given is clearly unrealistic. However, 
relaxing this assumption would not qualitatively change the results of the model. As will 
become apparent below, the only outcomes that would be affected would be: (i) the income 
thresholds that separate different types of consumer behavior; (ii) the fraction of education 
that takes place in the public sector for middle income households and (iii) the level of state 
school quality demanded by low income households.
10 While a child can only attend one type of education at any one time, children may switch 
between sectors during their childhood. Note that the assumption that private education is 
a continuous choice variable contrasts with the approach of Besley and Coate (1991) and 
Munk (2007a) in which education is modelled as a discrete choice between the public and 
the private sector.
59
in either the private and public sector as pure public and private users, respec­
tively.
P references: Households’ optimization problem over educational quality 
7r and other goods x  solves
max u (fi, qg,qp, x ) =  [h (p, qg,qP)]X x l~x (3.1)
where educational quality is a weighted average of quality obtained in the 
public and private sectors:
TT = h (p ,q 9iqp) = pqp + ( 1 - p)qg (3.2)
subject to:
(i) the budget constraint by which households pay a fixed price for residen­
tial location as a function of local state school quality, regardless of how much 
they consume in the public sector:
y > x  +  cqg +  ppqp (3.3)
(ii) constraints on the choice variables which stipulate that:
p  € [0,1]; qk e  qk,qk , k € {g,p} (3.4)
where qg < qp.
I make the following assumption on the three types of households. 
A ssu m p tio n  1 : Household income levels yl € { v l - ,  V m ,  V h } :  where yL < 
V m  < V h > satisfy the following conditions:
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( i )  Vl  < ^
(n)  V m  e  +  v
(Hi) yH >  ^  + t)
where 77 g  0 but ^  < —k +  77, where 77 is given by [(1 +  A) qg — qp] j  +
( 1 - A )  pqpqn
3.2.2 Private School Dem and
Assumption 1 assures that the income levels axe well defined and that the 
three income types segregate into three types of educational consumption: Low 
and high income (pure) households consume education only in the public and 
private sector, respectively, while middle income (mixed) households consume 
in both the public and the private sector as demonstrated by Proposition 1: 
Proposition 1: Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then optimal household 
behavior (p*.q*q*)., i G {L, A/, H } is characterized by:
Furthermore, note that the optimal fraction of private sector consumption 
in mixed households is below a threshold strictly smaller than 1:
Proof: See Appendix.
The key implication of Proposition 1 is that there is a non-monotonic re-
mm
0 ) if i = L
Qg, Qp ) if i = M
p* G (0, ji) if i = M
where p = 1 — - 9g^  < 1.
^  P Qp
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lationship between the demand for state school quality and household income. 
To see why this is the case, recall that the nominal unit cost of educational 
quality is lower in the public than in the private sector: c < p. However, due 
to the restriction on residential mobility, a fixed price is paid for local public 
sector quality, regardless of how much is actually consumed in the public sector 
over the time period. The "de facto" unit cost of educational quality obtained 
in the public sector11 thus increases in p, and at some point p overtakes the 
unit cost of quality in the private sector (p). In spite of lower unit costs in 
the public sector, rationing in the form of caps on maximal educational qual­
ity available lead middle income (mixed) households12 to consume in both the 
public and private sector. Conversely, for rich (pure private sector) households 
(with p* > p), it is optimal to avoid incurring costs related to locating near 
high quality local state schools so far as possible. Proposition 1 further im­
plies that the fraction of education consumed in the private sector increases 
monotonically in household income. Households willing to spend more on ed­
ucation (by the Cobb-Douglas preferences, desired expenditure is equal to Ay) 
than it costs to obtain the best quality of public education (cqg), will consume 
some or all education in the private sector13.
11 The "de facto" unit cost of educational quality obtained in the public sector is given by
12By construction of the income groups, p* G (0, p) for middle income households. For 
p* >  p educational quality is cheaper in the private sector. Households with income levels 
that yield p* >  p therefore only consume in the private sector.
13While it is not important for present purposes, note that the model furthermore may 
imply a non-monotonic relationship between the demand for private school quality and 
household income. This may arise if y <  0, or
fe “ 9g) ((1 + A) qg -  qp) > (1 - A) ^ qpqg (3.5)
To see this, consider that the lower unit cost of educational quality in the public sector 
for p* <  p further implies that it is optimal for mixed households to minimize the fraction 
of education consumed in the private sector, subject to realizing their desired overall level 
of expenditure educational quality. This expenditure level cannot be satisfied in the public 
sector alone for middle income households due to the constraint on the maximal quality 
levels available. (By the Cobb-Douglas preferences optimal expenditure on educational 
quality is equal to XyM — eg* +  p*pqp , where q* =  qg). Thus, it is optimal to consume
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3.2.3 Private School Dem and and the Dem and for Local
Public Educational Quality
Now consider the correlation of private school demand and the demand for 
local public educational quality in a cross-section of households, conditional 
on other local characteristics14. Proposition 1 implies that household loca­
tion within districts will be characterized by the following pattern: (i) pure 
private sector high income households demand minimal public sector quality, 
(ii) mixed middle income households demand the highest possible quality of 
public education and (iii) pure public sector low income households demand a 
lower level of public sector educational quality than the middle income house­
holds, but a higher level than high income households. Let the overall fraction 
of households of each income type yi be given by i £ {L, M, H }, with 
YliPi ~  1* Furthermore, there is exogenous variation in the composition of 
income types across districts. Suppose there is some but not perfect sorting 
by income across districts15. For instance, there are rich districts character­
ized primarily by medium and high income types (H-M districts) and poor
the highest possible quality in both the public and private sectors. However, the income 
threshold that induces a switch to pure private consumption implies an optimal level of 
spending on educational quality that may be either greater or smaller than the cost of 
obtaining the highest level of quality attainable in the public sector. If <  0, then we may 
have q* — Qp- This means that the demand for educational quality in the private
sector may be lower for the very rich compared to that of the middle income households. 
To understand the conditions under which we may obtain this outcome, notice that Xy < 0 
if (3.5) holds. For a given qp, the left hand side increases in the difference in maximal 
quality levels in the public and private sector, qp — qg. If there is a very large gap between 
the maximal quality levels attainable in the public and private sectors, the y* required to 
satisfy a given level optimal expenditure on educational quality increases and is therefore 
more likely to surpass Ji.
14In the empirical analysis in section 3.5, j  is a set of geographic coordinates (estimated 
eastings and northings), and local public school quality is an average of the five closest 
state schools in a 15 km radius. Each location j  is located in a smaller postcode district 
(neighborhood) as well as a larger school district (Local Education Authority). I include 
school district fixed effects as well as a series of postcode district level variables (including 
average house prices) to control for general neighborhood characteristics.
15In practice, we do not observe perfect sorting by income. The model thus departs from 
a classic Tiebout style models in which the equilibrium outcome involves perfect sorting 
by income into homogeneous neighborhoods. For other community-based models, see e.g. 
Fernandez and Rogerson (1996).
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districts characterized primarily by medium and low income types (M-L dis­
tricts)16. There may also be variation in the degree of income inequality such 
that, for the same mean income levels, the fraction of medium income types is 
high in some districts (M-district) but relatively low in others (H-L district). 
We then have that:
C oro lla ry  1: The (conditional) correlation between the demand for pri­
vate education and local state school quality in a cross-section of households 
may be either positive or negative, depending on the distribution of income 
types across districts.
The reason is as follows: The demand for private education increases 
monotonically in income. However, higher private school consumption is as­
sociated with higher demand for local state school quality for middle income 
households who also consume education in the public sector, but with lower 
demand for local state school quality for high income households who only 
consume in the private sector. The aggregate linear relationship found will 
therefore depend on the relative aggregate weight on the high and middle in­
come groups. This point is illustrated in Figure 3.1. The graph on the left 
hand side in Panel A shows an example of a three-point income distribution 
with most weight on the middle income group (M-district). The graph on 
the right hand side shows a mean preserving spread17 of this income distribu­
tion such that there is more weight on both the low and high income groups 
relative to the middle income group (H-L district). Panel B illustrates how 
the distribution of income distribution affects the aggregate linear relation­
ship between the demand for private education and local state school quality. 
The values for the fraction of education consumed in the private sector p for
16Note that as long as there are any medium type households in a district, there will be 
demand for the maximal level of state school quality.
17 Given the following income levels for the three types: yL =  10; yM — 30; yn  =  60, the 
mean of the distribution equals 27 in both cases.
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mixed households18 and for quality levels demanded in the public sector by 
the three groups are fictive. The size of the bubbles is proportional to the size 
of each income group as shown in Panel A. The thick black curve shows the 
"true" hump-shaped relationship between the demand for private education 
(as a continuous choice variable in the [0,1] interval) and local state school 
quality predicted by the model. The straight lines show fitted values of actual 
linear regressions of fi on qp given the different income distributions, based on 
the fictive values described above. In the example with low income inequality, 
and consequently relatively low weight on the high income group and high 
weight on the middle income group, the slope of the regression line is positive. 
However, in the example with higher income inequality with a greater weight 
on the high income group, this slope is negative.
The relationship of interest will furthermore be more negative in the rich 
(H-M) districts than in the poor (M-L) districts. As long as districts are 
not perfectly homogenous in income types, the aggregate relationship result­
ing from within district variation depends on the overall income distribution 
among all the households included in the analysis. Moving beyond these Ac­
tive illustrative examples, I now turn to investigate the empirical evidence 
for the predicted non-monotonic relationship between the demand for private 
education and local state school quality.
3.3 D ata Description
To investigate the association between local state school quality and private 
school demand empirically, I use survey data on private schooling and other 
household characteristics matched by residential location to school, house price 
and census data.
18/1* is always equal to 0 and 1 for pure public and private sector households, respectively.
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3.3.1 M easuring Private School Dem and and Other House­
hold Characteristics
To form the basic household-level data set, I use variables on private edu­
cation consumption, household income, geographic location, and other house­
hold/respondent characteristics from the nationally representative annual British 
Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS) data. There are 14 years of data in which 
these core variables are available, spanning the period 1986-2002. I extract 
all respondents living in England with school-aged or older children (aged 5+) 
who provide a yes/no answer to whether they have ever sent a child to pri­
vate school. Out of the resulting 21,398 observations, a base sample of 16,206 
observations satisfy all data requirements19.
The BSAS survey data makes it possible to distinguish between pure pub­
lic sector households and households which have ever consumed any private 
education. However, it is unfortunately not possible to tell apart mixed public- 
private users from pure private school users, since there are no direct measures 
of /i, the fraction of educational quality that is consumed in the private sector 
at the household level20. A measure of household income is constructed based 
on income bands defined in nominal terms. I take the mid-point of upper 
and lower values of these bands and adjust on a yearly basis by the UK retail 
prices index21. As a further (time-invariant) measure of household resources,
I therefore also employ information on respondents’ educational background
19 See Data Appendix, section 6.3 for details.
201 try to address this limitation of the data in various ways which I describe in more 
detail below.
21 The retail price index is the most widely used general purpose domestic measure of in­
flation in the UK. As a measure of household’s financial resources in general, and at the time 
at which private schooling decisions were taken, this income variable suffers from some draw­
backs. First, the highest income band is not bounded above and the accuracy of estimated 
income in this category is as such lower than that based on well defined bands. Second, 
low current household income in single parent families (roughly 25 percent of respondents 
with children) or in households headed by either very young or retired parents may not be 
indicative of low parental financial resources. For further details on income bands and the 
construction of the household income variable, see Data Appendix, Figure 6.6.
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(including on whether the respondent is privately educated). Furthermore, I 
include age, marital status, and religious and political orientation. Finally, I 
use information on the residential location of the respondents at the time of 
the interview to link household schooling decisions to neighborhood character­
istics.
Geographical information on residential location is available for all survey 
years. However, different geographical units are employed, and in different for­
mats, sometimes with inconsistencies or errors that can in part be corrected to 
enable matching to other data files. The matching procedure is further compli­
cated by numerous changes to names and codes of different geographical units 
over time. Using a variety of intermediate steps and geographic matching files, 
I am able to narrow down the residential location of all respondents in the base 
sample to geographical areas covering on average roughly 35,000 inhabitants. 
I derive estimated geographic coordinates as well as key pieces of administra­
tive geographical information for each observation in the data which enables 
matching survey respondents to the 5 closest state schools as -well as different 
relevant administrative units (postcode district and school districts (Local Ed­
ucation Authorities)) by which the survey data can be matched geographically 
to other data sources22.
3.3.2 M atching Survey D ata to Neighborhood Variables
Matching survey respondents’ private schooling decisions to neighborhood vari­
ables poses a number of methodological problems. Even if ideal neighborhood 
data were available, it would not be obvious which years of neighborhood data 
it would be relevant to match survey year of interview to, or how to define 
the geographical scope of matching. Beyond the inability to establish the tim­
22For details, see Data Appendix, section 6.3.3 and online appendix.
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ing of private schooling decisions in the survey data (private schooling choices 
may have taken place many years prior to the interview)23, we do not know 
how households relate schooling decisions to neighborhood characteristics. If 
schooling decisions are made simultaneously with housing decisions, such de­
cisions may be made years prior to actually sending children to private school. 
It is also not obvious how households factor information about neighborhood 
and school quality into those decisions. Households might observe quality over 
a number of years, say based on long-standing reputation of areas and the 
experiences of relatives and friends, or they might primarily focus on measur­
able outcomes, say mean test scores, at the time at which they are making 
decisions. There may be time lags in changing perceptions about neighbor­
hood quality to objective changes in circumstances. The only thing we know 
for sure is that households cannot base their decisions on neighborhood out­
comes occurring after the day of the interview. Furthermore, the older the 
respondent, and thus other things equal the older the households’ children, 
the further back in time schooling decisions are likely to have been made. The 
further back in time schooling decisions have been made, the weaker is the 
likely relationship of those schooling choices to the state school quality and 
other neighborhood characteristics of respondents’ residential location at the 
time of the interview. First, neighborhood characteristics may change over 
time. Moreover, the likelihood that households live in the same location as 
the one in which they made schooling decisions declines in the time elapsed 
between those schooling decisions and the time of the interview.
Mindful of these caveats, I proceed by matching survey data to contem­
23 Only an upper limit (the year of the interview) on private school choice timing can 
be inferred from the data. There is no information in the data on the number or ages of 
children a household has sent to private school, or for how long. Only children living at 
home are reported and thus it is (mostly) impossible to know how many children older 
respondents have had. For 1995 and 1996 only, information is additionally provided on 
whether households currently have children in private education. However this is a very 
small sample of roughly 150 observations.
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poraneous neighborhood variables where possible, and to the earliest possible 
year of data where it is not, to - so far as possible - approximate neighborhood 
characteristics likely to have affected schooling choices. By using the earlier 
survey data matched at the postcode district level to the more recent school 
performance and house price data the sample size is increased by almost 70 
percent. I discuss the practical importance of these problems further when 
reviewing the robustness of the empirical results.
As regards the geographical aspect of matching, there are again no strong a 
priori guidelines on how to define the scope of educational markets. Moreover, 
clear limitations are imposed by the available data. I use different approaches 
for the different data sets as described below.
3.3.3 M easuring Pupil Performance
School quality has many dimensions. In this paper, I focus on pupil perfor­
mance and use the school-level percentage of 15-16 year old pupils doing well in 
standardized GCSE24 exams (obtaining 5 or more A*-C grades) as the baseline 
measure of state school quality. This measure of pupil performance has been 
directly observable to the public in the so-called league tables since 199225.
I construct a school-level panel spanning the years 1993-2002 based on 
yearly data from the Department of Education and Skills which covers all 
public and private English schools and includes information on GCSE perfor­
mance, school type (public or private), enrollment numbers (in total and at 
different ages), as well as exact geographic coordinates (eastings and northings) 
that enables a precise localization of the schools26. Note that state schools refer
24 GCSE stands for General Certificate of Education and is normally taken in grade 11 
(15/16 years).
25Overall rankings are published in newspapers and on the internet, where it is possible 
to search for local information on particular areas, including a list of all the nearest schools 
and the performance on key standardized tests of the pupils of these schools.
26 Constructing this data requires matching disparate files across years (ASC, SEC and
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to schools operating in the public sector. I drop all special schools. I match the 
survey data to contemporaneous school data for the years 1993-2002, and to 
1993 school data for pre-1993 survey data. In terms of geographical matching, 
the exact postcode, and hence precise geographical coordinates, is available 
for all schools. For each of the estimated geographic coordinates of the sur­
vey respondents, I identify all schools which lie within a 15 kilometer radius 
in that survey year, or in 1993 for pre-1993 survey data. I then select the 5 
nearest schools (or largest number available) within the 15 kilometer radius27 
and construct a variable containing the mean value of their performance for 
each set of estimated BSAS coordinates. Furthermore, for robustness checks, 
I compute average performance of all schools by year and postcode district. 
In both cases, I weight by the number of 15-year old pupils when averaging 
across schools.
3.3.4 M easuring Neighborhood Quality
I include variables th a t proxy neighborhood quality more generally. First, I 
use English house price data from the Land Registry as an expression of the 
capitalization of general neighborhood quality. Second, I use Census data on 
the fraction of highly qualified individuals as a measure of overall neighborhood 
wealth and tastes for education. Geographically, both variables are matched 
to the survey data by postcode district. Temporally, the survey and house 
data is matched contemporaneously for 1995-2002 data, and pre-1995 survey
Edubase). This is complicated by the use of two different school identifiers (URN, unique 
reference numbers as well as the combination of local education authority (LEA) numbers 
and school establishment (estab) numbers. The latter are not consistent over time, and 
various intermediate files need to be used to match files containing the relevant information. 
However, by matching on a combination of old and new school identifiers as well as school 
postcodes only a small percentage of schools are left unmatched.
27 On average, there axe 50.3 schools within a 15km radius of the estimated geographic 
coordinates of respondents in the baseline sample. On average, the closest school is located 
1.55km from the estimated household location.
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is data is matched to 1995 house price data. The Census data is only available 
for 2001.
3.4 Preliminary D ata Analysis
The first column of Table 3.1 provides sample means for all respondents in the 
base sample, while columns (2) and (3) respectively contain sample means for 
the 13.3 percent of respondents who have sent any children to private school 
and for the remainder who have not. Respondents who have ever sent a child to 
private school are on average wealthier, better educated, including more likely 
to have attended private school themselves, older, more likely to be married 
or cohabitating, more religious and more conservative than those respondents 
who have not sent children to private school. Furthermore, private education 
households tend to live in areas with better performing state schools, higher 
average house prices, with a greater percentage of the population with higher 
level qualifications.
In comparison to the 13.3 percent of survey respondents who have ever sent 
a child to private school, only roughly 7 percent of English pupils are enrolled in 
private education according to school-level enrollment data in all English public 
and private schools during the period considered28. It is worth exploring what 
might explain such a large discrepancy in the two measures of private school 
demand and to what extent the two data sources appear consistent. As shown 
in panel 1 of Figure 3.2, in spite of some fluctuations in the survey data, the 
overall trends in both data series are relatively flat over the period considered29.
28Note, the pupil population figures are based on non-special public and private schools 
only.
29In addition to the baseline sample years of data, these figures also include data on private 
education for the 2003-05 BSA survey and 2003-06 pupil population data. These years 
are not included in the empiricial analysis because only relatively geographical information 
provided in the survey data for 2003 onwards which prevents adequate matching of the 
survey data to neighborhood variables.
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This suggests tha t differences are not caused by time lags in the representation 
of private school demand in the survey data30. Moreover, panel 2 shows that 
the two measures of private school demand are highly correlated at the regional 
level with a correlation coefficient of 0.891 31. The most plausible explanation 
for why the percentage of households who have ever sent children to private 
school is higher than the percentage of pupils in private education therefore 
appears to be tha t mixed households which consume in both the private and 
the public sectors make up a substantial proportion of private school users, as 
suggested in the theoretical analysis. Households may send children to private 
school for only part of their children’s primary and secondary education and 
may simultaneously consume in the public and private sectors by sending some 
of their children to private schools and some to state schools. Indeed, the 
fraction of pupils enrolled in private education increases markedly with the 
age of pupils, as demonstrated in panels 3-432.
Next, to explore the association of private school consumption with local 
state school performance and income, I divide the baseline sample into 8 equal 
sized groups according to the mean performance of the 5 nearest state schools 
and household income. The top group contains the 12.5 percent of households 
with the best local public schools or the highest household incomes; the next
30Since respondents axe asked whether they have ever sent children to private school, the 
survey data represents private school demand that potentially goes decades back in time 
relative to the survey year.
31 The figure also shows that regional variation in private education is very considerable in 
England: According to the pupil population numbers, only 3 percent of pupils in the North 
East attend private schools as opposed to 11 percent in the South East. Furthermore, there 
is much variation within regions, In some Local Education Authorities (schools districts) in 
London, 25-50 percent of pupils are educated in private schools, while the equivalent figure 
for other areas is 1-3 percent.
32In 2006, the percentage of pupils in private education was almost 50 percent higher 
among pupils aged 15 compared to pupils aged 6, a decline from 1996 where the equivalent 
figure was 76 percent. Furthermore, even given the high correlation of the two measures 
at the regional level, the ratio of age 15 to age 6 enrollement is correlated (.651) with the 
excess of the survey private school demand measure over the pupil population measure at the 
regional level. The excess, in region z, of private school demand as measured by the survey 
data (pctBSAz) over that measures by the pupil population data (pctDfESj) is calculated 
as 100*(pctBSAj/pctDfESi-l).
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group contains the next 12.5 percent, and so forth. Panels 5 and 6 show a clear, 
monotonic association between private school demand and, on the one hand, 
local state school performance and, on the other hand, household income. The 
drop in private school demand from the top household income group to the 
next is particularly striking and is suggestive of the extent to which private 
education predominates at the very top of the income distribution33.
The positive correlation between private school demand and state school 
quality may be driven by the fact that high household income is positively 
correlated with both private education demand and local state school qual­
ity. Panel 7 considers the raw correlation of household income and local public 
school quality by whether respondents have ever sent a child to private schools. 
In each income group, the households which have ever sent children to private 
school also on average live in areas with better local state schools than those 
who have not. This difference is less marked at the top of the income distri­
bution. On the whole, these raw empirical patterns suggest that a positive 
association between private school demand and local state school quality ex­
ists, even controlling for household income. Panel 8 further demonstrates that, 
at each income level, respondents who have themselves attended private ed­
ucation are far more likely to have ever sent children to private schools than 
those who have not.
To summarize, the key messages to take away from the comparison of the 
survey and pupil population data, and the preliminary look at the raw data are 
as follows: (i) Although the survey based measure of private school demand is 
higher than the pupil population based measure, the two measures of private 
school demand are highly correlated at the regional level with a correlation 
coefficient of 0.89. (ii) The discrepancy in the percentage of survey households
33 The average annual fee for a child in a private secondary school is approximately 40% 
of median disposable income for UK households or 20% at the 90th percentile (Graddy and 
Stevens, 2003).
who have ever sent children to private school and the percentage of pupils 
in private education coupled with the increase in private school enrollment by 
pupil age (panels 3 and 4 of Figure 3.2 is most likely indicative of the prevalence 
of mixed households which consume in both the private and the public sectors. 
It appears that a sizeable proportion of households ever consuming private 
education only send their children to private school for part of their compulsory 
education. The increase in private school enrollment by pupil age suggests that 
the most common approach is to initially send children to state schools and 
then later switch to the private sector. Note that, by construction, this type of 
mixed consumption whereby children are only sent to private school for a short 
duration of time will be more heavily represented in the survey data than in 
the pupil population data. In a snapshot taken in any given year such mixed 
households will make up a smaller proportion of private school enrollment 
than they will make up of the cumulative pool of households who have ever 
sent children to private education, (iii) Consistent with the theoretical model, 
there appears to be a positive association between private school demand and 
local state school quality exists, but it is less pronounced at the highest income 
levels. This apparent inverted U-shape of plot of local school quality and house 
prices in Appendix Figure 6.4 consistent with panel B of Figure 3.1 and panel 
7 of Figure 3.2). I now turn  to more formal empirical investigation to see if 
this latter pattern holds up to further scrutiny.
3.5 Empirical Analysis
The theoretical model suggests a monotonic relationship between household 
income and private school demand, but a non-monotonic relationship between 
the demand for private education and local state school quality (illustrated 
in panel B of Figure 3.1). This implies that we may find either a positive
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or a negative overall correlation between the demand for private education 
and local state school quality in a cross-section of households, depending on 
the distribution of income. However, as noted in section 3.3.1, the survey 
data makes it possible to distinguish between pure public sector households 
and households wThich have ever consumed any private education. On the other 
hand, mixed public-private users cannot be told apart from pure private school 
users. Although I have argued that the demand for private education should be 
considered a continuous choice, it is therefore only possible to study it directly 
as a discrete choice. The dependent private school variable is therefore an 
indicator variable which attains the value 1 if respondents have ever sent any 
child to private school and 0 if they have not. This introduces measurement 
error with a strictly positive mean in the private school demand for mixed 
households, but not for pure households. The model predicts tha t mixed users 
consume the maximal level of educational quality in the public sector, while 
pure private school users consume the minimal level of educational quality 
in the public sector, conditional on other neighborhood characteristics. To 
the extent that private education is indeed partly mixed, and a non-linear 
relationship exists as predicted by the theoretical model, this error therefore 
produces an upward bias in the estimated relationship between the demand 
for private education and local state school quality. This bias is illustrated 
by panels B and C of Figure 3.134. Noting this source of expected upward 
bias, I will first estimate the aggregate relationship between household-level 
demand for private education and local state school quality and next explore 
how this relationship varies with income and other personal characteristics 
that we expect to be correlated with p.
34In fact, in the example with high inequality, a negative aggregate relationship is obtained 
when [i is fully observable, but a positive relationship results when p  can only be observed 
as a discrete choice.
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3.5.1 Baseline Specification
To study the aggregate relationship between household-level demand for pri­
vate education and local state school quality, I estimate probit regressions of 
the form:
P i j k l t  = a Q j k l t  + P X k l t  + b Z i j k l t  + + 4>l + €i jk l t (3-6)
Let the variable Pijkt take the value 1 if the ith  household in residential 
location35 j ,  postcode district k and school district I in year t has ever had 
any children enrolled in private education (/z > 0) and 0 otherwise. Then 
Pijkt = 1 (Ptjkt > 0) where l(-) is the indicator function taking the value 1 if 
the expression in parentheses is true and 0 otherwise.
Qjklt denotes local state school quality (the average percentage of pupils 
achieving 5 or more A*-C grades at GCSE level in the 5 closest schools) in 
residential location j  at time £36.
Xkit is a vector of postcode district level covariates which include house 
prices and the fraction of the population with high level qualifications. As 
shown in Figure 6.4, local state school performance is positively correlated 
with proxies for general neighborhood quality and wealth such as house prices 
and the proportion of individuals with higher level qualifications. If households 
with a stronger taste for educational quality, and hence who are more likely 
to choose private education, also tend to care more about other neighborhood 
characteristics (safety, green areas, other public services and amenities and 
population composition), the coefficient on state school quality is upward bi­
ased in the absence of adequate controls for such neighborhood characteristics.
35 Residential location refers to estimated geographic coordinates (easting and northing) 
as described in section 3.4.
36As described in section 3.4, the survey data is matched to contemporaneous variables 
where possible.
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Zijkit includes the following household/respondent covariates: household 
income, the education of the respondent, respondent age and age-cohort, the 
respondent’s marital status and religious and political orientation3'. As shown 
in section (3.2), the model predicts that fi increases monotonically in income, 
while there is a non-monotonic relationship between qg and income. In addi­
tion, for a given level of household income, respondent education levels may 
affect both /i and qg, either directly through A, or indirectly by capturing un­
observed aspects of household income y. First, better educated individuals are 
likely to have higher A, that is, stronger tastes for education38. Proposition 1 
suggests that the optimal level of fi given mixed consumption increases in A. 
Furthermore, the income thresholds which trigger a change from no private sec­
tor consumption to mixed private sector consumption, and from mixed private 
private sector consumption to pure private sector consumption39 are decreas­
ing in A. Demand for public educational quality directly increases in A for pure 
public users only, since either maximal or minimal public educational quality 
is demanded in the mixed and pure private regimes, respectively. Second, as 
discussed in section 3, the household income variable may be a noisy mea­
sure of (life time) household income. Education is a typically time invariant 
variable (for individuals with school aged or older children) which is corre­
lated with life time earnings capacity. Respondent education levels, including 
whether the respondent has been privately education40, therefore provide an
37I do not include number of children in the baseline regression. First, only information 
on number of children living at home is provided. Secondly, the number of children in the 
household is potentially endogenous to private schooling decisions. In an English context, 
parents may plausibly choose to have fewer children to be able to afford sending them to 
private school.
38 For evidence that prerences for educational quality appear to increase in household 
education levels, see e.g. Kane, Hastings and Staiger (2005).
39We know that <  0 since since y =  j  ((1 +  A) cqg +  (1 — A) p <  > 1
given that c < p  and qp > qg.
40As shown in Figure 1, private school demand is strongly correlated with household 
income levels and whether respondents have attended private school.
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additional control for life time household income which is arguably a more 
important determinant of private schooling decisions than current household 
income. The descriptive statistics also show that private education predomi­
nates at the very top of the income distribution, as demonstrated in panels 6 
and 8 of Figure 3.2 where the baseline sample is split into 8 equal sized income 
groups. Almost twice as a high a percentage (30 percent) of the top 12.5 per­
cent richest households have ever sent a child to private school as the next 12.5 
percent richest households (16 percent). This percentage further declines at 
each lower household income group, but at a much slower rate. Furthermore, 
in each household income group, there is a 20-30 percentage point gap in the 
percentage of households who have ever sent a child to private school between 
respondents who have themselves been privately educated and those who have 
not.
Finally, households’ religious and political beliefs may capture variation in 
A41 which may drive both households’ private school demand and the propen­
sity to locate near high performing state schools. To control for household 
and neighborhood level A, I therefore include households’ religious affiliation42 
and political orientation43 as well as the postcode district fraction of the pop­
ulation that is conservative in the set of control variables. Finally, and 6t 
are school district (LEA) and year-of-interview fixed effects. Standard errors 
are assumed to be normally distributed and are adjusted for correlation of the 
errors within postcode districts.
41 In Munk (2007c), I find that certain religious affiliations and professed allegiance to the 
Conservative party is associated with stronger private school demand, controlling for income 
and education.
421 construct indicator variables for 6 different types of religious affiliation: Church of 
England/Anglican, Roman Catholic, Other Christian, Non-Christian, Jewish and Muslim. 
For more details, see Munk (2007c).
43 Respondents are categorized as Conservative partisan if they respond that they support 
the Convervative party and as sympathizers/identifiers if they respond that they feel a little 
closer or would vote for the Conservative party at the next election. Indicator variables for 
Labour partisans and sympathizers/identifiers are constructed using the same procedure.
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Table 3.2 reports marginal effects estimates from probit analyses of whether 
a household has ever sent any children to private school with progressively 
more of the variables in (3.6) included. To facilitate interpretation, the state 
school quality measure is standardized to mean zero and standard deviation 
one in the baseline sample. Column (1) includes the state school quality mea­
sure, controlling for year and regional fixed effects44. The coefficient on state 
school quality is positive and statistically significant45. The second column 
controls for additional measures of neighborhood quality at the postcode dis­
trict level: log house prices and the percentage of highly educated individuals. 
The school quality coefficient falls by almost one third, but remains positive 
and significant, as do the coefficients on both measures of neighborhood qual­
ity. As expected, these results indicate tha t state school quality is positively 
correlated with such other neighborhood characteristics and their omission 
consequently leads to upward bias of the school quality coefficient. Column 
(3) additionally controls for household income, respondent educational back­
ground (including whether respondent is privately educated) and other basic 
respondent/household demographic characteristics as described in the previous 
section. To control for household and neighborhood tastes for (private) edu­
cation, column (4) further includes the religious and political variables. The 
school quality coefficient is more than halved in each step and falls in signifi­
cance between column (3) and (4). These results again indicate elimination of 
upward bias of the school quality coefficient due to the respondent/household 
variables included in column (3) and (4) being positively correlated with the
44The 9 English regions (GORs) include: North East, North West, Yorkshire and The 
Humber, East Midlands, West Midlands, East of England, London, South East, South 
West. To avoid cluttering notation, the regional level subscripts and dummies are omitted 
in the description of the empirical method in the previous section.
45Note that the coefficient on state school quality is positive as opposed to that pre­
sented in Table 2.5 of Chapter 2. However, the measures are not identical. As discussed 
in section 2.5.1, the input-based measure (spending per pupil) is positively correlated with 
adverse neighborhood characteristics in an attempt to compensate for disadvantage. It’s 
interpretation is therefore problematic.
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school quality variable as well as private school demand. Furthermore, these re­
sults suggest that, for given socioeconomic neighborhood characteristics, state 
school quality is higher in areas where the population at large has a stronger 
taste for (private) education. Finally, to pick up remaining omitted factors at 
the school district level, columns (5) additionally adds school district (LEA) 
fixed effects. The school quality coefficient increases slightly while the coeffi­
cient on the proxy for general neighborhood quality, the percentage of highly 
educated individuals, falls in significance. On the whole, the results suggest 
that, in the aggregate, households consuming any private education tend to be 
located in areas with better state schools. A one standard deviation increase 
in state school quality is associated with a 0.9 percentage point increase in the 
propensity for private education which amounts to 6.8 percent of the sample 
mean (13.3 percent).
If private education were a discrete choice and there were only pure public 
and private sector users, the model would have predicted a negative relation­
ship. This result therefore suggest that a fairly large proportion of private 
school users in the survey data are indeed mixed households which consume 
education in both the public and private school sectors. However, the pres­
ence of mixed households also raises the concern that the results are upwardly 
biased, as discussed above. To further explore the theoretical prior that re­
sults are driven by differences in the demand for state school quality among 
households with mixed and pure consumption of private education, I now turn 
explore heterogeneity in the estimated relationship with respect to households 
characteristics which we expect to affect /i (which cannot be directly observed 
with the given data).
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3.5.2 “M ixed” versus “Pure” Educational Strategies
I first examine household income as a source of heterogeneity in the fraction 
of educational quality which is consumed in the private sector /i and thus in 
the association of private school demand and local public sector quality. The 
theoretical priors, as well as empirical evidence, suggest that n is monotonically 
increasing in household income. To examine whether there is evidence of a 
non-monotonic relationship between the demand for private education and 
local state school quality, the final column of Table 3.2 ads an interaction term 
of local state school quality and household income, 'yyijtQjt, to the baseline 
regression.
The coefficients on state school quality and household income (latter not 
reported) remain positive and significant. However, the interaction term be­
tween these variables is negative and significant. Consistent with the theo­
retical model, this result suggests that the association between state school 
quality and private school demand declines with income and thus with /i46.
To get a sense of the income levels at which there is a negative, rather than 
a positive relationship between the two key variables of interest, consider the 
marginal effect of increasing state school quality for a household of a given 
level of income:
BP*
=  a  +  M
d p *
Since a  is positive and 7 is negative, d^ k* is thus positive for low levels of 
income but turns negative for higher levels of income. Let u  denote the income 
level at which the relationship between the propensity to consume private 
education and increased local state school quality is equal to zero. We have:
46Note that empirical second derivatives in the probit regressions may not be accurate. 
Thus, the change in the marginal effect of x l w.r.t x2 is not the coefficient on the interaction 
of x l  and x2. I thank Steve Gibbons for pointing this out to me.
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a
7
(3.8)
W ith the caveat tha t this estimate is not likely to be accurate, according
but for the 3 percent wealthiest households47. One interpretation of this result, 
consistent with the theoretical framework, is that private education demand is 
only primarily pure, as opposed to mixed, among the very top of the income 
distribution. Pure households consequently have no motive to locate near the 
best state schools, conditional on other aspects of neighborhood quality. To put 
it differently, to ensure the best possible education, the wealthiest households 
will send their children to private schools if they choose not to locate near the 
best performing state schools. Conversely, less wealthy households are more 
often mixed households which do not send their children to private school 
throughout their education, or may only send some of their children to private 
school, and are therefore more sensitive to local state school quality.
To further examine whether the empirical evidence supports this conclu­
sion, I now consider some additional possible sources of heterogeneity in p. 
Columns (l)-(3) of Table 3.3 report the estimated relationship between state 
school quality and private school demand by parental private education back­
ground and the age and number of children in the households. First, column 
(1) interacts the school quality variable with dummies for whether the respon­
dent is privately educated (12.3 percent of the baseline sample) or not. We 
expect parental private school background to be positively associated with /i
47In unreported regressions, I find the difference in the estimated coefficients on public 
school quality between the top 10 percent of households incomes and the bottom 90 percent 
to be significant at 5 percent level.
to the results reported in column (6) of Table 3.2, u  = 0.529 which equals 
the 97th income percentile in the sample. This corresponds to the relationship 
between state school quality and private school demand being positive for all
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as a proxy for both preferences for educational quality and household income. 
I find that the coefficient on state school quality is positive and significant 
only for the non-privately educated respondents, while it is close to zero and 
insignificant for the privately educated respondents. The difference in the es­
timated coefficients on state school quality for the two groups is significant at 
the 2 percent level. This result lends further support to the theoretical prior 
that the association between private school demand and state school quality 
is at least less positive for households likely to have high fi and thus to be 
“purer” private school consumers.
Two further pieces of information that are likely to be correlated with /i 
are the age and number of children living in the household. As noted in section 
(3.4) and shown in panels 3 and 4 of Figure 3.2, the proportion of pupils en­
rolled in private education gradually increases with pupil age48. This empirical 
patterns thus suggest that the most common strategy for mixed households is 
to initially send their children to state school and later enroll them in private 
education. Hence, the younger the age at which a child is sent to private 
school, the greater is the likely proportion of that child’s education spent in 
private education going to be and, other things equal, the greater is household 
fi. Finally, conditional on any private school consumption, a greater number 
children in a household increases the scope for a low fi as simultaneous con­
sumption in the public and private sector is possible if the children are sent to 
different schools.
There is no information in the survey data on the number of children a 
household has sent to private school, at what age or for how long. However, 
the survey does contain information on the number and ages of children living 
in the household at the time of the interview. By separately considering house-
48During the period 1996-2006, the percentage of pupils in private education aged 15 has 
ranged from being 49-76 percent higher than among pupils aged 6, and 20-38 percent higher 
than among pupils aged 10.
holds where the eldest child living at home is less than 11 and the youngest 
child is 5 or above, it is possible distinguish between households which send 
children to private school at early ages from those which do not. I create three 
dummies for households where (i) the eldest child is less than 11 years old49,
(ii) the eldest child is 11 years old or older, but the youngest child living at 
home is below 18, and (iii) there are no children below 18 living at home. Col­
umn (2) of Table 3.3 reports results from interacting these three dummies with 
local state school performance measure. The state school quality coefficients 
are all positive and significant, and an F-test cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that there is no difference in the school quality coefficients. This finding might 
reflect that focusing on families which send children to private school at young 
ages does not yield a sufficient fraction of private school households with fi = 1 
to counteract the positive relationship between the two key variables of interest 
for households with 0 < fi < 1. To explore whether it is necessary to identify 
a group of households yet more likely to be “pure” private school consumers, 
I look at families with single children. To increase the likelihood that an only 
child living in a household in fact has no siblings and will get no siblings, I 
focus on households with 1 child aged between 6 and 14 years50. Column (2) 
includes a dummy for households with an only child aged 6-14 (6.1 percent of 
the sample) and interacts the school quality variable with this dummy and one 
for all other households in the base sample. Again an F-test cannot reject that 
there is no difference in the school quality coefficients. However, the difference 
in significance of the coefficients on the two interaction terms suggests that the 
positive association between school quality and private school demand might 
be weaker for households with young only children, although this could also
49The sample only includes households where the eldest child living at home is 5 or above.
50The younger the single child in the household is, the more likely it is to later be joined 
by more siblings, whereas it may be more likely to have older siblings which have left home 
the older it is.
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just reflect the small sample size of this group.
3.5.3 Urban versus Rural
This section investigates whether there are differences in the association of 
state school quality and private school demand between urban and rural ar­
eas. Urban and rural areas are likely to differ in a number of ways, including in 
terms of income inequality. By a variety of measures, urban areas are charac­
terized by a more unequal distribution of income and in particular by a greater 
concentration of very rich individuals compared to more rural areas51. As dis­
cussed in section 3.2.3, the theory predicts that a more positive association 
of state school quality and private school demand in areas where there is a 
relatively high concentration of high income households who consume only in 
the private sector52.
Table 3.3, column (4) reports results obtained from interacting the state 
school quality variable with dummies for whether the respondent is located in 
Greater London or not. The state school quality coefficient is only positive and 
significant for respondents residing outside Greater London, but almost zero 
and insignificant respondents from London. In a similar spirit, I interact the 
state school quality variable with the degree of urbanicity in column (5). The 
state school quality coefficient is only positive and significant when interacted 
with Semi-urban areas, and again almost zero and insignificant when interacted 
with Urban53.
Consistent with the theoretical prior, the positive association between state
51 The mean as well as the standard deviation of household income in the survey data is 
almost 20 percent higher in London than outside London, although the difference in the 
mean is not statistically significant.
52 A caveat regarding the mapping from the theory to the data is that the model only 
operates with a 3-point income distribution, while income is continuously distributed in the 
data.
53The insignificance of "Town, fringe, village and hamlet "-coefficient may be due to low 
sample size.
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school quality and private school demand thus appears strongest in less urban, 
and less unequal areas, but insignificant in the most urban areas with the 
highest levels of income inequality (greater London and areas classified as 
urban).
3.5.4 Area School Quality
Finally, the association between state school quality and private school de­
mand may depend on the "quality’' of the area in which households reside, 
for examples as measured by mean income levels or mean state school per­
formance. In this section I focus state school performance54. There are two 
reasons for this. First, to the extent households residing in LEAs with poorer 
performing state schools are also poorer, average //, conditional on n > 0, is 
also likely to be lower. As with lower income inequality, the model predicts 
that a lower fraction of high income households (and thus a greater fraction 
of middle income households consuming private education) will result in a 
more positive coefficient on state school quality. Second, suppose there are 
diminishing returns to educational quality. Given household income levels, we 
should then expect households to value marginal improvements to educational 
quality more in relatively poorly performing areas55. We might expect mixed 
households to be more determined to seek out the best local schools in areas 
where schools are generally relatively poor56.
54Mean public school performance is positively correlated with mean income levels. Similar 
results are obtained by dividing the sample into high and low income areas.
55Note that since the regressions include school district (LEA) fixed effects the results 
indicate the extent to which locating near the best public schools within an LEA affects 
households’ inclination to use private education, or, alternatively, the extent to which choos­
ing to consume education in the private sector is associated with households’ propensity to 
locate near the best public schools within an LEA.
56If the marginal cost of obtaining improved educational quality within an LEA, con­
ditional on neighborhood quality excluding education, declines in overall educational per­
formance at the LEA level, this would work in the opposite direction. Note, the stylized 
prediction of the model is that mixed households always demand the highest level of state 
school quality. However, reality might be less clear cut.
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I split the sample into households residing in the 50 percent best perform­
ing LEAs and the 50 percent worst performing LEAs and interact the school 
quality variable with indicator variables for each of these two groups. The 
positive association between state school quality is less than half as big in the 
50 percent best performing LEAs than in the 50 percent worst. The difference 
in the estimated coefficients of state school quality between residents in the 
best and the worst LEAs is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
Households who the live in the worst LEAs and have ever sent children to 
private schools are thus more inclined to be located near the best state schools 
in their LEA than those who live in the best.
3.5.5 Summary and Alternative Interpretations
Taken together, the above results support the prediction of the theoretical 
model that a non-monotonic relationship exists between private school demand 
and state school quality. For households with a relatively low expected ji*, 
given fi* > 0, this association is more positive than it is for households with 
relatively high expected fi. Thus, results are consistent with the theoretical 
model which predicts that pure private school users demand less state school 
quality than both mixed users and pure state school users.
In the following I discuss other possible interpretations of the results. The 
results may be driven by the difference in geographical precision of the state 
school quality and the other neighborhood variables. It may be that individuals 
with strong tastes for (private) education, who are more likely to choose pri­
vate education, also care more strongly about other neighborhood attributes 
which the performance of the 5 closest schools variable may simply better 
and more precisely capture than the other neighborhood controls. Second, a 
potential confounding factor in interpreting the results is the existence of re­
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verse causality in the relationship between aggregate private school enrollment 
and state school performance57. Local private school enrollment may either 
boost or depresses local state school performance. On the one hand, if private 
schools pupils are disproportionately attended by more able pupils, average 
pupil performance could be adversely affected by cream-skimming58. On the 
other hand, it may be that competition or knowledge spill-over effects from 
nearby private schools improve state school performance59. If there were a neg­
ative causal effect of local private school enrollment on local state school test 
scores (because the private sector attracts pupils who are on average placed 
higher in the ability distribution than those who remain in the state sector), 
this would result in downward bias of the estimated effect state school quality. 
This would go against finding the significant aggregate positive school quality 
coefficient.
Yet, reverse causality could be consistent with the negative effect found 
at the very top end of the income distribution. It might be that it is the 
withdrawal of children from by the very most affluent families from the private 
sector, or something unique about private education in the very most affluent 
areas, which most adversely affects tests scores in neighboring state schools. 
However, if such an effect were to drive results, it seems hard to explain why 
this negative effect would not be present for the slightly less affluent households 
(which are still in, say, the top quartile or quintile of the income distribution) 
who consume private education. This would appear to require that there is 
something extremely special about households in the very top percentiles of 
the income distribution, the areas they live in, or the private schools they
5 7 The dependent variable is measured at the individual household level which in a theo­
retical, partial equilibrium sense does not affect aggregate outcomes. Statistically, however, 
using disaggregated data does not dispense with reverse causality.
58 The effect of cream-skimming on public sector performance is studied for example by 
Altonji, Taber and Ching-I (2004) .
59 The literature on how private sector competition affects public school performance in­
cludes Couch et al. (1993), Newmark (1995), Hoxby (1994), and Chan (2006).
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attend, compared to those households only slightly further down the income 
distribution. Though various mechanisms though which state school tests 
scores might be affected by the presence of neighboring private schools can 
be envisaged60, it would also seem to suggest very high correlation between 
household affluence and child ability, or at least child performance on test 
scores. Indeed, even if the withdrawal of the less affluent (but still well above 
average) households from the public sector for some reason do not exert quite as 
big an impact on state school performance as that of the very most fabulously 
affluent, it does appear hard to explain why the difference would be so great. 
Conversely, if salutary competitive pressures from the private sector, instead of 
having a negative effect, exerted a positive causal impact on local state school 
tests scores, the aggregate positive school quality coefficient might be purely 
attributable to reverse causality. However again, it seems difficult to explain 
why a causal effect from private school enrollment to state school quality would 
result in the observed heterogeneity across household income and educational 
backgrounds. This would appear to necessitate that such positive competitive 
effects are not caused by the private schools attended by the very most affluent 
households. It might be that these private schools are so exclusive, and so 
overwhelmingly different from state schools, that the two types of schools are 
effectively are not in competition with one other, either in terms of pupils or 
teachers.
To summarize, reverse causality might bias the results both positively and 
negatively. However, it is hard to come up with compelling explanations that 
do not rely on very ad hoc, unsubstantiated assumptions for why the non­
monotonicity in the association between local public school quality and pri­
vate school demand should be driven by reverse causality. While these concerns
60For instance, it could be driven by the best teachers being attracted to the private, 
rather than the public sector due to better salaries and resources.
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might induce concern about the precision of the point estimates, the qualita­
tive predictions of the theoretical model are consistent with all the empirical 
regularities found in the data as will be elaborated further below.
3.6 Robustness Checks
In this section, I examine the robustness of my results to a number of alter­
native specifications using alternative measures of private school demand and 
state school quality, and including potentially relevant omitted variables.
3.6.1 Alternative M easures o f Local State School Qual-
ity
I first consider alternative measures of local school quality both in terms of 
the way the local market is defined and in terms of the school performance 
measures used. Table 3.4 repeats the baseline probit specification reported in 
Table 3.2 columns (5) and (6) using slightly different measures of local state 
school quality61. Columns (l)-(2) of Table 3.4 include the mean performance 
of the five closest state schools to the estimated household residential location. 
However, as opposed to the baseline measure of 5 or more A*-C GCSE grades, 
I here consider the percentage of pupils achieving one or more GCSE passes. 
This is a measure of the degree to which pupils are not doing very badly rather 
than a measure of how large a proportion of pupils are doing well.
The coefficient on state school quality in column (1) is statistically insignif­
icant, though of positive sign and of comparable magnitude to that in column 
(5) of Table 3.2. Column (2) further includes the interaction term of house­
hold income and local state school quality. In this case, the coefficients on
61 As previously, all the public school quality variables are transformed to have mean zero 
and standard deviation one in the baseline sample.
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both state school quality and the interaction term, respectively of positive and 
negative sign, are statistically significant and are very similar to those obtained 
in column (6) of Table 3.2. Columns (3)-(4) use the same school-level perfor­
mance measure of the fraction of pupils doing well (5 or more A*-C GCSE 
grades). However, I here employ a average at the postcode district in which 
households live, rather than an average over the five closest schools within a 15 
kilometer radius of their estimated residential location. Again, the coefficient 
on state school quality is insignificant in column (3), but significant results 
consistent with the baseline regressions are obtained in column (4), where the 
interaction term of household income and local state school quality is added. 
However, the state school quality coefficient in column (4) is only half as large 
as that in the baseline regression and less significant. A possible interpretation 
of the results is that the percentage of pupils doing very well (5+ A*-C grades) 
just around where households live (5 closest schools) better captures aspects 
of local neighborhood quality that private school consuming households care 
about than either the percentage of pupils not doing very badly (1 or more 
passes) or in a broader geographical area (postcode district average).
I now turn to the interpretation of the negative coefficient on the interaction 
term of household income and local state school quality, given the positive co­
efficient on state school quality as indicative of the association between private 
school demand and local state school quality being positive at lower income 
levels and negative at higher income levels. The implied income cutoffs at 
which the association between private school demand and state school quality 
turns negative are lower than the in baseline regressions. The results in Table
3.4 suggest that a negative relationship exists for the wealthiest roughly 20-25 
percent of the population as opposed to 3 percent as suggested by the baseline 
regression. This difference might reflect a different sensitivity to the different 
measures of state school quality. For instance, it may be that wealthier house­
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holds are more likely to leave the public sector if there is a high proportion of 
very bad pupils as opposed to if there is a small proportion of very good pupils 
in their closest state schools. Similarly, the urge to leave the public sector 
may be greater if not only the 5 closest state schools are not very good (and 
good local public education can nevertheless be obtained), but all schools in 
the postcode district are bad.
3.6.2 A lternative M easures o f Private School Demand
This section considers the sensitivity of results to using school level pupil popu­
lation data as an alternative measure of private school demand to that obtained 
from the survey data.
Survey versus Pupil Population D ata
School level pupil data offers an alternative method of measuring private school 
demand at the local level. The school level pupil data covers the entire popu­
lation of pupils in England at all age levels and in both the public and private 
sector, while the survey data only includes a representative sample of the pop­
ulation. However, the school level data suffers from the drawback that it is not 
possible to control for any pupil or households level characteristics. In addi­
tion, an important difference between the two data sources is as follows: The 
survey data contains information about whether households have ever sent 
any children to private school while the school level pupil data yields infor­
mation on the percentage of pupils enrolled in private education in any given 
year. If some households split educational consumption between the public 
and private sectors, this naturally implies that private education consump­
tion measured by the survey data will be higher than that measured by the
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pupil data62. Indeed, as noted in section 3.4, the survey measure of private 
school demand is almost twice as large as the pupil based measure, although 
the two measures are highly correlated at the regional level. By construction, 
“mixed” households with relatively low //, given /i > 0, will be overrepresented 
among private school users in the survey data compared to the school level 
data. Moreover, we there are reasons to expect households from the top end 
of the income distribution, with higher expected /x, to be slightly underrep­
resented in the survey data63, which will further skew the representation of 
low /x households. In view of the previous discussion and results, we might 
therefore expect to find a more positive association between private school 
demand and local public sector quality in the survey data than in the pupil 
population data64. In addition, it may be that reverse causality is stronger for 
the pupil population data than for the survey data for structural reasons. It 
appears plausible that the impact on postcode district state school quality of 
the faction of pupils enrolled in private education in that postcode district is 
greater than the impact on the 5 closest state schools to a given residential 
location that a given fraction of those households has sent their children to pri­
vate school at some point in time. A large catchment area for private schools 
(particularly boarding schools) might dilute the impact of households sending 
children to private school on overall state school performance in a the area in 
which they live. Finally, it is possible to focus on private school enrollment at
62If households who consume private education had more children than those who do not, 
this could counteract this relationship. However, there is no evidence that this is the case.
6311.3 of survey respondents are dropped because no household income is available. Among 
the respondents who have answered the private education question but not the household 
income question, the percentage who have ever sent children to private school is 18.4 per­
cent compared to 13.3 percent in the baseline sample. This suggests that the observations 
dropped due missing income information are drawn disporportionately from the top end of 
the income distribution.
64 A second difference is that while the survey data provides information about the resi­
dential location of households and hence pupils, but none about school location, the school 
level data contains the geographical location of the school they attend, but none about their 
residential location. It is not obvious how this might affect results.
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particular ages using the pupil population data. Since the state school quality 
measure is based on exams taken at age 15, a stronger association with private 
school enrollment at age 15 than at younger ages might be expected.
P ostcode D istrict Level Regressions
In order to produce as comparable regression results as possible using the 
different available measures of private school demand and state school quality 
aggregated at the postcode district level, I proceed as follows: Due to sample 
size limitations and the absence of any apparent time trend, I aggregate the 
survey based private school variable over all the years included in the survey 
at the postcode district level, while I construct yearly data at the postcode 
district level on private school enrollment and state school performance based 
on the school level data05.
I estimate linear probability regressions of the form
Pklt = a Qklt +  VXklt +  @t +  <t>l +  €klt
Where Put denotes private school demand in postcode district in k and 
school district (LEA) I at time t. Qkit and Xkit denote measures of state 
school quality and other neighborhood characteristics, respectively, in postcode 
district k at time t. In all regressions, as previously, Xkit includes house prices 
and the fraction of the population with higher level qualifications. 6t and 4>l 
are time and school district fixed affects. Table 3.5 reports results obtained 
using the different measures in turn66.
In column (1), I use the baseline measures of private school demand and
65For more details, see Data Appendix, section 6.3.4.
66 Note that to make results as comparable to the results of the probit analyses reported in 
Table 2, the private school demand measure in all cases varies between zero and one and the 
public school quality variables are again standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of one.
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local state school quality aggregated at the postcode district level. This regres­
sion thus constitutes an aggregated version of the probit regression reported in 
column (2) of Table 3.267. The state school quality coefficient remains positive 
and significant, though it is somewhat smaller in magnitude than the equiva­
lent coefficient in the baseline probit regression results. Similarly, column (2) 
provides an aggregated version of the results reported in column (3) of Table
3.4 . Mirroring the results obtained with the disaggregated survey data; the 
coefficient on the average performance of state schools in the postcode district 
is close to zero and insignificant. Next, in column (3), I regress the aggregated 
baseline measure of state school quality on the percentage of pupils enrolled 
in private education at the postcode district level. The state school quality 
coefficient is negative but statistically insignificant. Recall that this measure is 
based on the mean performance of the 5 closest schools within a 15 kilometer 
radius of the survey respondents’ residential location. The geographical loca­
tion of these schools may thus not overlap with the postcode district, or may 
not be representative of the overall postcode district performance. Column 
(4) therefore instead uses the postcode district average of school performance 
as local state school measure. The coefficient on this variable is negative and 
strongly significant. Columns (5) and (6) replicate columns (3) and (4), re­
placing the dependent variable with the percentage of 15-year old pupils in 
private education at the postcode district level, instead of the percentage of all 
pupils. The results are very similar though the negative state school quality 
coefficient is greater in absolute terms68.
67The level of observation here is year-postcode sectors, rather than respondents. It is 
somewhat artificial to include year variation. Given the way the private school demand and 
public school quality variables are constructed, the only source of yearly variation is the 
house price data. This approach is taken for the purpose of comparability only. Very similar 
results are obtained using only one time period of data.
68 Smaller and less significant coefficients are furthermore obtained in unreported regres­
sions where private school demand is defined the fraction of 6 or 10-year old pupils in private 
education.
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These results are striking in that statistically significant coefficients of op­
posite signs and non-trivial magnitudes are obtained on the local state school 
quality variables using different methods of measuring private school demand. 
However, the differences in results obtained with the two data sets may plausi­
bly be explained by greater representation of more mixed private school users 
compared to "purer" private school users in the survey data compared to the 
pupil population data (lower average (i given that fi > 0 in survey data). As 
argued previously, by construction of the respective data sets, mixed users will 
be more heavily represented in the survey data, and there wall be non-negative 
measurement error of the private school consumption of the mixed users. This 
creates an upward bias in the estimated linear relationship (see also panels B 
and C of Figure 3.1). In addition, the very top end of the income distribution 
(with higher expected fi) is likely to be slightly underrepresented in the survey 
data (see section 3.6.2). As such the results are consistent with the theoret­
ical prediction that the association between private school demand and state 
school quality is positive for households with mixed educational consumption 
while it is negative for pure private school households.
3.6.3 Further Empirical Issues
I finally address a number of additional issues relating to measurement error 
and potential omitted variable bias.
M easurem ent Error: C ontem poraneous Variables, Tim ing and Lo­
cation
As discussed in section 3, measurement error in the local state school qual­
ity variable stems, among other things, from the fact that the characteristics 
of households’ residential location at the time of the interview may not re­
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fleet the neighborhood characteristics on the basis of which private schooling 
decisions have been made. The failure to match the survey data to neighbor­
hood characteristics prevailing at the time schooling decisions are made, might 
bias the state school quality coefficient if the performance of state schools in 
neighborhoods with a greater prevalence of private schools tend to evolve dif­
ferently from those without. Although both school performance and house 
prices have increased drastically over the period considered, the ranking of 
different postcode districts has not changed markedly overall over the period 
for which data is available. The correlation coefficient between 1995 and 2002 
postcode district level average state school performance and house prices is 
0.92 and 0.85, respectively09. These correlations suggest that the ranking of 
postcode districts in terms of school performance and house prices in the mid 
1990s are fairly good proxies for their rank in the earlier period of the survey 
data, 1986-1992 (1994 in the case of house prices data).
As noted in section 3.2, the evidence suggests that residential mobility 
for families with children is relatively limited. Moreover, to the extent that 
circumstances and tastes tend to be relatively fixed before and after moving, 
and households tend to relocate to similar areas in terms of state school quality, 
the results would not be affected. Nevertheless, the possibility tha t households 
- at the time of the interview - no longer reside in the location where there made 
schooling decisions, might introduce bias if households change local state school 
quality once they move, and in particular if this change differs depending on 
households’ degree of private sector consumption. Suppose, for example, that 
households tend move home after retirement, after all children have completed 
primary and secondary education and leave home. At this point, the quality of 
local state schools, relative to other neighborhood characteristics, is likely to
69 The correlation coefficient between 1993 and 2006 public school performance at the 
postcode district level is 0.68.
97
be a lesser concern in determining residential location. Comparing households 
post-retirement would thus bias the state school coefficient towards zero, and 
would go against finding any significant relationship'0.
The first part of Table 4.6 explores the sensitivity of results to splitting the 
sample into groups which are likely to be differentially affected by problems 
relating to measurement error resulting from lack of contemporaneous match­
ing of variables. I first limit the sample to households with children below the 
age of 18. This decreases the scope for the time gap between the contempo­
raneous neighborhood data and schooling decisions. Column (1) of Table 4.6 
reports results when only households with children below 18 living at home 
are included. While the smaller sample size (reduced by more than a half) 
leads to larger standard errors and thus a slightly less precise point estimate, 
the school quality coefficient is almost identical to the baseline specification. 
There is thus no immediately obvious direction of bias resulting from this type 
of measurement error.
A further source of discrepancy in the timing of private schooling decisions 
and the neighborhood variables is present for the survey data dating from 
before 1995. Contemporaneous house price data is only available for 1995 
onwards, and the school data begins in 1993. In addition, the association 
between state school quality and private school demand may have changed 
over time. The publication of league tables from 1992 onwards has made 
state school quality more observable to households. Increased observability of 
state school quality may have made households are more inclined to substitute 
public for private education when state schools are relatively poor and thus
70 Another possibility is that residential relocation tends to follow income shocks resulting 
from job loss or divorce which may alter people’s choice sets and preferences such that 
households locate in less attractive neighborhoods and perhaps also, given neighborhood 
quality, with lower quality state schools. This would introduce bias if consumption private 
education is correlated -with the likelihood of households being subjected to such shocks. 
However, it seems implausible that this mechanism should affects results in any decisive 
way.
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reducing the positive correlation. Columns (2)-(3) of Table 4.6 show that, by 
splitting the sample into 1986-1994 and 1995-2002 data, the coefficient on state 
school quality is indeed more than twice as large in regressions run on the early 
period of data as it is in regressions the later period of data71. Nevertheless, 
when interaction terms of dummies for the two time periods with the state 
school quality variable are included in column (4), the difference in coefficients 
shrinks, and an F-test cannot reject that they are identical.
To conclude, the results therefore suggest that increasing the sample size 
by including the earlier data does substantially increase the precision of the 
results without introducing any significant bias.
Private School Supply and Performance
Finally, I consider the robustness of the results to private school supply factors 
which may be correlated with both private school demand and state school 
quality. The use of boarding schools (about 25 percent of private enrollment) 
implies that private school quality may be decoupled from neighborhood char­
acteristics of households’ residential location. However, households may be mo­
tivated to choose private education by the relative difference in performance 
between the local state and private schools. Furthermore, the relationship 
between state school quality and private school demand could depend on the 
availability of local private schools which facilitate private school consumption. 
Column (5) of Table 4.6 restricts the sample to households living in postcode 
districts which contain private schools which offer GCSE exams. This reduces 
the sample size to 30 percent of the baseline sample. The coefficient on state 
school quality increases in size, but decreases in statistical significance. Col­
71 Note that the samples sizes for the pre-1995 and 1995+ periods to not sum to the 
baseline sample size. This is because observations are lost due to the inclusion of LEA fixed 
effects. Lack of variation in private school demand at the LEA level results in failure to 
consume private education being predicted perfectly.
99
umn (6) reports coefficient estimates for the same sub-sample as in column (5) 
but including the mean performance of private schools in the postcode district. 
The coefficient on this variable is positive, as expected, but insignificant and 
the state school quality coefficient does not budge. As the catchment areas for 
private schools tends to be greater than for state schools, I also run regressions 
for the larger sample of households with a private school within a 15 kilometer 
radius (95 percent of the baseline sample). In these regressions I control for 
the mean performance of the 5 nearest private schools, rather than the mean 
postcode district performance of private schools. The results are reported in 
column (7). Relative to the baseline sample, the state school coefficient in­
creases slightly, but remains highly statistically significant. The private school 
coefficient is once again positive and insignificant.
The results may also be driven by the characteristics of neighborhoods in 
which private schools locate. It might be that private schools only locate in 
areas with very good state schools because the households they primarily cater 
to live in such areas. Neglecting to control for this could result in upward bias 
on the school quality coefficient. To address this concern, columns (8)-(9) of 
Table 4.6 control for the distance to the closest private school72- In both sets 
of regressions, the state school quality coefficient is unchanged relative to the 
baseline results. The coefficient on distance in column (8) is negative and 
statistically significant, suggesting that a residential location in proximity to 
private schools is associated with greater private school attendance. To further 
investigate how distance to private schools affects private school demand, I split 
the sample into quarters by distance to the closest private school. The resulting 
indicator variables are included in the estimation results reported in column
72 The distance is based on estimated geographic coordinates (easting and northing) of 
household location and the exact geographic coordinates of all private schools. The latter is 
available in the Department for Education and Skills Edubase data.
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(9). It seems that distance only matters for those households living within 2 
kilometers of the nearest private school. The state school quality coefficient 
remains unchanged. Overall, it thus appears that local private school demand 
is related local private school supply, as expected. Yet there is no evidence 
that local private school supply fundamentally alters the relationship between 
private school demand and state school quality.
3.7 Conclusion
The key finding emerging from this paper is that the connection between local 
private school demand and local state school quality depends upon underlying 
characteristics of the households consuming private education. The theoretical 
model suggests that household income and preferences for educational quality 
affect households’ distribution of educational consumption between the public 
and private sectors which in turn drives the demand for local state school 
quality. Depending on the distribution of income, we may therefore find either 
a positive or a negative correlation between private school demand and local 
state school quality in a cross-section of households. Empirically I find an 
overall positive correlation between household private school demand and local 
state school quality exists. Yet, consistent with the model, this association 
declines in household income and is negative for households at the top end 
of the income distribution. The policy implications of these results are that 
the interaction of public and private education is likely to depend on whether 
private sector households consume education only in the private sector, pr also 
in the public sector.
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3.8 Appendix: Proofs/Derivations
P ro o f  o f P ro p o sitio n  1: Substituting for x  using the budget constraint, the 
household’s optimization problem in section (3.2) can be rewritten as:
max w =  (pqp +  (1 -  /i) qg) (y -  cqg -  fipqp)
P-.Qg^p
1—A
subject to:
0 < (i < 1
o <  <  qk, k € {g,p} (3.9)
Form the Lagrangean function:
L  (m> Qgi Qp) =  u  (/b  Qg> gP)+*7iM+*72 (1 -  ^ )+ % ^ + ??4  {q9 ~  Q g)+r)sQp+Ve ( qp ~  Qp) 
The first order conditions with respect to /i,qg and qp are as follows:
(Ax)
dL (p, qg, qv) 
dfi
= u (p ,q g,qp)
7r x +  Vi -  V2 =  0
(Aii)
dL {fi,qg,qp) 
dqg — u (/x, qg, qp)
A(1zA  - (1 - a) £'
7r x
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(Aiii)
d L (n ,q g,qp) /i ,
  = V ’(fi ,qg,qp) A -  -  (1 -  A) —  +  r/5 -  ??6 =  0
v  L 7T X  -
For the following pairs, both constraints cannot be binding:
77^  =  0 vs. 772 (1 — /tx) =  0
VsQg =  0 vs. r)4 (qg -  qg) = 0
%QP =  0 vs. rj6 (qp -  qp) = 0 
Note that if all multipliers are equal to 0, the above expressions simplify
to:
(Bi)
(Bii)
(Biii)
a ?p_ _ 9£ =  {1 _  A) PQp (3 1Q)
7T X
A(1— A£) =  (1 _  A) £  (3 n )
7T X
^  =  (1 -  A) I  (3.12)
7T X
There are three cases depending on the level of household income (for a 
given A). I proceed by first considering three possible outcomes of the choice 
variable / / : / /* =  0; //* € (0,1) and fi* = 1. From this I derive the associated 
optimal values of the choice variables qg and qp, subject to the constraints on 
the choice variables, as well as the levels of y that are compatible with the 
three outcomes. Based on these income levels, I define three income groups.
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Case 1: Low income households; no consum ption in the private sec­
tor
No consumption in the private sector, /i* =  0, implies that 7r* =  q*g, x* = 
yL — cq* and r)2 = 0, while q* is indeterminate (households are indifferent 
about optimal qg since they do not consume in the private sector). (Aiii) 
simplifies to 775 — 776 =  0. But since > 0 (=£• q* = 0) is incompatible with 
r]6 > 0 (=> q* =  qp), we must have that r)5 = y6 = 0. That is, neither of the 
constraints on private school quality are binding. Hence, (Aiii) simplifies to 
(Biii) ^  =  (1 -  A) ^  or
Qg Vl  ~  cq*g
Suppose the constraints on public sector quality are not binding: q* € 
[0, qg] and thus 773 =  774 =  0, then (Aii) simplifies to (Bii) which yields
* ^ L r- Tn — 1
% =  —  6  L0 ’ Qg\
Now suppose the upper bound is binding rjA > 0, which implies q* =  qg 
and 773 =  0. That is, in the absence of the upper bound on qg, we would have
optimal qg > qg. Then (Aii) implies ^  — (1 — A) ^  > 0 o r
* -  ^  XV
q9 =  q9 <  —
which is a contradiction of /1* =  0. If desired expenditure on education 
(Ay) exceeds the cost of obtaining the maximal level of quality attainable in 
the public sector (cqg), then it is optimal to seek additional quality in the 
private sector, or \x* > 0.
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Case 2: M iddle incom e households; consum ption in both public and
private sectors
Consumption in both the public and private sectors, I > fi* > 0, imply that 
q* >  0 and q* > 0 and that rjx =  rj2 =  rj3 = rj5 =  0. Hence (Ai) simplifies 
to (Bi). Suppose rjA — 0. Then (Aii) simplifies to (Bii). Dividing (Bi) by 
(Bii) yields q* =  0 which is a contradiction of q* > 0. Hence, we must have 
that the upper bound on state school quality is binding and q* = qg. Next, 
suppose r]6 = 0. Then (Aiii) simplifies to (Biii). Dividing (Bii) by (Biii) 
yields (1 — //) =  £ >  1 which is a contradiction of 1 > (j,* > 0. Hence, it must 
be that the upper bound on private school quality is binding and q* =  qp. 
Consequently we have 
(EQ)
7T* =  (1 -  /i*) qg +  fi*q„
(BC)
(Ci)
(Cii)
(Ciii)
yM = x +cqg + fi pqp
A' k ^  =  ( 1 _ A)^
7r* x*
A( l z ^ > ( 1 _ A)±
7T* X*
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U p p e r b o u n d  on  y  Dividing (Cii) by (Ci) and rearranging (BC) and (Ci) 
yields:
(i)
P Q p
(ii)
»  y -  CQ a — X
p  = -------- =-------
PQp
(iii)
=  (1 — A) ( y  -  cqg +  ^ r )  
V  Q p -  Q a )p g ,
By (i) and (ii):
Vm < P Q p - c  (gp -  qg) +  cqg + x '
= ( p - c ) QP + 2cqg + ( l - \ ) ( y M - c q g + F ^ ->J
=  l ( v - c) a  + ^ c s  + i i = H & 5 i.X \y  x cQg ^  a  Qn—Qn
Lower b o u n d  on  y  We have the following equations: 
(BC):
(Cii), (Ci) and (BC) 
X  from (Ci)
Vm  =  x* +  cqg +  n*pqp
Rearranging (Ci), (Cii) and (Ciii) we obtain:
, =  A {y -  cqg) _  qg (1 -  A) 
PQp { % - % )
* 1 — A 7r*c
x  >
A ( 1 - p * )
* 1 — A *x > —-— 7r p
A
We therefore have that yM > ^  (i ^ 7) +  +  p*pqp > -f2- and Pm >
+  cqg +  p*pqp > ^ q gp +  cqg > since p* G [0,1] and qp - q g > 0.73
Hence
y A , > T
Finally, plugging q* = qg and qp =  into (Bi), yields
A (y ~  cqg) qg (1 -  A)
p =
PQp {QP ~  %)
But we also know from (Aii) (because r)s =  0 and r/4 > 0): A-1.!' ■ >
(1 — A) -p while (Bi) entails that A^P~J9 =  (1 — A) Dividing yields:
73 The full derivation does not produce any intuitively meaningful results:
V > —)r ^ P  +  cqg +  ppqp
= ^  ((1 -  p) qg +  pqp) p  +  cqg +  ppqp
= w  [ { %  ~  ^ r Q g ) ]  + { ^ p  +  c) %
= t  _ [ f e - ^ s ) ]  ( i^ -^ i^ y )  + (1Ti P + c)9s
2 — A)«®)]
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pqp
Case 3: H igh incom e households; no consum ption in the public sec­
tor
No consumption in the public sector, /x* =  1, implies that q* =  0, n* =  q* > 0, 
x* = Vr ~ PQp and ^  =  rj4 = r/5 = 0.
Suppose r]2 = 0. Then (Ai) simplifies to A|£ = (1 — A) ^  or
* ^Vr
QP = -----
P P
Plugging into (Aiii) implies rj6 =  0.
Next, suppose rj2 > 0. Then (Ai) implies — (1 — A) ^  > 0 .  Rear­
ranging yields
. AVr 
Qp < ^
P
And (Aiii) implies r)6 > 0 or q* =  qp. 
D erivation o f corollary 2
Vm  <  P Q p - c  (qp -  qg) +  cqg + x
=  ( p - c ) q p +  2cqg +  ( \ - \ )
=  ¥~—a 4 -  — -  co 4 -  —  y\ Q p  A  C(*9 +  A  qn-qn ~
VM ~  c y  +
{<?*} . ^  =  qp if and only if yr > ^|£. We therefore have that {qp} i=R < 
if
PQp n
l/M,max ^ < 1 1
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or
or
rr, X N -  _  1 c  1 -  A pqvqa
[ ( !  + ^ ) q g -  qP] t  +  — t —  = — = -  <  o  
A  A  qP - q g
(qP -  qg) ( ( i  +  A) -  qp) >  ( i  -  A) 9
where the latter term is always positive, but goes to 0  as A —► 1.
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Figure 3.1: The Demand for Private Education and Local State School Quality 
given Different Income Distributions: Numerical Examples
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Figure 3.2: Demand for Private Education
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
All
( 1)
No child 
privately 
educated
(2)
Child
privately
educated
(3)
Respondent characteristics a
Household income (mid-point of bands, adjusted 196.7 185.2 273.7
by retail price index) [147] [138.4] [176.6]
Higher education below degree 14.4 13.1 22.9
A level or equivalent 8.6 8.2 11.5
O level or equivalent 18.5 18.9 15.9
No qualification 38.7 41.4 21
Respondent attended private education? 11.8 7.8 38.7
Age of respondent 50.7 50 55.8
[15.5] [15.5] [14.7]
Married or cohabitating 70 69.7 71.5
Religious 64 62.7 72.7
Conservative supporter* 19.7 16.5 40.6
Neighborhood characteristics
Mean performance o f  5 nearest public schools b
5 or more A*-C GCSE grades (2006 school 58.2 57.8 60.6
data)** [9.4] [9.4] [9.3]
Postcode district level characteristics
Average house prices (£1,000,2006 prices)0 194.1 188.7 229.5
[96.3] [91.8] [115.2]
Percent o f population with higher level 14.1 13.7 16.6
qualifications*1 [6.3] [6.2] [6.9]
N 16206 14049 2157
Percent 100 86.7 13.3
Sources:
a: British Social Attitudes Survey, 1986-2002 
b: Department for Education and Skills, 1993-2006 
c: Land Registry 1995-2002 
d: UK 2001 Census
* Respondents are classified as political "supporters" if they respond yes and specify a particular political 
party in response to the question: generally speaking, do you see yourself as a supporter of any one 
political party?
**Weighted average by pupils aged 15 in each school
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Table 3.2: Private Education and Public School Quality
(Dependent variable: Child attended private education?)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean performance of 5 nearest public 0.038*** 0.026*** 0.011*** 0.006** 0.009*** 0.018***
schools [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005]
Log house prices 0.063*** 0.017 -0.002 0.004 0.002
[0.018] [0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.014]
Percent of population with higher level 0.003*** 0.002** 0.002*** 0.001* 0.001
qualifications [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Mean performance of 5 nearest public -0.034**
schools x Household income [0.015]
Income cutoff (=alpha/gamma) 0.529
Income percentile above which negative
relationship between public school quality 96.9
and private school demand
Household income, education, and
demographic controls y y y y
Household taste controls y y y
Neighborhood taste controls y y y
School district (LEA) FE y y
Number of school districts (LEAs) 138 138 138 138 138 138
Number of postcode districts 1110 1110 1110 1110 1110 1110
Observations 16206 16206 16206 16206 16206 16206
Pseudo R-squared 0.04 0.15 0.19 0.22 0.24 0.24
Notes: Marginal effects of probit regression. All regressions include year and regional fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the postcode district (e.g. WC2A) level are reported in brackets. Local public school 
quality is measured as the mean fraction of pupils achieving 5 or more A*-C GCSE grades in the 5 public 
schools located closest to the estimated household location, Additional household income controls include 
education, marital status and age, while the additional taste controls consist of religious affiliation and political 
allegiance. Neighborhood taste control consits of the fraction of survey individuals at the postcode district level 
who profess allegiance to the Conservative party, see Table 4.1 for details. * means significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%
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T a b le  3.3: H e te ro g e n e i ty  in A sso c ia t io n  b e tw e e n  P r iv a te  E d u ca t io n  and  Publ ic  School  Q u a l i ty
(Dependent variable: Child attended private education?)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 public school performance interacted with:
Respondent privately educated 0.001
[0.005]
Respondent not privately educated 0.014***
[0.003]
ildest child at home <11 0.014**
[0.007]
ildest child at home 1 or over 0.011***
[0.004]
Jo children at home below 18 0.010***
[0.004]
)nly child 5-14 0.016
[0.010]
Jot only child 5-14 0.013***
[0.004]
greater London 0.003
[0.007]
Jot Greater London 0.012***
[0.003]
Jrban 0.008
[0.006]
emi-urban 0.014***
[0.004]
'own, fringe, village and hamlet 0.006
[0.007]
0 percent best performing LEAs 0.007*
[0.004]
0 percent worst performing LEAs 0.018***
[0.005]
t 5.54 0.26 0.06 1.23 1.5 3.53
ue 0.019 0.877 0.812 0.267 0.470 0.060
rvations 16206 16206 16206 16206 16206 16206
lo R-squared 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.23
>: Marginal effects of probit regression. All regressions include the same respondent and neighborhood 
ols as the baseline regression reported in Table 3.2, column (5). Robust standard errors clustered at the 
ode district (e.g. WC2A) level are reported in brackets. The null for the F-tests are that the coefficients on 
iteraction terms are identical. * means significant at 10%; ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%
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Table 3.4: Robustness Checks. Alternative Measures o f Local Public School Quality
(Dependent variable: Child attended private education?)
easure of public school performance: More than 5 A*-C
1 or more GCSE passes GCSE
iverage over: 5 closest schools postcode district
(1) (2) (3) (4)
>cal public school quality 0.005 0.016*** 0 0.009*
[0.004] [0.005] [0.003] [0.005]
ousehold income (adj) 0.272*** 0.282*** 0.258*** 0.265***
[0.018] [0.018] [0.019] [0.019]
;>cal public school quality x Household income -0.053*** -0.034**
[0.014] [0.015]
come cutoff (=alpha/gamma) 0.302 0.265
come percentile above which negative
lationship between public school quality and 78.5 74.5
ivate school demand
ihool district (LEA) fixed effects yes yes yes yes
jighborhood "tastes" covariate yes yes yes yes
limber of school districts (LEAs) 138 138 138 138
amber of postcode districts 1084 1084 946 946
jservations 16206 16206 14476 14476
eudo R-squared 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.23
>tes: Marginal effects of probit regression. Robust standard errors clustered at the postcode district (e.g. 
C2A) level are reported in brackets. All regressions include the same respondent and neighborhood 
mtrols as the baseline regression reported in Table 3.2, column (5). Futher details on the public school 
rformance measures are provided in the text. * means significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
piificant at 1%.
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Table 3.5: Robustness Checks: Alternative Measures of Private School Demand
(Survey versus pupil population data postcode district level regressions)
Dependent variable Pet. ever sent child to Pet. of pupils in Pet. of 15- year olds
private school private schools in private schools
Source BSAS DfES DfES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Local public school performance
5 closest schools to respondents in survey data, 0.018*** -0.006 -0.008
averaged at postcode district level [0.007] [0.004] [0.005]
Postcode disctrict average 0 -0.012*** -0.019***
[0.006] [0.004] [0.005]
Neighborhood controls
Log average house prices 0.072*** 0.082*** 0.066*** 0.070*** 0.037* 0.044**
[0.024] [0.024] [0.016] [0.016] [0.020] [0.020]
Percent of population with higher level qualific; 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.007***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Number of school districts (LEAs) 139 139 139 139 139 139
Number of postcode districts 1007 1007 1007 1007 1007 1007
Observations 11032 11032 11032 11032 11032 11032
R-squared 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.25 0.27
Notes: Linear probability postcode district level regressions. The sample consists of all postcode sectors with both 
survey observations and public schools with GCSE data. All regressions include time and LEA fixed effects. 
Standard errors have been adjusted for serial correlation within postcode districts.
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Table 3.6: Further Robustness Checks
(Dependent variable: Child attended private education?)
Private Private Private Private
Sample Children 1986-1994 1995-2002 All
school in school in school school
All
<18 data data postcode
district
postcode
district
within 15 
km
within 15 
km
( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Mean performance (AC5) of 5 nearest public 0.010** 0.017*** 0.007* 0.017* 0.017* 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009***
schools [0.005] [0.006] [0.004] [0.010] [0.010] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
1986-1994 data x Mean performance of 5 0.011**
nearest public schools [0.005]
1995-2002 data x Mean performance of 5 0.008**
nearest public schools [0.004]
Postcode disctrict average private school 0.005
performance [0.006]
Mean performance (AC5) of 5 nearest private 0.004
schools [0.003]
Distance to closest private schools -0.002**
[0.001]
Less than 2km to nearest private school (1/4 of 0.027*
sample) [0.015]
1.8-3.7km to nearest private school 0.013
[0.014]
3.7-7.2km to nearest private school 0.007
[0.013]
7.2+km to nearest private school 0.011
[0.013]
Observations 6757 6397 9472 16206 4778 4778 15348 15348 16206
Pseudo R-squared 0.24 0.27 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.23
Notes: Marginal effects of probit regression. All regressions include the same respondent and neighborhood controls as the baseline regression reported in Table 3.2, column 
(5). Robust standard errors clustered at the postcode district (e.g. WC2A) level are reported in brackets. * means significant at 10%; ** significant at 5% and *** significant 
at 1%.
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Chapter 4
Religion, Political A llegiance 
and Private Schooling Choices 
in England
4.1 Introduction
A large fraction of private schools are at least nominally religious, and views are 
divided as to whether private schools are desirable or not. While a growing 
body of literature investigates how culture, beliefs, values and norms shape 
individual behavior, very little is known about how such variables are linked 
to educational choices.
In this paper I explore the association between parents’ religion and po­
litical allegiance and their private schooling choices, with primary focus on 
the relationship between religious beliefs and private school demand. I use 
household level data from 1986 to 2005 from the nationally representative 
British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS). These surveys includes information 
on whether respondents have ever sent a child to private school as well as a 
range of respondent/household characteristics. The surveys include informa­
tion about religious affiliation as well as about the intensity of beliefs (fre­
quency of attending religious services, frequency of prayer, perceived strength 
of religious beliefs and degree of belief in God). Furthermore, respondents
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are asked about their political allegiance and beliefs. To isolate the effect of 
religion and political allegiance from other confounding effects, I control for 
several individual and household characteristics: household income, education, 
including whether privately educated, marital status and age.
I find that self-reported religious beliefs and political allegiance are strongly 
and robustly correlated with private school demand. However, there is con­
siderable variation in the relationship between religion and private education 
across religious denominations. The impact of religion on private school de­
mand is strongest for minority religious denominations (Roman Catholic, Mus­
lim, Hindu and Jewish), wdiile no aggregate relationship exists for the 40 per­
cent of respondents who belong to the largest religious denomination repre­
sented in the data, the Church of England. Further, the demand for private 
education increases in the intensity of religious beliefs and practices, suggest­
ing that the religious effect is to a large extent driven by religious motives. 
However, the greater Muslim, Hindu and Jewish demand for private education 
appears to be primarily caused by a greater preference for education among 
these groups. As to political allegiance, stating support for the Conservative 
party, which views private education favorably, is associated with a signifi­
cantly higher propensity to choose private education. The opposite is true for 
individuals who support the Labour party, which is critical of private educa­
tion. Furthermore, I find evidence that the strength of the association between 
political allegiance and private schooling depends significantly on the extent 
of identification expressed with the political party in question. Overall, these 
results suggest that religious, ethnic and political factors play important roles 
in non-trivial economic decisions. The results are robust to the inclusion of ad­
ditional controls for income, education and wealth, school district fixed effects 
and neighborhood controls including the performance of local state schools, 
house prices and the percentage of the population with higher level qualifi­
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cations. Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that the observed correlations 
cannot readily be interpreted as causal effects. In particular, unobserved vari­
ables may cause people both to be more religious or shape their political party 
affiliations as well as affect their preferences towards education in general, and 
private education in particular. Moreover, reverse causality cannot be ruled 
out: The act of sending children to (religious) private school may affect par­
ents’ religious and political beliefs and behavior.
This paper contributes to a substantial body of literature on schooling 
choices. There is sizeable literature modelling individuals’ choice between con­
suming publicly provided private goods, such as education, in the public or 
private sector. Examples include Stiglitz (1974), Besley and Coate (1991) and 
Epple and Romano (1996, 1998). With a few exceptions like Kremer and 
Sarychev (1998), Dixit (2002) and Besley and Ghatak (2005), the existing the­
oretical literature does not consider individuals’ preferences for other attributes 
of education than pure academic quality or academic achievement. Empirical 
studies on the determinants of the supply and demand for private education in­
clude Downes and Greenstein (1996, 2002), Figlio and Stone (2001) and Munk 
(2007a, b). Downes and Greenstein (1996, 2002) and Munk (2007a) study 
religious schools separately from secular schools. A number papers have, pri­
marily based on US data, studied whether (religious) private schools are more 
effective providers of education than the state sector. This literature includes 
Rouse (1998), Altonji, Elder and Taber (2000b), Figlio and Stone (2000), Neal 
(2007)1. Using UK data, Gibbons and Silva (2006) study whether state aided 
religious schools produce better educational outcomes than secular schools. 
None of these papers, however, use micro data  to investigate the relationship 
between religion and political allegiance and the demand for (religious) private
focu sin g  on the religious aspect Gibbons and Silva (2006) study whether state aided 
religious schools produce better educational outcomes than secular schools.
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education at the household level. There are several micro level studies on the 
effects of religion on various other economic outcomes. Religion seems to affect 
wages (Chiswick, 1983), school attendance (Freeman, 1986), health (Ellison, 
1991), criminal behavior (Evans et al., 1995) and economic attitudes conducive 
to higher per capita income and growth (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2003). 
More broadly, this paper is related to a growing empirical literature underscor­
ing the importance of individual cultural background and beliefs in explaining 
attitudes and behavior2.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides 
some background information about religion and political beliefs in England. 
Section 4.3 describes the data and section 4.4 presents some preliminary data 
analysis. Section 4.5 describes the empirical approach and discusses the base­
line results. Sections 4.6 and 4.7 further explore the relationship between pri­
vate school demand and religion and political allegiance, respectively. Section 
4.8 reviews the robustness of the results and section 4.9 concludes.
4.2 Background
This section briefly provides some background knowledge to motivate why 
religion and political beliefs may m atter for private education choices.
4.2.1 Religious Private Education
Around 50 percent of private schools in England are nominally religious3. How­
ever, in many cases they are so primarily for historical reasons. Nominally
2For example, this literature finds that home country/region attributes are predictive of: 
immigrants’ economic achievement (Borjas, 1999), fertility rates (Fernandez and Fogli, 2005) 
and corruption (Fisman and Miguel, 2006). Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln (2005) find that 
exposure to Communism has made East Germans much more pro-state than West Germans.
3 The sources of this information are the Edubase files released yearly from the Depart­
ment of Education and Skillls.
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religious private schools generally do not pursue religious indoctrination of 
pupils and generally do not preclude pupils of other faiths from attending if 
they wish. Furthermore, the requirement of state schools to timetable periods 
of Christian worship diminishes the need for mainstream religious households 
to have their religious taste satisfied in the private sector, but not necessarily 
for minority religious households. Religious schools set up by minority groups, 
especially those opened in recent years so that the religious label is not a his­
torical relic, are more likely to be genuinely religious and to differ substantially 
from state schools. Accounting for 5.2 and 2.6 percent of all private schools, 
respectively, Muslims and Jews are the only non-Christian religious groups 
with a non-negligible and well defined religious school presence. The Muslim 
private school sector was virtually non-existent a few decades ago, but has 
grown rapidly in recent years. (For further details or religious private schools, 
see Munk 2007a).
4.2.2 Political Allegiance and Private Education
In England, private education is rendered politically sensitive by the highly un­
equal nature of the English educational system and the predominantly elitist 
character of private education. Most agree that private education is generally 
superior to public education for the individual pupil4. However, views are di­
vided as to whether private schools are socially desirable. As such, households 
may experience a conflict between what they perceive to be in their personal 
interest and what they perceive to be in the collective interest, or in confor­
mity with the norms and beliefs of the groups they belong to. As shown in
4 The average annual fee for a child in a private secondary school is approximately 40% 
of median disposable income for UK households or 20% at the 90th percentile (Graddy and 
Stevens, 2003). It is widely believed that attending exclusive private schools improves future 
life chances. Naylor, Smith and McKnight (2002) find evidence that private school atten­
dance confers a wage premium on former students of roughly 3 percent, which is increasing 
in the level of school fees.
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Figure 4.4, attitudes towards private education expressed in survey data differ 
quite drastically between Conservative and Labour supporters. Conservative 
respondents tend to view private education favorably, while the opposite holds 
for Labour respondents. For instance, 38 percent of Labour supporters think 
there should be fewer or no private schools, while only 8 percent of Conser­
vative supporters are of this opinion. It is interesting to note that although 
Conservatives are generally better educated and wealthier than Labour sup­
porters (though more Labour supporters have higher education), their views 
on private education are the "least educated", in the sense that the attitudes 
towards private education of more educated individuals are closer to the views 
of Labour supporters. These differences in attitudes are also reflected in high 
profile political anecdotes5.
4.3 Data
To form the basic household-level data set, I use variables on private educa­
tion consumption, religious orientation, political allegiance, household income, 
and other basic household/respondent characteristics from the nationally rep­
resentative annual British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS) data. There are 17 
years of data in which these core variables are available spanning the period 
1986-20056.
I extract all respondents living in England with school aged or older chil­
dren (aged 5+) who provide a yes/no answer to whether they have ever sent a
5In recent years, prominent British Labour MPs, including Jeremy Corbyn, "about as 
unreconstructed a beard-and-sandals leftwinger as New Labour endures" (Guardian, May 
13, 1999), and Diane Abbot, Westminster’s first black woman MP, have compromised their 
political credibility by opting to send their children to private schools rather than, as force­
fully advocated by themselves and their party, to the local public school. Conversely, Oliver 
Letwin, Conservative shadow home secretary at the time, famously claimed that he would 
rather beg than send his children to a local comprehensive.
6The excluded years are 1988, 1992 and 1997.
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child to private school. The resulting data set consists of 27,229 observations. 
I drop 11.5 percent of observations for which no household income information 
provided, reducing the sample size to 24,093. A further 1 percent of obser­
vations in this sample are in turn dropped because the religious or political 
variable or other covariates are missing or inconsistently coded. This yields 
the base sample of 23,862 observations.
The dependent variable of the analysis is an indicator variable which attains 
the value 1 if respondents have ever sent a child to private school and 0 if they 
have not7. 18 different religious denominations are represented in the data8. I 
focus on the seven largest religious groups (sorted by size): Church of England, 
Other Christian9, Roman Catholic, Methodist, Muslim, Hindu, Jewish and 
group the remainder as non-Christian10. Furthermore, information is provided 
on the frequency with which respondents attend church aside from special 
occasions, pray, how religious they consider themselves and the extent of their 
belief in God11. I further classify respondents by political party identification. 
Following the terminology used in the survey data, I distinguish by partisans, 
sympathizers and residual identifiers12. I refer to respondents who are either
7 Private education demand is coded based on whether respondents with children in the 
household answer yes or no to the following question: “Have any of your children/ has your 
child ever attended a fee-paying, private primary or secondary school in the United King­
dom?” ‘Private’ primary or secondary schools include: independent schools, scholarships and 
assisted places at fee-paying schools. They exclude: direct grant schools (unless fee-paying), 
voluntary-aided schools, grant-maintained (‘opted out’) schools and nursery schools.
Note that it is not possible to distinguish between whether households have sent their 
children to religious or secular schools.
8 Religious denomination is coded based on the answers to the following question: “Do 
you regard yourself as belonging to any particular religion? IF YES: Which?”
9Other Christian includes: Christian - no denomination, Other Protestant, Baptist, Pres­
byterian, United Reform Church, free Presbyterian and Brethern. See Table 1 for details.
10 Other non-Christians make up 0.85 percent of the baseline sample and include Sikhs 
and Buddhists. A fuller set of religious denominations in the data is shown in the notes to 
Table 4.1.
n I describe these variables in more detail when they axe introduced in the empirical 
analysis.
12 Party identification is coded is coded based on the question “Generally speaking, do 
you think of yourself as a supporter of any one political party?” (yes—partisan). If NO: 
“Do you think of yourself as a little closer to one political party than to the others?” 
(yes—sympathizer). If NO: “If there were a general election tomorrow, which political party
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partisans, sympathizers or residual identifiers as party supporters.
To isolate the effect of religion and political allegiance from other confound­
ing effects, I control for several individual characteristics. These characteristics 
include respondent educational background13, sex, age and marital status14 as 
well as a measure of household income constructed based on income bands 
defined in nominal terms15.
4.4 Preliminary D ata Analysis
The first column of Table 4.1 provides sample means for all respondents in 
the base sample, while columns (2) and (3) respectively contain sample means 
for the 13.1 percent of respondents who have sent any children to private 
school and for the remainder who have not. To compare groups of the same 
marital status and of similar age, column (4) restricts the sample to married or 
cohabitating respondents aged between 35 and 54. This sample will henceforth 
be referred to as the "restricted sample".
Almost 64 percent of respondents in the baseline sample are religious, of 
which almost 40 percent belong to the Church of England/Anglican Church. 40 
percent of respondents go to church occasionally apart from special occasions. 
31 and 40 percent of respondents support the Conservative and Labour party, 
respectively. Respondents who have ever sent a child to private school on aver­
do you think you would be most likely to support? ”(if answer= residual identifier).
13 Based on answers to questions about exams passed or qualifications obtained, respon­
dents are classified by the BSAS survey into the following categories: 1 Degree; 2 Higher 
educ below degree; 3 A level or equiv; 4 O level or equiv; 5 CSE or equiv; 6 Foreign or 
other; 7 No qualification. Furthermore, respondents are asked "Have you ever attended a 
fee-paying, private primary or secondary school in the United Kingdom?" where private ed­
ucation is defined as in the question regarding whether the respondent has sent children to 
private school.
14Marital status is coded based on the question: " Which of these applies to you at present? 
1 Married; 2 Living as married; 3 Separated (after being married); 4 Divorced; 5 Widowed; 
6 Single (never married)".
15For details on the construction of the household income variable, see Data Appendix, 
section 6.3.
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age more religious, go to church more often, are more Conservative, wealthier, 
better educated, including more likely to have attended private school them­
selves and older than those respondents who have not sent any children to 
private school.
Figures 4.1-4.2 provide graphical overviews of the religious and political 
composition of the survey respondents. Panels 1-2 of Figure 4.1 show that the 
age profiles differ considerably between the different religious denominations. 
Panels 3-4 show that household income is on average lower in religious house­
holds than in non-religious households. However, this difference almost disap­
pears when only the restricted sample is considered, suggesting that differences 
stem mainly from religious households being older. There is also heterogeneity 
across denominations. Jewish respondents (of which there are only 43 in the 
restricted sample), on average have considerably higher household income than 
other religious denominations, while Muslim and other non-Christian respon­
dents are relatively poor. Moreover, there is important variation in the degree 
of religious intensity, for instance as measured by the extent of church atten­
dance. Almost 20 percent of respondents attend church once a week or more, 
while almost 40 percent never, or practically never, go to church. Church of 
England and Jewish respondents go to church the least, while the other mi­
nority religious denominations (Roman Catholic, Muslim, Hindus and other 
non-Christians) go to church most frequently.
Next, panels 1-2 of Figure 4.2 show that there are more Labour than Con­
servative supporters overall, but there are roughly equally many "partisans" 
(strong supporters) of each party. Panel 3 shows the correlation of religion and 
political allegiance. Being Conservative and being religious is positively corre­
lated. The percentage of Conservative partisans is almost twice as high among 
religious as non-religious respondents. Panel 4 shows that there is no marked 
differences in age across political allegiance, although stronger supporters of
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either party tend to be older. Average household income is considerably higher 
among Conservative supporters, and this is particularly true of the stronger 
Conservative supporters.
Figure 4.3 takes a preliminary look at the association of religion and polit­
ical allegiance and private education, as well as how this varies by household 
income. To avoid confounding religious and political effects with age and 
marital status effects, all graphs in Figure 4.3 are based on the restricted sam­
ple. Panels 1-2 indicate the very considerable variation in private education 
background (whether respondent privately educated) and demand for private 
education (whether any children privately educated) across religious denomi­
nations and political allegiance. Nevertheless, the high percentage of Jewish, 
Hindu and Muslim households which have sent children to private school com­
pared to the other religious groups is quite striking16. Note also how Hindus 
and Muslims are much more likely to have sent children to private school 
than to have attended them themselves. In addition, the low private school 
demand among Methodist respondents is conspicuous. It is furthermore re­
markable that private education, both for the respondent and their children, 
increases almost monotonically when moving politically from left to right. The 
two residual identifier groups, which correspond to the lowest level of political 
identification out of the Conservative or Labour party supporters, constitute 
the only small deviation from this pattern. Finally, panels 3-8 demonstrate 
how the demand for private education varies with income interacted with re­
ligion and political allegiance. Demand for private education clearly increases 
in household income, and the patterns observed aggregated over income tend 
to hold at any income level. Private education generally appears to be closely 
correlated for parent and child across income groups. However, respondents
16It should, however, be noted that the sample size for the smallest minority religious 
groups in the restricted sample is relatively small (ranging from 43 to 140).
127
in the highest income groups tend to be more likely to send their children 
to private school than to have attended them themselves17. Having observed 
these suggestive patterns in the raw data, I now turn investigate whether they 
hold up to more rigorous empirical analysis.
4.5 Empirical Analysis
4.5.1 Empirical M ethod
To study the relationship between household-level demand for private educa­
tion and religious and political allegiance, I estimate probit regressions of the 
form:
P i j k t  =  a % ijk t  +  <j>k +  Ot +  e i jk t  (4.1)
Let the variable P^kt take the value 1 if the zth respondent in postcode 
district j ,  region k and year t has ever had any children enrolled in private 
education and 0 otherwise. Then — 1 (P*jkt > 0) where l(-) is the indi­
cator function taking the value 1 if the expression in parentheses is true and 
0 otherwise. Note that it is not possible to know which type of private school 
respondents have sent their children to. For example, secular and religious 
private education cannot be distinguished. Zijkt includes the following house­
hold/respondent covariates: religion, political allegiance, household income, 
the education of the respondent, age and age-cohort and the respondent’s 
marital status as described in section 4.3. For a given level of household in­
come, respondent education levels may affect the household’s propensity for
17It is notable that demand for private education rises particularly rapidly in income for 
Muslim respondents (140 observations in restricted sample). This contrast with the results 
in Munk 2007a which suggest that it is the poorest religious minority households that opt 
for religious private education.
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sending children to private school for at least two reasons. First, better ed­
ucated individuals may have stronger tastes for education than less educated 
individuals, and private schools provide better education than state schools. 
Furthermore, education is a typically time invariant variable (for individuals 
with school aged or older children) which is correlated with earnings capac­
ity. Respondent education levels, including whether the respondent has been 
privately education, therefore provide an additional control for household in­
come at the time at which private schooling decisions are made as well as a 
possible proxy for taste for tastes for private education. As shown in section 
4.4, religious beliefs, church attendance and political allegiance vary by age. 
Religious and political variables may thus be picking up age or cohort-related 
effects. Furthermore, a given household income may reflect different levels of 
household resources depending on respondent age and marital status. Finally, 
<f)k and 6t are regional18 and year-of-interview fixed effects. Standard errors 
are assumed to be normally distributed and are adjusted for correlation of the 
errors within postcode districts19.
It should be noted that, in spite of the richness of the data, the results 
obtained with this empirical approach should not be viewed as necessarily 
identifying causal effects. In particular, the empirical strategy is vulnerable to 
the classic latent variable critique: an unobserved variable may cause people to 
be more religious or shape their political party affiliations as well as affect their
18The 9 English regions (GORs) include: North East, North West, Yorkshire and The 
Humber, East Midlands, West Midlands, East of England, London, South East, South 
West.
19Postcode district information is not available for the 2003-05 data. However, observa­
tions axe sampled in small geographical units, which in previous years does not extend be­
yond a postcode district. The areas sampled axe numbered and each observation is assigned 
such a number (spoint), preventing the identification of the specific geographic location, but 
making it possible to group respondents residing in the same area. The survey contains on 
average 15.7 observations in each sampled area. For the 2003-05 data, I therefore cluster 
by artificial postcode districts made up from the sampled areas. This means that clustering 
is effectively done by postcode district and year for the 2003-05. However, each postcode 
district only occurs 1.8 times in 1986-2002 data set. The difference from the rest of the data 
is therefore slight.
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preferences towards education in general, and private education in particular. 
Moreover, reverse causality cannot be ruled out: The act of sending children 
to (religious) private school may affect parents’ religious and political beliefs 
and behavior. However, after presenting the basic results, I report and discuss 
additional pieces of empirical evidence which consistently support the preferred 
interpretations put forward of the main results.
4.5.2 Baseline Specification
Table 4.2 reports marginal effects from probit analyses based on equation (4.1) 
of whether a respondent has ever sent any children to private school. Column 
(1) includes a dummy variable for whether the respondent belongs to any re­
ligion, controlling only for year and regional fixed effects and clustering at 
the postcode district level to account for correlation of the errors at the lo­
cal level. The religious coefficient is positive and statistically significant. I 
additionally control for household income in column (2). The coefficient in­
creases in magnitude, reflecting that religious households are on average poorer 
than non-religious households, and that income is positively associated with 
private school demand as shown in Figure 4.1. Column (3) further controls 
for whether the respondent is privately educated. The coefficient remains 
positive and statistically significant, but falls in magnitude by more than 20 
percent. While this control may pick up household income and wealth not 
captured by the household income variable, this result may also suggest tha t 
the religious coefficient partly picks family traditions or intergenerationally 
transm itted preferences.
I next consider the association of political allegiance and private school 
demand. As discussed in section 4.2.2, the Conservative party views private 
education much more favorably than the Labour party. If party lines and be­
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liefs guide the behavior of individual party supporters, we would, other things 
equal, expect Conservative supporters to more inclined to choose private ed­
ucation than Labour supporters. Column (4) includes a set of indicator vari­
ables for whether respondents support the Conservative or the Labour party, 
with those who support neither party as the omitted category. The Conser­
vative and Labour coefficients are both highly significant with the expected 
signs. The political coefficients fall in absolute value following the introduc­
tion of the household income control in column (5), reflecting that Conservative 
respondents are on average richer, and Labour respondents poorer, than the 
omitted category. The absolute value of the political coefficients fall further af­
ter controlling for whether the respondent is privately educated in column (6). 
Again, this reflects that being privately educated is positively correlated with 
being Conservative supporter, and negatively correlated with being Labour 
supporter. In addition, the result is once again indicative of a possible role 
played by inter-generational preference transmission. Finally, column (7) in­
cludes both the religious and political indicator variables as well as a full set of 
household and respondent controls. The magnitude of the religious and Con­
servative coefficients falls further, reflecting the positive correlation of these 
two variables, while the Labour coefficient remains largely unchanged. How­
ever, all three coefficients retain their original signs and statistical significance.
4.6 Religion and Private Education
Well aware of the difficulty in interpreting the observed correlations as causal 
effects, I now further examine different interpretations which are consistent 
with the empirical patterns.
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4.6.1 M ain H ypotheses
The greater demand for private education by religious individuals may be 
driven the following three main factors: (i) Preferences for the religious con­
tent of education (a) Differences in the price of educational quality faced by 
religious and non-religious households (Hi) Differences in preferences for edu­
cational quality between religious and non-religious households.
First, there may be a component of private school demand which is driven 
by preferences for the religious content, or the type of education provided, 
rather than the quality. I will refer to this as a mission-driven component 
of demand20. Greater intensity of religious practice may lead to a height­
ened concern for the religious content or conformity with religious norms and 
prescriptions of one’s children’s education, and hence a greater demand for 
religious private education. If religious intensity has a significant effect on 
religious private school demand, we might expect to see differential effects of 
religion on private school demand by expressions of religious dedication, such 
as the frequency of church attendance or prayer, or the extent of belief in God.
On the other hand, to propagate a given religion, religious entities might 
sponsor religious education for religious households. Religious households may 
therefore have access to subsidized (high quality) private education not avail­
able to non-religious households, and thus face a lower cost of private edu­
cation. If anyone registered as belonging to a particular religion can attend 
such schools, then a greater religious demand may be primarily driven by these 
price differences. In this case, if sending children to such schools furthermore 
does not change parents’ religious behavior and beliefs, we should not expect 
households’ religious intensity to m atter significantly for (religious) private 
school demand. However, subsidized religious private education may only be
20This terminology is based on Besley and Ghatak (2004). A mission may, for instance, 
consist in a specific curriculum or a method of teaching.
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available to households who have a proven religious record (e.g. church at­
tendance). Households may thus have an incentive to attend church that is 
unrelated to the "true" intensity of their religious belief and is not genuinely 
a mission-drive component of demand. Suppose churchgoing reflects house­
holds responding to such incentives, and is only weakly correlated with actual 
religious beliefs or preferences21. If this were the case, we might expect more 
private and unobserved religious activities, e.g. prayer and belief in God, to be 
less strongly related to private school demand than comparatively observable 
religious activities such as church attendance.
Finally, tastes for educational quality may differ between religious and non­
religious households. These differences may be culturally determined, or deter­
mined by socioeconomic stigma associated with belonging to a minority group, 
as much as determined by religion. In this case, we would again not expect 
the intensity of religious practice to play a major role, except perhaps as an 
expression of the degree to which households identify with their religious and 
cultural group.
To sum up, if there are no differential effects of religion by intensity of reli­
gious practice or beliefs, this would put into question the role of religion per se 
as a causal factor of private school demand. Such a finding might suggest (a) 
that the religious coefficient captures differences in preferences for education 
between different religious groups determined by cultural or socioeconomic fac­
tors or (b) - to the extent that no record of religious commitment is required 
to attend such religious private schools - differential access to subsidized reli­
gious private education. Differential effects by relatively observable religious 
practices but no differential effects by comparatively non-observable religious 
practices would suggest that the religious effect could be driven by access to
21 Even it participation in religious activities is initially driven by economic incentives, it 
might of course also affect actual beliefs and preferences, as is no doubt intended by the 
religious entities which organise these activities.
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religious private schools being conditional on observable religious participa­
tion. Finally, significant differences in the effect of being religious on private 
school demand by both observable and non-observable religious expressions of 
religious devotion, would suggest that there is an important mission-driven 
component of religious private education22.
4.6.2 H eterogeneity by Religious Intensity
Table 4.3 investigates whether a greater intensity of religious practices and 
beliefs is associated with a greater positive effect on private school demand. I 
create dummies for whether religious individuals attend church "at least once 
a month", "less than once a month" or "never or practically never", which I 
interact with the religion variable. Column (1) shows that the religion coeffi­
cient increases in magnitude and significance in the frequency of church atten­
dance23 . The difference in the estimated coefficients on religion for individuals 
who "never or practically never" attend church versus the coefficients for in­
dividuals who do attend church are statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level24. The second column reports results from splitting religious respondents 
into those who pray weekly versus those who pray at least yearly, but not 
weekly25. The difference in the coefficients is again statistically significant at
22 Another possibility is as follows: (i) It is primarily the availability of subsidized private 
religious education that entice religious households into sending their children to religious 
private schools in the first place, (ii) Yet having children in religious private education also 
affects the parents’ non-observed religious intensity, e.g. prayer frequency and belief in God.
23The frequency of church attendance is coded based on the question: “Apart from such 
special occasions as weddings, funerals and baptisms, how often nowadays do you attend 
services or meetings connected with your religion?” (l=Never or practically never; 2=Less 
often than once a year; 3=Less often but at least once a year; 4=Less often but at least 
twice a year; 5=Less often but at least once a month; 6=Less often but at least once in two 
week; 7=Once a week or more).
24 The religious coefficient is almost 50 percent greater for respondents who attend church 
at least once a month compared to repondents who attend church less than once a month, 
but an F-test cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the coefficients.
25The frequency of prayer is coded based on the question: “About how often do you pray?” 
(l=Never; 2=Less than once a year; 3=1-2 times a year; 4=Several times a year; 5=About
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the 1 percent level. Next, I split religious respondents into those who say that 
they "know God really exists" against those who doubt or only sometimes be­
lieve26 . The results from including these dummy variables are shown in column 
(3). Again the coefficients are different at the 1 percent level.
Overall, the point estimates on the effects of religion thus increase con­
siderably in different measures of religious intensity and these differences are 
highly statistically significant. Respondents who go to church at least monthly, 
pray weekly or more or "know God really exists" are respectively 2.7, 8.7 and 
7 percent more likely to send children to private school than non-religious 
respondents27. In comparison, the aggregate estimated effect of religion on 
private school demand reported in Table 4.2 is only 1.6 percent. Particularly 
the large differential effects by more private and non-observable expressions 
of religious intensity are suggestive of a genuine mission-driven component of 
private school demand.
4.6.3 H eterogeneity by Religious Denom ination and Eth­
nicity
The overall positive association of religion and private education may mask 
important differences across religious denominations. We might expect house-
once a month; 6=2-3 times a month; 7=Nearly weekly; 8=Every week; 9=Several times a 
week; 10=Once a day; ll=Several times a day).
Those who pray less than yearly are grouped together with non-religious individuals due 
to small sample size. The variable on how often respondents pray is only present in the 1991 
and 1998 BSAS data.
26 Belief in God is coded based on the question “Please tick one box below to show which 
statement comes closest to expressing what you believe about God. ” (l= D on ’t believe in God; 
2=1 don’t know whether there is a God and I don’t believe there is any way to find out; 3=1 
don’t believe in a personal God, but I do believe in a Higher Power of some kind; 4=1 find 
myself believing in God some of the time, but not at others; 5=While I have doubts, I feel 
that I do believe in God; 6=1 know God really exists and I have no doubts about it).
The variable on belief in God is present in the 1991, 1993, 1995, 1998 and 2000 BSAS 
data.
27In column (2), non-religious respondents include those who identify themselves as reli­
gious but pray less than once a year.
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holds belonging to minority, non-mainstream religious groups to have a stronger 
incentive to obtain religious education in the private sector since their religion 
and traditions will be less well represented in state schools as noted in section 
4.2.1. Moreover, it may be that individuals electing to belong to minority reli­
gions - especially religious denominations associated with social stigma such as 
Islam - are on average more religiously dedicated than members of the majority 
religion28. We might expect a stronger mission-driven component of demand 
from the average religious individual belonging to more devout denominations. 
However, differences in private school demand across religious denominations 
may also result from culturally or ethnically determined preferences for particu­
lar traditions or types of education, or differences in preferences for education 
more generally, that are not necessarily religious in nature. Education may 
generally be considered more important in some cultures than in others. An­
other possibility is that ethnic and religious minorities in England differ from 
the white mainstream in their perception of the role of (private) education for 
their life chances, e.g. due to discrimination. For example, more than 40 per­
cent of the baseline sample agree that there is prejudice against Asians. The 
religious coefficients do not immediately allow us to distinguish between these 
different interpretations.
In the raw data, religious denomination and ethnicity are closely correlated. 
This is particularly true for Muslims and Hindus: 95 percent of Pakistani and 
Bangladeshis in the BSAS data are Muslim, and they make up 57 percent of 
Muslims in the data. The rest are a relatively even mixture of blacks, other 
Asians and whites29. Indians make up 92 percent of Hindus, and bit less than 
half of Indians are Hindus. Whites makes up 99 and 95 percent of Church of
28 This prediction would be in keeping with Iannacone’s (1992) perspective on religion, 
whereby stigma and sacrifice strengthen religious dedication among members. See also 
Berman (2000).
29Respectively 13, 11, 10 and 9 percent. See appendix Table 6.4.
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England and Roman Catholic respondents, respectively. By contrast, only 1.4 
percent of Hindus are white.
In Table 4.4, I examine whether there are significant differences in the as­
sociation of religion and private school demand across religious denominations 
and ethnic groups. I first construct indicator variables for the seven largest 
religious groups represented in the baseline sample (sorted by size): Church 
of England, Other Christian30, Roman Catholic, Methodist, Muslim, Hindu, 
Jewish as well as for the remaining "Other non-Christian"31 and no religion. I 
replicate column (7) of Table 4.2 in column (1) of Table 4.4, replacing the re­
ligion indicator variable with a set of eight religious indicator variables, again 
omitting the no religion category. Consistent with the aggregate result on 
religion, the majority of the religious coefficients are positive and significant. 
However, the coefficients on Church of England - the largest religious group 
covering almost 40 percent of the baseline sample - and Other non-Christian 
are positive but insignificant. Moreover, the coefficient on Methodists - at 3 
percent of the sample the fourth largest religious group - is negative. The 
religious denominations are most positively associated with private education 
are Jewish, Muslim and Hindu.
To explore the extent to which private school demand is driven by ethnic 
origin, I create indicator variables for whether respondents are of (i) black, 
(ii) Indian, (iii) Pakistani or Bangladeshi, (iv) Chinese or other Asian or (v) 
white origin32. Respondents of white ethnic origin make up 95.4 percent of 
the base sample, while the four minority ethnic groups constitute 2.2, 1.2, 
.7 and .5 percent, respectively. Column (2) excludes the religious variables
30Other Christian includes: Christian - no denomination, Other Protestant, Baptist, Pres­
byterian, United Reform Church, Free Presbyterian and Brethern. See Table 4.1 for details.
31 Other non-Christian includes: Sikh and Buddhist.
32 Including variables on ethnic origin reduces the sample by 11 percent to 21,286 obser­
vations. Information on ethnic origin is only available from 1989 onwards. I further drop 
respondents of mixed origin from the sample.
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and includes the set of ethnic indicator variables instead, omitting the white 
category. The coefficients on the minority ethnic groups are all positive and 
significant, except the Chinese or other Asian category. However, the coeffi­
cient on the latter category is positive but insignificant. The insignificance is 
likely due to the small sample size. The results suggest that Indian, Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi (IPB) Asians and blacks are respectively 10-11 percent and 
5 percent more likely than the white majority to have sent children to private 
school. The IPB Asian coefficients are of roughly the same magnitude as the 
Muslim and Hindu coefficients in column (1). Column (3) includes both sets 
of religious and ethnic indicator variables. Except for the Muslim and Hindu 
coefficients, the religious coefficients are virtually unchanged as a result of the 
inclusion of ethnic dummies in the regression. However, reflecting the high de­
gree of collinearity between the two variables, the Muslim and "Pakistani or 
Bangladeshi" coefficients decrease in size and are rendered insignificant. The 
magnitude and significance of the Hindu coefficient also falls, while the Black 
and Indian coefficients remain almost unchanged relative to column (2). In 
column (4) I omit the "Pakistani or Bangladeshi" group, whereby the Mus­
lim coefficient retains its original significance, though it falls in magnitude by 
almost 25 percent.
These results thus suggest that ethnicity may be a separate driver of private 
school demand, distinct from religion. It is also worth noting that supply of 
religious private education constrain religious minorities’ possibilities to obtain 
private education of their own religion. The share of Hindu and (until recently 
at least) Muslims private school pupils has been very low compared to their 
population share. Conversely, pupils in private Jewish religious schools make 
up a relatively large fraction of private school pupils, relative to the population 
share of Jews33. Thus, a substantial portion of Jewish private school demand
33 For further details, see Munk (2007a).
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is plausibly for Jewish religious education. However, the lack of Muslim and 
Hindu religious private schools in the time period in which the survey respon­
dents in this data set have sent children to private schools puts into question 
that the positive Muslim and Hindu coefficients represent a mission-driven 
component of demand.
Finally, column (5) ((5a)-(5b)) explores the importance of dedication as 
expressed by church attendance by religious denomination. First, I interact 
the religious variables with dummies for whether respondents attend church at 
least yearly or "never or practically never”34. The results obtained by including 
these interaction terms again reveal a significant divergence in the association 
on religion and private school demand depending on church attendance. Most 
remarkably, the insignificant signs on the aggregate coefficients on Church of 
England and Other non-Christian change into significant coefficients of oppo­
site signs wThen the church attending and the non-church attending religious 
respondents are separated: The coefficients of the interaction terms of belong­
ing to these religious groups and attending church "at least once a year" are 
positive and significant, while the coefficients on the interaction terms with 
"never or practically never" attending church are negative and significant. F- 
tests show that these coefficients are different at the 1 and 5 percent levels, 
respectively. This is suggestive of the prior that members of the Church of Eng­
land as the majority "default" religion in England, are overall less intensively 
religious than members of other religious denominations. As a consequence, 
the mission-driven component of demand is only significant for those members 
who are genuinely committed to their religion. For the other religious denom­
inations, except Other Christian, the coefficient on religion is significant only
34 Conditional on at least yearly church attendance, I do not distinguish between the 
frequency here. The aggregate results presented in Table 3 suggest that there is no significant 
difference between attending church at least once a month and less frequently. Moreover, 
the sample size of smaller religious denominations is quite low.
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for the church going segment, but the coefficients are not significantly different.
All in all, the results suggest that religious beliefs are an important factor 
driving the association between religion and private education, and as such 
tha t there is a significant mission-driven component of demand. However, 
particularly for Muslims and Hindus or IPB Asians, it seems plausible that 
there is a culturally or ethnically driven component of private school demand 
related to a greater demand for educational quality in these groups that is 
unrelated to the demand for religious education.
4.6.4 A ttitudes and Beliefs
The following section considers further empirical evidence that sheds light on 
whether the positive and significant religious and ethnic coefficients are likely 
to be driven by religious motives or preferences for educational quality more 
generally.
R eligious Intensity
As suggested above, there may be heterogeneity in the average degree of de­
voutness across religious denominations. I estimate ordered probit regressions 
of different measures of the intensity of religious practices or beliefs regressed 
on the same set of covariates used in the private education regressions. These 
measures include the frequency of church attendance, prayer, how religious 
the respondent considers him/herself35, and the respondent’s stated degree of 
belief in God36. All variables axe coded such that a higher number represents 
a higher degree of religious devotion. I restrict the sample to religious respon­
dents and include the full set of religious denominations (omitting the majority
35Degree of religiosity is coded based on the question “Would you describe yourself as 
(l=Extremely non-religious; 2=Very non-religious; 3=Somewhat non-religious; 5=Some- 
what religious; 6= Very religious; 7=Extremely religious).
36See variable descriptions of church attendance, prayer and belief in God in section 4.6.2.
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religion, Church of England) as well as the full set of other covariates used in 
previous regressions.
Indeed, the results reported in Table 4.5 reveal considerable heterogeneity 
in the intensity of religious practices and beliefs across denominations. Re­
spondents belonging to minority denominations are, other things equal, sys­
tematically more religious than Church of England respondents. Except Jews, 
they are significantly more likely to attend church and pray frequently, to con­
sider themselves more religious and to be certain that God exists37. This is 
particularly true of Muslim and Hindu respondents. It is also worth noting 
that respondents who are privately educated are more likely to attend church 
frequently. This might be suggestive of possible endogeneity of the church at­
tendance variable with respect to sending children to private school. Moreover, 
the frequency of church attendance and prayer increases in respondent educa­
tion, but declines in household income. However, the strength of respondents’ 
religious beliefs is unrelated to socioeconomic background.
In summary, as expected, on the whole members of minority religious de­
nominations evince a stronger intensity of religious practices and beliefs than 
members of the majority religion, Church of England. I have shown in Table 
4.3 that the association between religion and private school demand increases 
significantly in the available measures of religious intensity. As such it ap­
pears plausible that members of more religiously intense denominations may 
also on average be more inclined to be motivated by religious concerns to seek 
education in the private sector.
37A substantial part of this difference appears to stem from differences in ethnic back­
ground. In unreported regressions, the religious coefficients drop in magnitude, but remain 
positive and significant, once ethnicity is further controlled for along with religion. f
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A ttitudes towards Education
I further look into the effect of religion on attitudes towards education, includ­
ing religious education, to examine whether I find results consistent with the 
above interpretations of the results on private school demand. As in the pre­
vious section, I estimate ordered probit regressions for five different dependent 
variables regressed on the same set of covariates used in the baseline private ed­
ucation regressions. I consider preferences regarding the religious composition 
of schools, the importance of education as a priority for government spending, 
the priority that government spending should give to students at universities 
and two variables measuring respondents’ opinions of private schooling.
Panel A of Table 4.6 employs the simple religion indicator variable used in 
the baseline regression, while panel B includes the full set of religious indicator 
variables described in section 4.3. The first column explores preferences for  
own-religious education38. The results show that, as we would expect, religious 
respondents axe more inclined to prefer schools with only their own religion as 
opposed to schools mixed religions than non-religious respondents. To check 
whether the preference for own-religious education differs - as expected - by the 
intensity of religious beliefs, I separate religious respondents by the frequency 
of their church attendance. The results are reported in Column (4) of Table 
4.3, along with the results on how the demand for private education differs 
by religious intensity. The magnitude of the religious coefficient is more than 
twice as large for religious respondents who attend church at least once a 
month, compared to those who do not. Furthermore, Panel B of Table 4.6 
shows that the preference for own-religious schooling varies considerably by
38Respondents can choose between the following three answers to describe their prefer- 
erence regarding the religious composition of schools: own religion only; mixed - religion; 
no preference. It might appear illogical that non-religious respondents should prefer schools 
with only own religion, however, 21 percent of non-religious respondents express this pref­
erence. Presumably this should be interpreted as a disinclination to have mixed ethnic as 
well as religious education.
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religious denomination. It is strongest for Roman Catholics, and of the same 
magnitude and significance, but of opposite sign, for Hindus. In other words, 
Roman Catholics significantly prefer schools of only their own religion, while 
Hindus prefer schools of mixed rather than of their own religion. Remarkably, 
no coefficients on any non-Christian religious denomination have positive and 
significant signs. On average, these minority religions thus do not appear to 
be attracted by segregating into their own religious schools. However, the lack 
of significance could also be an issue of low sample size.
As proxies for the importance attached to (further) education I use variables 
on whether education is regarded as a top priority for government spending39 
and on whether spending on university students is a priority for extra govern­
ment spending on education40. Columns (2)-(3) reveal that, in the aggregate, 
being religious has no apparent effect on such preferences. However, Muslims 
are significantly more likely to prioritize spending on education in general, and 
both Muslim, Hindus and Jews are significantly more favorable towards spend­
ing on higher education than the other religious denominations. This result 
supports the conclusion that the non-Christian religious coefficients observed 
in Table 4.4 are driven by stronger preferences for education.
Finally, I consider attitudes specifically towards private education. I use 
opinions on whether there should be more or fewer private schools41 and on 
how private schools affect the state sector42. Columns (4)-(5) show that re-
39Respondents are asked to state their first and second priority for extra government 
spending out of the following areas: Education; Defence; Health; Housing; Public Transport; 
Roads; Police and Prisons; Social Security Benefits; Help for Industry; Overseas Aid; (none 
of these).
40 Respondents are asked to state their first priority for extra spending on education from 
the following list: Nursery or Pre-School Children; Primary School Children; Secondary 
School Children; Less Able Children with Special Needs and Students at Colleges or Uni­
versities.
41 Attitudes towards private education are coded based on the question: "Generally speak­
ing, what is your opinion about private schools in Britain? Should there be ..." (l=M ore 
private schools, 2=About the same number as now, 3=  Fewer private schools, 4=No private 
schools at all).
4 2 Attitudes towards the external effects of private education are coded based on the ques­
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ligious respondents are slightly more in favor of having more private schools, 
particularly Jewish respondents, and to a lesser extent Church of England. 
Religion does not appear to have any strong effect on views regarding whether 
private schools are good or bad for the state school sector.
Overall, these results support the conclusion that the positive Muslim, 
Hindu and Jewish coefficients in the private education regressions reflect more 
than a religious component of demand. Rather it appears that, other things 
equal, these religious/ethnic groups put greater emphasis on education than 
the rest of the population. This could be for cultural/historical reasons un­
related to the English context. Alternatively, it could be that education is 
perceived as being more important to succeed by ethnic and religious minority 
groups than by the white mainstream, e.g. due to discrimination.
4.7 Political Allegiance and Private Education
I now turn to investigate the association of political allegiance and private 
school demand in more detail. Even more so than with the religious effects, 
the observed correlations cannot be immediately interpreted as causal effects. 
Bearing this in mind, I discuss different interpretations of the aggregate results 
below.
4.7.1 M ain H ypotheses
The effect of political allegiance on the demand for private education may be 
driven the following three main factors: (i) People’s behavior is shaped by 
their political views and allegiance; (ii) Consuming private education affects 
people’s political views and allegiance; (Hi) Political allegiance may capture
tion: "If there were fewer private schools in Britain today do you think, on the whole, that 
state schools would ..." (1= Benefit, 2=Suffer, 3= Would it make no difference).
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unobserved individual characteristics which drive both political allegiance and 
preferences for (private) education.
First, it may be that people’s behavior is affected by what they personally 
believe is "right" or "wrong", distinct from what they think is in their own 
personal interest, and regardless of what other people think. If people believe 
that private education has negative externalities for the state sector, they may 
feel less good about, and therefore be less inclined towards, consuming private 
education than if they do not hold this belief43. A stronger identification with 
a political party is likely to reflect a greater degree of support of the values 
and beliefs embodied by the political party. If there exists a causal impact 
of political allegiance on people’s behavior through either of these channels, 
we should therefore expect the absolute magnitude of the effects of political 
allegiance to increase the degree of identification with a given political party.
Second, we may be concerned about reverse causation. The act of consum­
ing private education may exert an independent effect on people’s political 
preferences and beliefs. For example, individuals who pay for private educa­
tion may be less supportive of government spending on education which does 
not benefit them directly, or may be exposed to different peer groups as a re­
sult of sending children to private schools which in turn affect their preferences 
and beliefs44. Moreover, it is conceivable that private sector consumption, or 
the lack of it, also affects beliefs in more subtle ways: People may incur a 
disutility from behavior which they perceive as anti-social in some way, even 
if it benefits themselves (for instance, if people believe that private education
43It might also be that people’s behavior is in part driven to a desire to obtain approval 
from their social environment. Private education may in part be a status good whose value 
depends on what family, friends and neighbors think of it. If private education is viewed 
more favorably in some environments, then it will be more attractive for individuals part of 
those environments to consume private education.
44 For instance, Table 4.1 shows that almost 55 percent of respondents in the baseline 
sample who have ever sent a child to private school supports the Conservative party. In 
contrast, this is only true of 28 percent of respondents who have never sent a child to private 
school.
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harms the state sector) or tend to have a more negative opinion of types of 
behavior or consumption that they choose not to, or are not able to, take part 
in. To maximize utility, people may tailor their beliefs to rationalize or justify 
their behavior. Moreover, people’s inclination to identify with a party may 
fall if they choose a course of action (for example, sending children to private 
school) which is condemned by that party.
Third, the presence of unobserved personal characteristics which cause peo­
ple both to be attracted to certain political parties as well as affects their 
preference for (private) education cannot be ruled out. For instance, it might 
be that more intelligent and hard-working individuals are both more likely to 
be Conservative as well as have a stronger taste for (private) education. Fur­
thermore, if spite of the available controls in the data, political allegiance may 
pick up unobserved aspects of income, education and wealth which increase 
the demand for private education. As shown in Figure 4.2, panel 5 (discussed 
in section 4.4), Conservative supporters on average have higher incomes than 
Labour supporters. If unobserved aspects of income and wealth follow the same 
pattern as observed income, then we might expect Conservative allegiance to 
be positively correlated with unobserved income, education and wealth and 
Labour allegiance to  be negatively correlated with these unobserved charac­
teristics. The political coefficients might reflect just this. However, it should 
be noted that the scope for relevant correlated omitted heterogeneity is limited 
due to the richness of the data. Characteristics such as income and education, 
and thus ability, wealth and preferences for (private) education, are arguably 
fairly precisely captured by observable variables in the BSAS data. In addition, 
there is a less obvious potential causal link between, say, unobserved ability 
and preferences for education and political allegiance than there is between, 
say, unobserved health status and preferences for private health insurance and
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public spending on health which has been studied elsewhere45.
Figure 4.2, panel 6 also shows that income is increasing in the strength of 
party identification for supporters of both parties. Suppose then that party 
identification is positively correlated with unobserved income and wealth for 
both Conservative and Labour supporters. In that case, if the results are 
driven entirely by unobserved income, education and wealth effects, we would 
expect the association between political allegiance and private school demand 
to increase in individuals’ degree of party identification with either party (since 
increased party identification just picks up unobserved characteristics). Howt- 
ever, if results are genuinely driven by political beliefs (including perhaps some 
degree of reverse causation), we would expect the absolute value of the politi­
cal coefficients (positive or negative) to increase in individuals degree of party 
identification.
To summarize, we thus have two main competing hypotheses: First, that 
political allegiance and beliefs has a causal effect on, or at least a substantive 
connection with, private school demand. Second, that political allegiance and 
the degree of party identification merely pick up unobserved characteristics, 
such as income, education and wealth, which drive private school demand with­
out there being a direct relationship between the political variables and private 
school demand. These two hypotheses yield opposite, and testable, predictions 
on the coefficients on Labour party supporters: In the data, Labour support is
45 To deal with the problem of correlated common unobservables in the choice of private 
health insurance and support for public health spending, Hall and Preston (1998) assume a 
common correlation term in the error across different behaviors. However, the case for corre­
lated common unobservables driving the relationship between private education status and 
political allegiance is considerably less compelling than in the case of insurance status and 
support for public health spending. There is a weaker case for relevant characteristics being 
unobserved than in the case of health insurance where relevant correlated omitted hetero­
geneity could consist in general preferences for health related goods, unobserved aspects of 
health status and hostility to the state. In addition, there is a much less obvious causal link 
between unobserved preferences for education and religion or broad political allegiance than 
there is between unobserved health preferences/status and preferences on public spending 
on health.
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negatively correlated with the available measure of household income but the 
degree of party identification is positively correlated with the household income 
measure. If political identification merely picks up unobserved characteristics, 
such as income, that are positively correlated with private school demand, we 
should expect the negative Labour coefficients to be smaller in value for indi­
viduals who identify more with the Labour party. The converse holds if Labour 
party identification picks up genuine political beliefs which negatively affect 
the propensity for private education. The first hypothesis would thus lead us 
to expect the negative Labour coefficients to be greater in absolute value the 
more strongly an individual identifies with the Labour party. In contrast, the 
second hypothesis would predict the negative Labour coefficients to decrease 
in absolute value the more strongly an individual identifies with the Labour 
party.
4.7.2 H eterogeneity by Strength o f Party Identification
To examine which of these hypotheses is most consistent with the data I pro­
ceed as follows. First, as a measure of party identification, I divide respondents 
into political partisans, sympathizers and residual identifiers as described in 
section 4.44G. I select the sub-sample of Conservative and Labour supporters 
and create a party identification variable constructed such that a greater de­
gree of identification with either the Conservative or Labour party is coded 
with a higher number47. To ascertain that the degree of party identification 
is indeed, other things equal, positively correlated with observable measures 
of income, wealth and education (measured by reported household income,
46 Party identification is coded is coded based on the question “Generally speaking, do 
you think of yourself as a supporter of any one political party?” (yes=partisan). If NO: 
“Do you think of yourself as a little closer to one political party than to the others?” 
(yes=sympa,thizer). If NO: “If there were a general election tomorrow, which political party 
do you think you would be most likely to support?” (if answer=residual identifier).
47The variable is coded such that l=Residual identifier; 2=Sympathiser and 3=Partisan.
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whether respondent or child privately educated, and whether respondent has 
obtained higher education) for supporters of both political parties, I run or­
dered probit regressions of the party identification variable controlling for the 
full set covariates used in the baseline sample, except for the political variables. 
The results are reported in Table 4.7. In the first column I use the sample of 
Conservative or Labour supporters in the baseline sample and next in columns 
(2) and (3) restrict the sample to Conservative and Labour supporters, respec­
tively. The results show the strength of the degree of political identification 
increases in household income and education among both Conservative and 
Labour supporters.
I then construct indicator variables for the political party respondents sup­
port interacted with the degree of party identification. Table 4.8 replicates the 
baseline results of Table 2 replacing the Conservative and Labour dummies 
with this set of indicator variables, again omitting respondents who are not 
either Conservative or Labour supporters. The results and associated F-tests 
show that the political coefficients for both Conservative and Labour support­
ers differ at the one percent level48.
The coefficients on political partisans as opposed to residual identifiers and 
sympathizers are greater in absolute value for both Conservative and Labour 
supporters, and the coefficients are different at the 1 percent level. These re­
sults are more consistent with the first than with the second hypothesis. They 
appear to suggest that, other things equal, the stronger respondents identify 
with the political party they support, the greater is the strength of the politi­
cal effect. In other words, a stronger party identification makes Conservative 
supporters more likely to choose private education for their children, while the 
opposite is true for Labour supporters.
48 The only exceptions are the Labour partisan and Labour residual identifier coefficients 
which differ at the 5 percent level.
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To further substantiate the conclusion that the results using the political 
identity variable indeed appear to capture a real association of political beliefs 
and private school demand, I repeat the analysis using a different dependent 
variable as measure of political engagement: respondents’ interest in politics49. 
The results are reported in Table 4.7, columns (4)-(6). Like the other measure 
of political engagement, the degree of party identification, this variable is pos­
itively correlated with household income and education. However, while the 
strength of party identification is arguably related to the degree to which an 
individual believes in the political views of a given party, the degree of interest 
in politics does not have to be correlated with unconditional support for a 
given party line. Indeed, columns (5) and (6) show a positive correlation be­
tween private school consumption and interest in politics for both Conservative 
and Labour supporters. This contrasts with the negative correlation of private 
school consumption and party identification for Labour supporters found in 
column (3). Equivalently, Table 4.8, column (2) ((2a)-(2e)) also does not show 
the ranking of the Labour coefficients according to political engagement found 
in column (1).
4.8 Robustness Checks
4.8.1 Additional Controls for Income, Education and  
W ealth
Omitted aspects of income, education and wealth are leading candidates for 
unobserved respondent or households characteristics that the political vari­
ables might pick up rather than political effects. In this section, I check the
49Interest in politics is coded based on the question 11 Houi much interest do you generally 
have in what is going on in politics?” (l=None at all; 2=Not very much; 3=Some; 4=Quite 
a lot; 5= A great deal).
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robustness of the main results to the inclusion of additional controls for such 
variables. I create indicator variables based on respondent’s social class50, the 
economic activity of the respondent’s spouse51, respondent’s degree of interest 
in politics52 (which may pick up unobserved aspects of education or general 
interest in education), and whether the household owns or rents accommoda­
tion53. In Table 4.9 I drop observations which do not contain information on 
all these variables such that the sample size is more than halved from 23,862 
observations in the baseline sample to 10,959 observations. The first column 
replicates the baseline regression on the restricted sample. In the following 
columns (2)-(6), I add the sets of dummy variables associated with each of 
the additional control variables54. The social class of respondents, interest in 
politics and home ownership are positively associated with private school de­
mand and decrease the size of the coefficient on household income. As such 
these variables most likely pick up income, education and wealth effects. The 
magnitude of the Conservative coefficient also drops, but very slightly, while
50In Britain, for statistical purposes, class has been defined using the Registrar General’s 
scale of social Class and Socio-economic groups. Respondents are divided into the following 
groups: 1: Class I: Professional ; 2: Class II: Managerial/Technical ; 3: Class III: Skilled ; 
4: Class IV: Partly Skilled ; 5: Class V: Unskilled.
51 The economic activity of the partners of respondents who axe married or living as 
married is coded based on the following question. “Which of these descriptions applied 
to what your partner was doing last week, that is the seven days ending last Sunday?” (l=In  
full-time education (not paid for by employer, including on vacation); 2=On government 
training/ employment programme; 3=In paid work (or away temporarily) for at least 10 
hours in week; 4=Waiting to take up paid work already accepted; 5=Unemployed and 
registered at a benefit office; 6=Unemployed, not registered, but actively looking for a job 
(of at least 10 hrs a week);7=Unemployed, wanting a job (of at least 10 hrs a week) but not 
actively looking for a job; 8=Permanently sick or disabled; 9= Wholly retired from work; 
10=Looking after the home.)
52 Interest in politics is coded based on the question “How much interest do you generally 
have in what is going on in politics?” (l=N one at all; 2=Not very much; 3=Some; 4=Quite 
a lot; 5 = A great deal)
53 Whether the household owns or rents accommodation is coded based on the question 
“Does your household own or rent this accommodation?” I recode answers to this ques­
tion such that respondents are divided into three groups(l=Own outright; 2=Buying on a 
mortgage; 3=Renting). See data appendix for full set of options given to respondents.
54The omitted categories for each variable are as follows: Social class (Class V: Unskilled) 
Spouse’s economic activity (In paid work); Interest in politics (None at all); Home ownership 
(Renting).
151
the religious and Labour coefficients are virtually unchanged. These results 
suggest that the estimated effects axe not very sensitive to unobserved aspects 
of income, education and wealth.
Finally, I split the sample up into males and females in columns (7) and 
(8). Since men on average have a higher earnings and a greater labour force 
attachment than women, the poorer controls for spouse’s income, education 
and economic status than the respondent in the data may lead the political 
variables to pick up more information about the households income, education 
and wealth levels. Indeed, the Conservative coefficient for women is greater 
than for men, which would be consistent with this expectation. However, the 
Labour coefficient (which we expect to be negatively related to unobserved 
income, education and wealth) for women is smaller than that for men, which 
is not consistent with that prior. Moreover, the coefficient on higher educa­
tion is larger for women than for men. These results show that, for given 
observed respondent and household characteristics, women are more likely to 
have sent children to private school. The likely explanation is that for a given 
set of respondent socioeconomic characteristics, having sent private education 
is associated with greater household income and wealth for women than for 
men55. Overall, these results suggest that, given the rich set of controls already 
included, the political coefficients do not pick up latent income, education or 
wealth effects to any great extent in the baseline regressions. Since these vari­
ables are the leading candidates for latent variables which might drive the 
results, this reinforces the conclusion that the political results reflect a sub­
stantive connection between political beliefs and private schooling choices.
55Since men generally earn more than women (who may stay at home or work part-time), 
household affluence will be more accurately captured by the man’s education and socio­
economic status.
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4.8.2 Neighborhood Controls and Fixed Effects
Finally, it might be that belonging to a particular religious or political group 
makes respondents more likely to locate in areas where private education is 
more prevalent. The religious and political effects might then pick up omitted 
area characteristics rather than capture a genuine causal effect. Table 4.10 
investigates this possibility. I limit the sample to the sub-sample covering the 
years 1986-2002 for which neighborhood variables are available at the postcode 
district level (for details, see Munk, 2007b). This reduces the sample size from 
23,862 to 16,206.
Column (1) repeats the regression reported in Column (1) of Table 4.3 
for a slightly reduced number of religious denominations for expositional clar­
ity. Column (2) includes log house prices, the percentage of highly qualified 
individuals and state school performance at the postcode district level. The 
coefficients change very slightly. Finally, to control for unobserved neighbor­
hood characteristics, column (3) further introduces school district fixed effects. 
Once again, the coefficients are virtually unchanged. These results thus suggest 
that including neighborhood variables do not change results on religious and 
political allegiance significantly and robust results can be obtained using the 
much larger data set for which the geographical variables are not consistently 
available.
4.8.3 Summary
Taken together, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that religious 
and political identification and beliefs exert a significant effect on private school 
demand. The religious effects increase in different measures of intensity of re­
ligious beliefs and practices. Conversely, the evidence also suggests that the 
positive Muslim, Hindu and Jewish coefficients in the private education regres­
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sions are to a large extent driven by cultural or ethnic, rather than religious, 
components of demand. As to the political effects in particular, some degree 
of reverse causality or omitted variable bias cannot be ruled out. However, it 
is notable that the political effects significantly increase in respondent’s degree 
of identification with the political party that they support. Party identifica­
tion increases in income and educational attainment for supporters of both 
the Conservative and the Labour party. However, support for the Labour 
party decreases in income and educational attainment, while support for the 
Conservative party increases in income and educational attainment. If the cor­
relations of unobserved components of income, education and wealth with the 
variables of interest follow the same pattern as correlation with the observed 
component of income, education and wealth, then finding the absolute value 
of the political effects to be increasing in party identification for both Conser­
vative (positive effect) and Labour (negative effect) supporters is inconsistent 
with results being driven by latent variables. On the other hand, this result is 
consistent with the prior that political beliefs matter. Moreover, both religious 
and political effects are strongly robust to the inclusion of a battery of individ­
ual, household and neighborhood level controls and as well as school district 
fixed effects. Nonetheless, further research is required to make a stronger case 
tha t the statistical relations observed are causal.
4.9 Conclusion
In this paper, I explore the association between parents’ religion and political 
allegiance and their private schooling choices, with primary focus on the associ­
ation of religion and private school demand. Controlling for detailed household 
covariates, I find strong and robust associations. The relationship between re­
ligion and private education varies considerably across religious groups, and is
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strongest for non-mainstream denominations (Roman Catholic, Muslim, Hindu 
and Jewish). Stating support for the Conservative party which views pri­
vate education favorably is associated with a significantly higher propensity 
to choose private education. The converse holds for individuals who support 
the Labour party which takes a very critical stance towards private education. 
Furthermore, the association of private schooling with religion and political al­
legiance significantly strengthens in the intensity of religious beliefs (frequency 
of attending religious services, prayer, self-rated degree of religiosity or belief 
in God) and political allegiance (the degree of identification expressed with a 
political party), respectively. These results suggest that religion and political 
allegiance play important roles in non-trivial economic decisions.
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Figure 4.1: Religion
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Figure 4.2: Political Allegiance
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Figure 4.3: Private Education, Religion and Political A llegiance
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Figure 4.4: Attitudes towards Private Schools, Political Allegiance and Education
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
No child Married or
Sample All
Child privately
p H i i P Q t p r l
privately cohabitating,
educated aged 35-54
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pet N Pet N Pet N Pet N
leligion
Religious 63.8 15233 72.4 2266 62.5 12967 60.1 5161
No religion 36.2 8629 27.6 865 37.5 7764 39.9 3426
Church of England 39.3 9386 42.5 1330 38.9 8056 36.5 3136
Other Christian 8.8 2099 11.2 350 8.4 1749 8.2 704
Roman Catholic 9.4 2235 11.5 359 9 1876 9.1 778
Methodist 3.1 729 2.4 75 3.2 654 2.2 185
Muslim 1.2 288 1.4 44 1.2 244 1.6 140
Hindu 0.7 178 1 32 0.7 146 1.2 99
Jewish 0.5 116 1.6 50 0.3 66 0.5 43
Other non-Christian 0.8 202 0.8 26 0.8 176 0.9 76
Church aside from special occasions
religious respondents)
Sometimes 39.6 8004 53.2 1466 37.4 6538 36.2 2474
Never or practically never 26.9 5440 20.4 562 27.9 4878 23.4 1601
Political allegiance
Conservative 31.4 7485 54.5 1706 27.9 5779 33 2833
Labour 39.8 9504 20.4 638 42.8 8866 38.2 3277
Conservative partisan 19 4527 39.1 1225 15.9 3302 19.3 1654
Conservative sympathiser 8.8 2108 12.4 389 8.3 1719 9.9 847
Conservative residual identifier 3.6 850 2.9 92 3.7 758 3.9 332
Neither Cons nor Labor 28.8 6873 25.1 787 29.4 6086 28.8 2477
Labour residual identifier 6.8 1620 2.9 92 7.4 1528 6.7 575
Labour sympathiser 11.3 2694 6.4 199 12 2495 11.6 992
Labour partisan 21.8 5190 11.1 347 23.4 4843 19.9 1710
ncome and education
Household income (adj) 217.4 301.3 204.8 308.5
[161.6] [191.6] [152.7] [167.7]
Respondent privately educated 11.5 37.4 7.6 11.9
Higher education, inch foreign 10.4 22.9 8.5 14.3
Higher educ, no degree 14.2 21.7 13.1 17
A or 0 level 28.4 28.7 28.4 32.9
ge, birth cohort and marital status
Age of respondent 51.8 56.6 51.1 44.1
[15.5] [14.7] [15.5] [5.6]
Bom: 1880-191 Os 5.6 9 5.1 0
Bom: 1920s 12.5 15.8 12 0
Bom: 1930s 16.5 19.8 16 6
Bom: 1940s 22.4 25.9 21.8 33.3
Bom: 1950s 21.9 18.4 22.4 40.6
Bom: 1960-70s 21.1 11.1 22.6 20.1
Married or cohabitating 67.7 70.3 67.3 100
Separated or divorced 14.1 12.2 14.4 0
Widowed 13 14.6
l  /  A
12.8 0
N 100 23862 3131 86.9 20731 36 8587
oles: see next page
Notes for Table 4.1
Source: British Social Attitudes data, 1986-2005. "All" denotes baseline sample described in text. 
Detailed list of religious denominations represented in baseline sample*
Church of England 39.33 9386
Roman Catholic 9.37 2235
Christian, no denomination 4.83 1153
Methodist 3.06 729
Other Protestant 1.37 326
Muslim 1.21 288
Baptist 0.89 213
Presbyterian 0.76 181
Hindu 0.75 178
Jewish 0.49 116
United Reform Church 0.47 111
Other Christian 0.37 88
Other Non-Christian 0.38 90
Sikh 0.33 78
Buddhist 0.13 30
Other 0.13 31
No religion 36.16 8629
Total 100 23862
Definitions of political allegiance/identifiation:
Supporter
Partisan
Generally speaking, do you think of 
yourself as a supporter of any one 
political party?” If yes, which one.
[No to previous question] Do you think of 
yourself as a little closer to one political 
Sympathizer party than to the others? If yes, which
one.
Residual
identifier
[No to previous question] If there were a 
general election tomorrow, which political 
party do you think you would be most 
likely to support?
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Table 4.2: Private Education, Religion and Political Allegiance
(Dependent variable: Child attended private education?)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Religious
Conservative
Labour
Log household income 
Respondent privately educated
0.048***
[0.004]
0.052***
[0.004]
0.041***
[0.004]
0.098***
[0.006]
-0.050***
[0.005]
0.070***
[0.003]
0.056***
[0.003]
0.277***
0.082*** 0.069***
[0.006] [0.006]
-0.045*** -0.034***
[0.005] [0.005]
0.057*** 0.046***
[0.003] [0.003]
0.254***
[0.010]
0.016***
[0.004]
0.048***
[0.005]
-0.032***
[0.005]
0.061***
[0.003]
0.189***
Additional respondent controls y
Observations 23862 23862 23862 23862 23862 23862 23862
Pseudo R-squared 0.03 0.07 0.14 0.07 0.1 0.16 0.2
Notes: Marginal effects o f probit regression. All regressions include year and regional fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors clustered at the postcode district (e.g. WC2A) level are reported in brackets. Additional controls include education, 
marital status, age and birth cohorts. See Table 4.1 for details. * means significant at 10%; ** significant at 5% and ***
significant at 1%.
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Table 4.3: Heterogeneity by Intensity of Religious Practice and Beliefs
Dependent variable:
Frequency of church attendance
Religious*Church at least once 
a month
Religious*Church less than 
once a month
Religious*Never or practically 
never attend church
Frequency o f prayer
Religious*Pray weekly or more
Religious*Pray at least yearly, 
not weekly
Belief in God
Religious*Know God really 
exists
Religious*Doubt, but 
believe/sometimes
Observations 
Pseudo R-squared
Child attended private education Respondent prefers school only own religion
(1)
0.027***
[0.006]
0.019***
[0.007]
-0.008
[0.006]
20385
0.21
(2)
0.087***
[0.022]
0.025
[0.016]
979
0.33
(3) P-value*
0.2032
0.0000
(4)
0.792***
[0.099]
0.334***
[0.085]
0.347***
[0.089]
P-value*
0.0000
0.0005
0.0003
0.070***
[0.019]
0.016
[0.013]
2339
0.24
0.0019
2765
0.06
Notes: Marginal effects of probit regression. All regressions include year and regional fixed effects and full set of controls included in Table 4.2. 
Robust standard errors clustered at the postcode district (e.g. WC2A) level are reported in brackets. P-values stem from F-tests of the null 
hypotheses that most religious coefficient (the top row for each set of results using one of the three variables uest to measure religious intensity) is 
identical to the coefficient reported in the same row as the p-value. Thus the coefficient on being religious and attending church at least once a 
month is different at the 1 percent level from the coefficient on being religious and not attending church, but not significantly diferent from the 
coefficient on being religious and attending church less than once a month. * means significant at 10%; ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 
1%.
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Table 4.4: Heterogeneity in Private School Demand by Religious Denomination and Church Attendance
(Dependent variable: Child attended private education)
ich of England
er Christian
aan Catholic
hodist
dim
du
Church attendance 
Never or 
Sometimes practically 
never
( 1) (2 ) (3) (4) (5)
0.006
[0.004]
0.019***
[0.007]
0.047***
[0.009]
-0.016*
[0.009]
0.116***
[0.027]
0.089**
[0.035]
0.007
[0.005]
0.015**
[0.008]
0.045***
[0.009]
-0.016*
[0 .010]
0.041
[0.037]
0.02
[0.037]
0.007
[0.005]
0.015**
[0.008]
0.045***
[0.009]
-0.016*
[0.010]
0.085***
[0.030]
0.027
[0.038]
(5a)
0.015**
[0.006]
0.012
[0.009]
0.051***
[0.011]
-0.013
[0.013]
0.109***
[0.038]
0.125***
[0.043]
(5b)
-0.018***
[0.006]
0.025*
[0.013]
0.026
[0.017]
-0.030*
[0.016]
0.097*
[0.055]
0.091
[0.120]
P-value
0.000
0.369
0.186
0.427
0.861
0.794
ish 0.157*** 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.170*** 0.094 0.449
[0.049] [0.054] [0.054] [0.059] [0.073]
;r non-Christian 0.04 -0.003 -0.001 0.075** -0.079*** 0.033
[0.026] [0.024] [0.024] [0.037] [0.019]
:k 0.048** 0.047** 0.045**
[0.019] [0.019] [0.019]
an 0.111*** 0.103** 0.093**
[0.029] [0.044] [0.044]
stani or Bangladeshi 0.102*** 0.064
[0.039] [0.052]
iese or other Asian 0.056 0.05 0.04
[0.035] [0.035] [0.033]
dine respondent controls y y y y y
»rvations 23862 21286 21286 21286 23862
ido R-squared 0.21 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
:s: Marginal effects of probit regression. All regressions include year and regional fixed effects and full set of controls included
ible 4.2. P-values stem from F-tests of the null hypotheses that coefficients in each row of columns (5a) and (5b) are identical.
jst standard errors clustered at the postcode district (e.g. WC2A) level are reported in brackets. * means significant at 10%; **
jficant at 5% and *** significant at 1%.
164
Table 4.5: Intensity of Religious Practice across Denominations
Dependent variables: 1
Church attendance Prayer
1 1 U W  A V l l g l U U J  i o
respondent?
i w o p u i i u v i l l  a  U V l i W l
about god?
Other Christian 0.601*** 0.683*** 0.845*** 0.705***
[0.028] [0.123] [0.192] [0.084]
Roman Catholic 0.737*** 0.562*** 0.597*** 0.590***
[0.024] [0.054] [0.097] [0.062]
Methodist 0.590*** 0.248*** 0.759*** 0.339***
[0.040] [0.080] [0.115] [0.088]
Muslim 1.036*** 1.509*** 1 914*** 1.552***
[0.071] [0.187] [0.500] [0.299]
Hindu 0.770*** 1.313*** 1.123*** 0 744***
[0.058] [0.098] [0.141] [0.246]
Jewish 0.267*** -0.565 -1.031** -0.212
[0.079] [0.599] [0.444] [0.259]
Other non-Christian 0.781*** 0.568 0.648 0.718***
[0.083] [0.393] [0.714] [0.278]
Conservative -0.023 -0.099 0.133 -0.077
[0.019] [0.061] [0.122] [0.063]
Labour -0.127*** 0.013 0.168 -0.039
[0.021] [0.055] [0.130] [0.051]
Household income -0.110* -0.670*** -0.317 -0.214
[0.062] [0.226] [0.232] [0.180]
Respondent privately educated 0.202*** 0.019 -0.082 0.146*
[0.022] [0.069] [0.063] [0.079]
Higher education 0.594*** 0.486*** 0.027 -0.028
[0.028] [0.076] [0.173] [0.085]
Observations 19744 918 627 2301
Pseudo R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.04
Notes: Ordered probit regressions where all variables are constructed such that a greater degree of religious 
participation or belief is coded with a higher number. The sample consists of all religious respondents in the 
baseline sample. All regressions include year and regional fixed effects and full set of controls included in Table 
4.2. Robust standard errors clustered at the postcode district (e.g. WC2A) level are reported in brackets. The 
Church of England is the omitted religious denomination. The frequency of church attendance is coded based on 
the question: "Apart from such special occasions as weddings, funerals and baptisms, how often nowadays do you 
attend services or meetings connected with your religion?" (l=Never or practically never; 2=Less often than once 
a year; 3=Less often but at least once a year; 4=Less often but at least twice a year; 5=Less often but at least once 
a month; 6=Less often but at least once in two week; 7=Once a week or more).
The frequency of prayer is coded based on the question: "About how often do you pray?" (l=Never; 2=Less than 
once a year; 3=1-2 times a year; 4=Several times a year; 5=About once a month; 6=2-3 times a month; 7 =Nearly 
weekly; 8=Every week; 9=Several times a week; 10=Once a day; 1 l=Several times a day). Degree of religiosity is 
coded based on the question “Would you describe yourself as ..” (l=Extremely non-religious; 2=Very non­
religious; 3=Somewhat non-religious; 5=Somewhat religious; 6=Very religious; 7=Extremely religious). Belief in 
God is coded based on the question “Please tick one box below to show which statement comes closest to 
expressing what you believe about G od .” (l=Don’t believe in God; 2=1 don’t know whether there is a God and I 
don’t believe there is any way to find out; 3=1 don’t believe in a personal God, but I do believe in a Higher Power 
of some kind; 4=1 find myself believing in God some of the time, but not at others; 5=While I have doubts, I feel 
that I do believe in God; 6=1 know God really exists and I have no doubts about it).
165
Table 4.6: Educational Preferences, Religion and Political Allegiance
Dependent variable:
Respondent 
prefers school 
only own 
religion
Education is 1st or 
2nd priority for 
government 
spending
Students at 
universities is 1st or 
2nd priority for extra 
gvt spending on 
education
Respondent's 
opinion of 
private 
schooling
More private 
schools 
benefit state?
Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Religious 0.365*** 0.007 0.052 0.047 -0.034
[0.069] [0.018] [0.033] [0.068] [0.037]
Conservative 0.105 -0.033 0.031 0.328*** 0.208**
[0.069] [0.022] [0.039] [0.039] [0.082]
Labour -0.048 -0.019 -0.057 -0.455*** -0.330***
[0.069] [0.023] [0.036] [0.071] [0.039]
Household income -0.125 0.317*** 0.123 0.306*** -0.206
[0.204] [0.059] [0.131] [0.116] [0.187]
Respondent privately 0.042 0.008 -0.001 0.257*** -0.022
educated [0.113] [0.024] [0.051] [0.061] [0.112]
Child attended private 0.201* 0.024 0.066 0.363*** 0.252***
school [0.121] [0.029] [0.042] [0.079] [0.068]
Higher education -0.394*** 0.303*** 0.189*** -0.393*** -0.403***
[0.105] [0.035] [0.054] [0.073] [0.077]
Observations 1952 18984 8510 2259 2247
Pseudo R-squared 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.03
Panel B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Church of England 0.252*** -0.006 -0.001 0.052** 0.023
[0.087] [0.018] [0.024] [0.022] [0.038]
Other Christian 0.503*** 0.026 0.05 -0.082** 0.025
[0.095] [0.024] [0.039] [0.041] [0.067]
Roman Catholic 0.841*** 0.033 0.037 0.069 -0.07
[0.071] [0.027] [0.039] [0.052] [0.047]
Methodist 0.105 0.054 0.065 -0.032 -0.147
[0.087] [0.037] [0.069] [0.094] [0.095]
Muslim 0.369 0.218*** 0  477*** 0.257 -0.032
[0.227] [0.064] [0.096] [0.164] [0.171]
Hindu -8.425*** 0.047 0.410*** 0.081 0.331*
[0.141] [0.074] [0.110] [0.090] [0.179]
Jewish 0.611 -0.015 0.401*** 0.567*** 0.214
[0.438] [0.111] [0.139] [0.181] [0.266]
Other non-Christian -0.295 0.027 0.133 0.18 0.158*
[0.564] [0.069] [0.153] [0.117] [0.091]
Observations 3981 33282 15361 6394 6326
Pseudo R-squared 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.03
Notes: Ordered probit regressions. All regressions include year and regional fixed effects and full set of controls included in 
Table 4.2. Robust standard errors clustered at the postcode district level are reported in brackets. The dependent variables of 
columns (4) and (5) are coded such that a higher number represents a more favorable view of private education. For details 
of dependent variables, see text and data appendix.
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Table 4.7: Determinants of Party Identification and Interest in Politics
Dependent variable Party identification Interest in politics
Sample
Baseline, 
Conservative or 
Labour supporters
Conservative
supporters
Labour
supporters Baseline
Conservative
supporters
Labour
supporters
( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Household income 0.664*** 0.782*** 0.514*** 0.818*** 0.702*** 0.881***
[0.075] [0.093] [0.111] [0.071] [0.110] [0.109]
Respondent privately educated 0.136*** 0.223*** -0.053 0.178*** 0.090** 0.223***
[0.032] [0.040] [0.052] [0.027] [0.038] [0.052]
Child attended private school 0.072** 0.173*** -0.131*** 0.124*** 0.134*** 0.158***
[0.029] [0.038] [0.049] [0.024] [0.038] [0.047]
Higher education 0.231*** 0.076 0.394*** 0.854*** 0.668*** 0.931***
[0.035] [0.050] [0.051] [0.031] [0.056] [0.050]
Higher education, no degree 0.170*** 0.225*** 0.122*** 0.572*** 0.442*** 0.590***
[0.028] [0.039] [0.038] [0.026] [0.046] [0.042]
A or 0  level 0.111*** 0.156*** 0.079*** 0.446*** 0.344*** 0.449***
[0.022] [0.033] [0.030] [0.020] [0.036] [0.033]
Religious 0.215*** 0.312*** 0.153*** 0.035** 0.052 0.016
[0.022] [0.029] [0.027] [0.017] [0.037] [0.026]
Observations 17253 7575 9678 18724 5592 7686
Pseudo R-squared 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.06
Ordered probit regressions. All regressions include year and regional fixed effects and full set of controls included in Table 4.2. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the postcode district (e.g. WC2A) level are reported in brackets. Party identification is coded based on the 
question “Generally speaking, do you think o f yourself as a supporter of any one political party? ” (yes-partisan). If NO: “Do you think of 
yourself as a little closer to one political party than to the others? ” (yes-sympathizer) . If NO: "If there were a general election tomorrow, 
which political party do you think you would be most likely to support? ”(if answer=residual identifier). (l=Residual identifier; 
2=Sympathizer; 3=Partisan). Interest in politics is coded based on the question “How much interest do you generally have in what is going on 
in politics?” (l=None at all; 2=Not very much; 3=Some; 4=Quite a lot; 5=A great deal). Robust standard errors clustered at the postcode 
district level are reported in brackets. * means significant at 10%; ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%.
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Table 4.8: Private School Demand, Party Identification and Interest in Politics
(Dependent variable: Child attended private education?)
Heterogeneous effects by: Party identification Interest in politics
Partisan Sympathizer
Residual
identifier A great deal Quite a lot Some
Not very 
much None at all
( 1) (2)
Conservative
Labour
(la)
0.064***
[0.006]
-0.039***
[0.0051
(lb)
0.036***
[0.007]
-0.020***
[0.0061
(lc)
0.007
[0.012]
-0.020**
[0.0081
(2a)
0.099***
[0.015]
-0.018*
[0.0091
(2b)
0.058***
[0.010]
-0.025***
[0.007]
(2c)
0.044***
[0.008]
-0.030***
[0.006]
(2d)
0.036***
[0.011]
-0.042***
[0.0071
(2e)
0.01
[0.023]
-0.048***
[0.011]
Observations 
Pseudo R-squared
23862
0.21
18375
0.2
P-values
Conservative
Labour
0.0001
0.0073
0.0000
0.0436
0.0080
0.4670
0.0000
0.2490
0.0000
0.0170
0.0030
0.0400
Notes: Marginal effects of probit regression. All regressions include year and regional fixed effects and full set of controls included in Table 4.2. 
Robust standard errors clustered at the postcode district level are reported in brackets. * means significant at 10%; ** significant at 5% and *** 
significant at 1%. Note that the coefficients reported in columns (la)-(lc) all stem from one regression, as do the coefficients reported in columns 
(2a)-(2e). For variable definitions, see Table 7. P-values derive from F-tests of the null hypotheses that the Conservative (Labour) coefficients 
reported for in the given column are identical to the Conservative (Labour) coefficient reported in columns (la) in the case of party identification 
and (2a) in the case of interest in politics. Thus, the P-values reported in the Conservative row show that the Conservative Partisan coefficient 
reported in column (la) is different at the 1 percent level from the Conservative Sympathiser coefficient reported in column (lb) as well as from 
the Conservative residual identifier coefficient reported in column (lc).
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Table 4.9: Robustness Checks: Additional Income, Education and W ealth Controls
(Dependent variable: Child attended private education?)
Male Female
(1) (2)_____(3)_____(4)_____(5)_____(6)______(7)_____(8)
ligious 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.018** 0.021***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.008]
Tiservative 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.025** 0.034***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.010] [0.010]
bour -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.043*** -0.029***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.010] [0.008]
g household income 0.075*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.060*** 0.066***
[0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.009] [0.008]
spondent privately 0.180*** 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.171*** 0.169*** 0.170*** 0.190*** 0.147***
acated [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.022] [0.019]
gher education, incl. 0.135*** 0.094*** 0.093*** 0.086*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.072*** 0.104***
eign [0.016] [0.015] [0.015] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.019] [0.023]
ional income and wealth controls
I class of respondent
iss I: Professional 0.078*** 0.077*** 0.072*** 0.068** 0.068** 0.136* 0.016
[0.028] [0.028] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.071] [0.032]
iss 1: 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.054*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.099* 0.023
magerial/Technical [0.020] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.051] [0.021]
iss III: Skilled 0.01 0.01 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.037 -0.006
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.042] [0.018]
iss IV: Partly Skilled 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.04 -0.004
[0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.052] [0.017]
e's economic activity
employed, permanently -0.007 -0.009 -0.056*** 0.032
c or disabled [0.014] [0.013] [0.014] [0.022]
;ired 0.006 -0.001 -0.011 0.005
[0.010] [0.009] [0.013] [0.014]
)king after the home -0.001 -0.004 -0.009 -0.015
[0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.038]
;t in politics
jreat deal 0.049** 0.047** 0.047** 0.064* 0.033
[0.022] [0.021] [0.021] [0.037] [0.026]
ite a lot 0.033* 0.032* 0.032* 0.04 0.029
[0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.031] [0.021]
ne 0.026 0.025 0.025 0.041 0.014
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.031] [0.017]
: very much 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.035 0.002
[0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.033] [0.018]
lousehold own or rent accommodation
ms outright 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.049*** 0.018
[0.010] [0.010] [0.017] [0.014]
zing on mortgage 0.002 0.001 0.02 -0.013
[0.010] [0.010] [0.015] [0.012]
lale 0.007 0.013** 0.012** 0.015*** 0.014** 0.013**
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
ervations 10959 10959 10959 10959 10959 10959 5557 5402
ido R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.21
Marginal effects of probit regressions. All regressions include year and regional fixed effects and full set of controls included in 
|.2. Robust standard errors clustered at the postcode district leve?2re reported in brackets. * means significant at 10%; ** 
ant at 5% and *** significant at 1%.
Table 4.10: Robustness Checks: Neighborhood Controls and School District Fixed Effects
(Dependent variable: Child attended private education?)
(1) (2) (3)
Church of England/Anglican 0.004 0.004 0.004
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Roman Catholic 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.045***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011]
Other Christian 0.012 0.012 0.012
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
Non-Christian 0.039 0.039 0.038
[0.026] [0.026] [0.027]
Jewish Q 0.133*** 0.140***
[0.049] [0.048] [0.051]
Muslim 0.144*** 0.147*** 0.150***
[0.040] [0.041] [0.042]
Conservative partisan 0.069*** 0.067*** 0.066***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
Conservative sympathiser/identifier 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.026***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.008]
Labour sympathiser/identifier -0.019*** -0.017** -0.015**
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Labour partisan -0.040*** -0.038*** -0.036***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Respondent privately educated 0.191*** 0.185*** 0.182***
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
Respondent controls y y y
Neighborhood controls y y
LEA fixed effects y
Observations 16206 16206 16206
Pseudo R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.23
Notes: Marginal effects of probit regression. All regressions include year and regional fixed 
effects and full set of controls included in Table 4.2. Neighborhood controls include the 
performance of local public schools, house prices and the percentage of the population with 
higher level qualifications. See text for details. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
postcode district level are reported in brackets.* means significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5% and *** significant at 1%.
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Chapter 5
Concluding Chapter
This thesis examines, theoretically and empirically, how the demand for sec­
ular and religious private education relates to the distribution of income, the 
quality of public education, and religion and political allegiance. In Chapter 
2 I find that while private education is most prevalent in the most affluent 
neighborhoods, (minority) religious schools locate where the religious individ­
uals are relatively poor. Furthermore, holding mean income levels constant, 
local income inequality is positively related to the demand for private school­
ing, but less so for religious private education. Chapter 3 suggests that a 
non-monotonic relationship exists between the quality of public education and 
the demand for private education, where the demand for private education is 
defined as the fraction of compulsory education that is consumed in the private 
sector. A key premise is that residential mobility is limited during the years in 
which children attend compulsory education, yet children may switch between 
the private and the public sectors during this period. In this context, the im­
portance attached to the quality of local public schools by families consuming 
any private education will depend on the extent to which they also use state 
schools for some periods of time. It thus matters whether private education is 
viewed as a continuous or discrete choice.
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Finally, Chapter 4 studies the role of religion and political allegiance for the 
propensity to send children to private schools. The relationship between reli­
gion and private education varies considerably across religious groups, and is 
strongest for non-mainstream denominations (Roman Catholic, Muslim, Hindu 
and Jewish). However, the greater demand for private education among Mus­
lims, Hindus and Jews does not appear to be driven primarily by religious 
motives but rather by stronger preferences for education. Coupled to the find­
ings of Chapter 2, it appears that members of minority non-Christian religious 
denominations are segmented into low income members who are attracted by 
own-religious private education, while richer members are attracted to secular 
private education. I also find evidence that political beliefs and allegiance af­
fects private schooling decisions. Stating support for the Conservative party 
which views private education favorably is associated with a significantly higher 
propensity to choose private education. The converse holds for individuals who 
support the Labour party which takes a very critical stance towards private 
education. Furthermore, the association of private schooling with religion and 
political allegiance significantly strengthens in the intensity of religious beliefs 
and political allegiance, respectively
There are some limitations to the results found in this thesis. First and 
foremost, additional work is required to corroborate that the statistical re­
lationships found reflect genuine causal relationships. A battery of tests and 
robustness checks performed in the thesis all yield results that reassuringly sup­
port the overall conclusions. Yet, the data sources used have clear limitations, 
and have not permitted an empirical strategy, for instance instrumental vari­
ables, which would more unambiguously identify precise causal effects. Several 
of the key variables used in the empirical analysis are inherently flawed. Most 
importantly, there is no fully adequate measure of the demand for private ed­
ucation at the household level. The survey data does not provide information
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on the extent to which families use private education over time (exclusively 
or only for a short duration of time such that public sector alternatives are 
also used to some degree). I have argued that it matters crucially for how 
families locate relative to state schools that private education is viewed as a 
continuous choice, rather than a discrete choice, over the course of a child’s 
compulsory education. Furthermore, pupil numbers only provide a snapshot 
of demand in any given year, and also don’t provide information on the ex­
tent of families switching between the private and public sectors. Additionally, 
there is no information available on family background characteristics in the 
school data. Furthermore, it is not quite clear if the available pupil num­
bers for private schools (especially small schools) can be fully trusted across 
the board. Moreover, adequately measuring the quality of public education 
is difficult. Public school quality as determined by per pupil spending (the 
measure used in Chapter 2) may be indicative of underlying characteristics 
of pupil population (additional resources are allocated to compensate for dis­
advantage). High per pupil spending therefore does not necessarily correlate 
with schools being more attractive. Moreover, there generally appears to be a 
tenuous relationship between school inputs and pupil outcomes. Another key 
available measure, mean pupil performance (the measure used in Chapter 3), 
is primarily determined by underlying pupil characteristics rather than school 
inputs. Pupil performance on standardized tests thus does not indicate how 
good schools axe at conferring value added, yet parents appear to value mean 
test scores, in part because they are indicative of good peers. Thus mean test 
scores are probably a better indicator of parents’ perception of school quality 
than spending per pupil. The fact that these two measures capture different 
things is also highlighted by the coefficients obtained using the respective mea­
sures in Chapters 2 and 3 being of opposite signs. Finally, the survey data 
does not offer any information on the type of private education attended, for
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instance whether boarding schools or not, the level of fees, or whether religious 
or not.
As regards directions for future work, it would overall appear desirable 
with a better and more nuanced understanding of, first, how different kinds 
of private schools operate and, second, what motivates parents to send their 
children to them (academics, school resources, peer groups, pedagogical ap­
proach, religious instruction etc.), and what factors amenable to public policy 
interventions may sway their choices. At the school level, it would be very use­
ful with additional data on fees, pupil characteristics, admission practices (in 
terms of academics and religious credentials) and religious practices. Previous 
literature has focused a great deal of finding appropriate instrumental variable 
approaches, regression discontinuity designs or - if possible - using natural or 
controlled experiments to pin down causal effects. However, fully convincing 
instruments or discontinuities are very hard to find, and relying on experi­
mental data alone would greatly reduce the contexts and topics that can be 
studied. Yet it seems that less ambitious endeavors are nonetheless worthwhile, 
given the wealth of data that is increasingly (potentially) available, and that 
our knowledge of rather basic properties of private education remains limited. 
It particularly seems relevant to study more carefully the heterogeneity among 
different types of private education, and how this heterogeneity matters for 
private education affect the state sector in different regards. For instance, it 
would be interesting to look into how elite private schools differ from other 
types of private schools, perhaps differentiating by school fees, or mean house­
hold income levels of the enrolled pupils. In this context, it appears important 
to understand the wider impact of peer effects. How are state schools af­
fected if the pupils from the most affluent families opt out and choose private 
education instead? Are there heterogeneous effects by the characteristics of 
these pupils? Does it m atter if these pupils spend some years in state schools,
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rather than being exclusively privately educated? How is the availability of 
good teachers affected? To what extent is support for public education af­
fected by whether households consume private education, and whether they 
do so exclusively, or only in part? It also appears of interest to gain a better 
understanding of the differences between secular and (truly) religious private 
education, as well as the heterogeneity within the religious sector. There may, 
for instance, be great differences in the impact on academic achievement of 
attending, and in the types of households attracted to, moderately religious 
as opposed to fervently religious schools etc. If such differences exist, it would 
be of great interest to gain a greater understanding of how religious aspects of 
school instruction affects educational outcomes. Another topic which apears 
pertinent to explore further is why members of religious and ethnic minorities 
appear to be drawn to private education to a greater extent than members of 
the white, Christian majority, other things constant. Is it simply that they 
value education more in general, or is it because the payoff to (private) ed­
ucation is greater for them, because they are otherwise generally subject to 
discrimination and stigma, and/or less well served by the public sector?
The policy implications that may be drawn depend crucially on whether 
private education is, on the whole, considered desirable or not in terms of over­
all pupil performance, distributional concerns and social segregation, which is 
not the subject of this thesis. It also depends on whether different types of pri­
vate education, or ways of consuming private education (exclusively, or merely 
for a limited duration of children’s compulsory education), are considered more 
or less desirable from a societal perspective. However, at the very least the 
results of this thesis make clear that policies aiming at increasing the role of 
non-public educational alternatives, for example subsidies to private schools 
or school vouchers, must take into account differences among different types 
of private schools, and different motives for and different ways of consuming
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private education.
In conclusion, in spite of the difficult challenges in terms of identifying pre­
cise and unambiguous causal effects, private education remains an important 
and highly topical issue which deserves further study, including the collection 
of superior data.
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Chapter 6
D ata A ppendix
All variables are aggregated at the level of the postcode district, except per 
pupil spending. Postcode districts on average contain almost 95,000 inhabi­
tants (with a substantial amount of variability: standard deviation of 81,500) 
and are taken to approximate local school markets.
6.1 School D ata
6.1.1 Edubase Files
Every year since 2003, a file covering (normally) time-invariant data on all 
schools in England, including those which have closed in the past 15 years, is 
published. This contains information on, among other things:
• type (private or public - with various subcategories of state schools. Spe­
cial schools are dropped)
• religious denomination
• opening and closing dates
• gender
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•  admission procedures
•  address
6.1.2 ASC Files and Performance Tables
For the period 1993-2005, year-on-year school level information for both public 
and private schools is provided on
• Pupil numbers
•  Performance on standardised tests
•  Percentage of pupils eligible for free school meals
•  Percentage of pupils with special educational needs (with and without 
statements)
6.1.3 Spending per Pupil
In addition, the Department for Education and Skills have provided separate 
files with information on spending at the Local Education Authority (equiv­
alent of school district) level data from 1995-2003. This is a higher level of 
aggregation than that of the postcode district, and is as such a less precise 
indication of localised conditions than the other variables.
6.1.4 Constructing School Counts
I construct counts of, on the one hand, all private schools, and, on the other 
hand Muslim and Jewish private schools at the postcode district level. I only 
include those schools which have positive pupil numbers in 2005. Since there 
is a substantial amount of turnover of schools, and the degree of turnover
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may vary across areas, looking only at schools that still exist appears a better 
measure of net entry
6.1.5 Identification of Religious Schools
Differentiating public from private schools is unproblematic. However, prop­
erly identifying religious schools is a little more tricky. Data on religious de­
nomination has improved substantially with the release of 2004 Edubase data 
in 2005, with a few further improvements to the 2005 data release. However, 
there remain a substantial number of schools in the data for which the correct 
denomination does not appear to have been assigned (this applies in particular 
to schools that are no longer open). For Muslim and Jewish schools, I have 
supplemented the schools identified as such with about 30 percent additional 
schools based on cross-checking with Muslim and Jewish websites and search­
ing for 86 and 67 uniquely Muslim and Jewish name components (see below), 
respectively in school names in 17 separate data files covering the period 1993- 
2005. This leaves me with a large degree of confidence that I have identified 
and matched up virtually all Muslim and Jewish schools that have existed 
since 1993. To identify additional Muslim and Jewish schools, I searched for 
whether the following words entered the names of schools:
• M uslim : Al-Islamia, Arabic, Arabiya, Islam, Islameah, Islamia, Is­
lamic, Islamiyah, Muslim, Abu, Afifah, Al, Al-Ansaar, Al-Aqsa, Al- 
Asr, Al-Bilal, Al-Burhan, Al-Furqan, Al-Hijrah, Al-Hira, Al-Muntada, 
Al-Noor, An-Nur, Arqam, Azhar, Bakr, Darul, Darul, Dawatul, Fa- 
rooq, Furqan, Ghausia, Hanifah, Huda, Hudaa, Imam, Imaam, Imaan, 
Jamahiriy, Jamea, Jameah, Jameah, Jamia, Jamiah, Jamiatul, Jamiatul, 
Jamiatul-Ilm, Jaamiatul, Karam, Karam, Kassim, Kauthax, Madaniyah, 
Madni, Madrasah, Madrasatul, Madrassa, Markazul, Mazahirul, Muham­
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mad, Mumin, Qurania, Quwwatt, Rabia, Rabia, Rawdhatul, Salafi, Shak- 
siyah, Shifa, Suffah, Taqwa, Tarbiyah, Tawhid, Tawhid, Tayyibah, Uloom, 
Ummah, Ummah, Zakaria, Zakariya
•  Jew ish : Aharon, Akiva, Avigdor, Beis, Bnois, Bnos, Bobov, Brodetsky, 
Chaim, Chinuch, Clore, Etz, Hadass, Hamedrash, Hasmonean, Hatorah,
, Kerem, Lebonos, Liyeshivah, Lubavitch, Machzikei, Malka, Meirim, 
Menorah, Mesifta, Mesivta, Moriah, Moshe, Naima, Noam, Norim, Oholei, 
Pardes, Rochel, Schlomoh, Sinai, Sobell, Solomon, Soroh, Talmud, Tal- 
mudical, Tashbar, Tiferes, Torah, Trana, Vodaas, Yeshivah, Yesodey, 
Yetev, Yisroel, Yitzchok, Yosef, Yaakov, Zichron and Talmud-, Yetev-.
In this way, a total of 42 additional Muslim and Jewish schools were thus 
identified on top of those designated as such in the official statistics. This 
mainly affects schools that are now closed and reflects that accurate descrip­
tions of religious affiliation were only made in the past few years.
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6.2 Income and Census Data
The employed income data comes from the New Earnings Survey (NES) which 
is a one percent sample of the working population. Home postcodes are pro­
vided for the years 2000 onwards. On average there are 110 income obser­
vations per postcode district (standard deviation 68). The minimum is 10 
observations - all postcode districts with less than that have been dropped. 
From the raw data, I have constructed measures of mean income and a variety 
of measures of income dispersion: the relative mean deviation, coefficient of 
variation, standard deviation of logs, the Gini coefficient and the ratio of 75th 
and 25th income percentiles. I focus on the Gini coefficient in the empirical 
analysis. In addition, to check robustness, I have used data from CACI (a pri­
vate firm based on questionnaires coupled with Census data) and house price 
data from Nationwide.
The Census data stems from the 2001 census which includes a range of 
socioeconomic and ethnicity information. I focus on general population char­
acteristics in terms of qualifications and labour market attachment, overall as 
well as split up according to religion (Muslim and Jewish).
6.3 British Social A ttitudes Survey D ata
6.3.1 Years o f D ata Included
The Survery data covers the years 1986-2002. During this period, the years 
1988, 1992 and 1997 are excluded. The survey was not carried out in 1988 and 
1992, and no private education question was included in 1997. Furthermore, 
although the private education variable is present, I drop the years 1983-1986 
because of inconsistencies in the way the private education question was defined 
relative to the later period, and 2003-05 because the geographical information
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is much less precise than in other years.
6.3.2 Sample Construction (Chapter 3)
I extract all respondents living in England with school aged or older children 
(aged 5+) who provide a yes/no answer to whether they have ever sent a child 
to private school. Out of the resulting 21,398 observations, I drop 11.3 percent 
of observations for which no household income information provided, reducing 
the sample to 18,989. Out of this sample, I have been able to geographically 
match 92.2 percent of observations by the available geographic variables in 
any given year to the postcode data base with geographic coordinates1. 0.9 
percent of observations in this sample are in turn  dropped because no state 
schools are located with 15 kilometers of the estimated household location, as 
are a further 6.7 percent because other covariates are missing or inconsistently 
coded or due to collinearity. This yields a base sample of 16,206 observations.
6.3.3 Geographical M atching of Survey data (Chapter
3)
The geographical units present in various years of the BSAS data include 
wards (names or codes), local authorities (names or codes), postcode districts, 
postcode sectors and parliamentary constituencies. For details, see further 
Data Appendix Table A2-A3.
Using a variety of intermediate steps and geographic matching files, I am 
able match the geographical units available in each year to the National Sta­
1This has involved a great deal of inferring information based on different kinds of in­
formation, correcting mistakes or names or codes than have changed over time. In some 
instances, it has involved guessing. For example: ward and postcode district can be matched 
to the data base, but not parliamentary constituency. A set of postcodes that belong to 
any given combination of ward and postcode district, may distributed on two or three par­
liamentary constituencies. In such cases of ambiguity, I have picked the option with the 
greatest number of address counts.
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tistics Postcode Directory (NSPD) database which assigns 1.4 million English 
postcodes to the different relevant geographical units. Each postcode very pre­
cisely captures geographic location, containing on average 17.8 postal address 
points (standard deviation of 14.7). Each year of survey data provides two to 
three pieces of information on partly overlapping different geographical units. 
Combining the available pieces of geographical information and matching them 
to the postcode directory allows me to identify the postcodes belonging to the 
intersection of these geographical units. On this basis I derive three separate 
pieces of geographical information for each observation in the data: (i) Es­
timated geographical coordinates. Using the described method, I am able to 
narrow down the residential location of all respondents in the base sample to 
an average of 4,200 possible address points covering on average roughly 35,000 
inhabitants2. All postcodes are uniquely identified by a set of geographical 
coordinates (easting and northing) which describe their geographical location. 
To estimate the geographic coordinates of households’ residential location as 
precisely as possible, I take the average value, weighted by number of address 
points, of the geographic coordinates of the postcodes that lie in the intersec­
tion of the different geographical units provided for each household in each 
survey year3; (ii) Postcode districts. Information about the postcode district 
in which respondents reside can be directly inferred from the BSAS survey for 
all observations in the period 1993-20024 and can be obtained indirectly via
2Due to the availability of different geographical information, precision in terms of average 
address points pr geographical unit is greater in some survey years than others, ranging from 
2,558 in 2001 to 13, 818 in 1999. See further Data Appendix Table A2.
3For instance, a postcode district covers on average 10,688 (sd: 7,359) address points. 
Each postcode district contains on average 2.1 (sd: 1.1) parliamentary constituencies. Hence 
the combination of postcode district and parliamentary constituency increases precision by 
more than half (each combination containing average of 4,893 (sd: 5,971) address points). 
Adding information on ward codes further reduces the average number of address points 
contained in each combination to 1,379 (sd: 1,599).
4 In 1993-1995 postcode sector information is provided. The postcode district is defined 
by the first half of the complete postcode. Examples include G2, SP5, PA15 and WC2A. 
Postcode sectors are further defined by the number in the second part of the postcode, such 
as WC2A 2.
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the above procedure for the survey years prior to 19935. There are a total of 
2321 postcode districts in England, containing on average 90.000 inhabitants6, 
of which 1110 are represented in the baseline sample. Postcode districts infor­
mation is of interest as this allows geographical matching all to the other data 
sources on neighborhood characteristics used for this paper; (Hi) School dis­
tricts (Local Education Authorities or LEAs): LEA information is not provided 
in the Survey data, but may be obtained with the above matching procedure 
to the NSPD database. There are a total of 150 LEAs in England7 which each 
cover on average roughly 200 schools. I use LEA information to include LEA 
fixed effects in the empirical analysis8.
6.3.4 Aggregating Survey and School Level D ata at the  
Postcode District Level (Chapter 3)
There are on average only 15.1 observations per postcode district for the entire 
time 14 years of survey data (covering the period 1986-2002), and on average 
each postcode district only appears in the survey 1.8 times in total over that 14 
year period9. Since there are so few observations per year and there is no strong 
time trend in private school demand over the period considered, as shown in 
Figure 3.2, I disregard the time variation and aggregate the private school
5 In some cases a set of postcodes that belong to a given combination of other geographical 
units are spread over more than one postcode district. In such cases of ambiguity, I select 
the option with the greatest number of address points. The possible error deriving from this 
procedures is thus maximally that a contiguous postcode district is erroneously selected.
6 The former figure is derived from the National Statistics Postcode Directory while the 
latter is based on Census 2001 data.
712 LEAs are dropped from the baseline sample due to lack of variation in the dependent 
variable in the survey data.
8For further details on the geographical information provided in the BSAS survey and 
how this is matched to other data sources to produce estimates of household location, see 
Appendix Tables 6.1-6.3 and online Appendix.
9 There are in total 2321 postcode districts in England of which 1110 axe represented in 
the BSAS base sample.
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variable over all the years included in the survey at the postcode district level10. 
However, there is a marked upward time trend in school performance over the 
period considered with average state school performance increasing almost 
40 percent between 1996-2006 (see Appendix Figure 6.1) -  a growth that is 
generally attributed to grade inflation. Averaging the average performance of 
the 5 closest schools (the benchmark measure of local state school quality) 
over time in an unbalanced panel is more problematic. Instead, I match all 
the estimated respondent locations appearing in the survey over the 1986-2002 
time period to the 1993-2002 average performance of the 5 closest schools11. I 
then calculate the mean of this variable at the postcode district level. Next, 
with the 11 years of pupil population data ranging from 1996-2006,1 construct 
yearly data at the postcode district level on private school enrollment and state 
school performance.
10In any case, we do not have information on private school demand in any given year 
since we do not know which year respondents have sent their children to private school. 
On average 142 postcode districts axe represented in any given year, whereas 1110 postcode 
district in total are covered in the 1986-2002 data used in the baseline regressions. To the 
extent that there were large fluctuations in private school demand over time, aggregating 
over time could therefore potentially lead to private school demand being recorded as such 
as artificially high (low) in postcode districts included in years where private school was 
higher (lower) than average. However, this concern is alleviated by the absence of a strong 
time trend.
11 This approach may be problematic to the extent that public schools open and close 
over this period, leading to certain years possibly carrying undue weight in some cases. An 
alternative approach is to just use one year of data to avoid such concerns. Results are 
virtually identical either way.
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DATA APPENDIX
Figure 5.1: Pupil Performance in Public and Private Sectors
Public and private school performance
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
year
 a —  P u b lic   P r iv a te
Heterogeneity in public sector performance
2004
Grammar V oluntary a ided
t V oluntary controlled — B—  Foundation
— * -----  C om prehensive
Notes: Performance is measures as average school-level percentage o f pupils achieving 5 or 
more A*-C grades on GCSE exams, weighted by 15-year old pupil enrollment. Source: 
Department for Education and Skills.
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Figure 5.2: Geographical Dispersion o f Secondary Private Schools in England
1993
♦
♦  ♦
♦♦♦ $  %# ♦♦ ♦♦
•»
2006
Note: All private schools with GCSE performance data.
Source: Secondary school performance tables 1993 and 1996 and Edubase 2006.
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Figure 5.3: Correlation o f Public School Performance and Private School Enrollment
Public schools and private enrollment 
By postcode disticts. 2002 data
Public school and age 6 private enrollment
By postcode distorts. 2002 data
Local pubic school performance
Public school and age 10 private enrollment 
By postcode distorts, 2002 data
Public schools and age 15 private enrollment
Local public school performance
By postcode distorts, 2002 data
3532-M *
0 20 40 60 80
Local school |
Con* tot on coclfioant
Figure 5.4: Correlation o f Public School Performance and Neighborhood Characteristics
Public schools and house prices 
Based on estimated location of survey households. 2002 data
Public schools and house prices 
By postcode distorts. 2002 data
12
Log house prices in postcode district Log house prices
Public schools and population qualifications 
Based on estimated location of survey households. 2002 data
•  •  •  •
Public schools and population qualifications 
By postcode distorts, 2002 data 
• • \  ,  ••
Ftercerrt of population w rth higher level qualifications
Corrttoton coefficient
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Figure 5.5: Geographical Dispersion of BSA Survey Households and Schools
Estimated geographic coordinates for all BSA years 1983-2002.
°«
State schools 1993
State schools 2001
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Figure 5.6: Construction of BSAS Household Income Variable
Estimated mean log household income
2003
•  2002
•  2001
•  2000
•  1999
•  1998
•  1997
19 9 6
•  1995
1994• 199;
•  1991
1989
•  1987
•  1986
•  1985
1984
•  1983 , , , ! r_
4.7 4.8 4.9 5 5.1 5.2
W e i g h t e d  a v e r a g e  o f  l o g s  o f  m i d p o i n t s  o f  i n c o m e  b a n d s  a d j u s t e d  b y  r e t a i l  p r i c e  i
•  y e a r  - - - - - - - - - - - -  F i t t e d  v a l u e s
Note: Average is weighted by number of observations in each income band.
Examples o f survey income bands and responses
1986 Pet 2002 Pet
1 < 2000 p 0.4 1 < than 3999 2.2
2 2000-299 2.5 2 4000-5999 9.1
3 3000-399 3.7 3 6000-7999 8
4 4000-499 5 4 8000-9999 6.5
5 5000-599 4.8 5 10000-11999 5.9
6 6000-699 5.8 6 12000-14999 6.6
7 7000-799 5.9 7 15000-17999 5.3
8 8000-999 12.6 8 18000-19999 4.5
9 10000-11 11.6 9 20000-22999 3.5
10 12000-14 10.7 10 23000-25999 4.8
11 15000-17 9.2 11 26000-28999 4.5
12 18000-19 5.4 12 29000-31999 4
13 20000+ p 11.9 13 32000-37999 5.7
98 don't know 6.5 14 38000-43999 4.5
99 na 4 15 44000-49999 3.2
16 50000-55999 2.6
17 56000 or more 8.6
refused
97 information 6
98 don't know 4.5
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Table 5.1: Sample Size and Geographical Variables per Year for Base Sample
In BSAS sample In NSPD database Pet matched
Observa Postcode Pari. Ward Local authority Areas address points address points
Year tions LEAs districts constit. Code Name Code Name matched mean median mean median Areas Obs.
1986 834 80 H 6 ** * * 129 4,224.2 3,562 2,558 2,038 92.2 92.1
1987 771 80 H 8 ** * * 129 4,072.4 3,450 2,558 2,038 93 92.2
1989 798 75 H 2 ** * * 130 3,998.0 3,207 2,558 2,038 90.8 91.2
1990 1 1 1 1 85 137** * * 152 4,224.9 3,686 2,558 2,038 96.7 97.3
1991 1216 91 142** * * 151 4,190.6 3,488 2,558 2,038 96 1 0 0
1993 831 81 127 * 171 3,690.4 3,797 2,153 1,973 98.8 99
1994 1405 97 155 151 X 204 2,864.9 2,980 99.5 99.3
1995 1563 80 151 136 ** 214 3,067.8 3,309 90.2 95.2
1996 1509 79 142 128 298*** 393 3,252.4 2,808 1,379 776 96.7 97.7
1998 1334 76 127 128 2 5 5 *** 390 3,086.1 2,725 1,379 776 82.3 86.9
1999 1438 84 146 1 2 1 181 13,818.0 12,423 5,775 2,782 91.2 91.5
2 0 0 0 1547 83 151 152 293 375 3,458.8 2,917 1,379 776 89.9 90.9
2 0 0 1 1382 8 8 154** 152 288 418 2,558.1 2,351 1,379 776 83 82.1
2 0 0 2 1702 105 164 181 389 446 2,650.5 2,404 1,379 776 1 0 0 1 0 0
Avg. 1197.5 83.3 135.5 146.9 306.3 298.0 1 2 1 . 0 1 2 1 . 0
Not used
1983 * * 97 4317 4116 77.3 77.1
1984 * * 97 4540 4177.5 82.5 80.9
1985 522 65 91** * * 98 3,894.4 3,477 2,558 2,038 95.9 96.2
2003 x x
2004 x x
2005 x x
x Available, but I have not included variables in final data file and will update this.
* Information not in BSAS data, but names provided in technical appendix (scanned pdf documents) and can be typed in manually. These names can be
matched to codes using intermediate files. I will update overview to include info for these years.
** Inferred using other information (1985-1991: roughly A72001 postcode district is available, but it is entirely wrong as postcodes districts indicated
to not exist in the regions observations belong to)
*** Codes are not entirely correct, can mostly infer correct information
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Table 5.2: Different Geographical Variables Available in Each Year
postcode Pari. Local address points
district sector constit. authority Ward mean median SD
1996-98;
2000-02 x X X 1.379 776
1983-91 X X 2.558 2038
1994-95 X X X
1993 X X 2.153 1973
1999 x X 5.775 2782
2003-05 X X 30.551 34162
X 2.649 2119
X 9.322 8350
X 10.688 9697
Notes:
Examples of:
Postcode disctricts: B2, SP5, PE 10 and WC2A 
Postcode sectors: B2 4, SP5 5, PE 10 0, WC2A 2
Ward codes, for example 26UGFA, are subject to ongoing change. New sets of codes are provided for 1991, 1998 and 2005 in the NSPD database. However, ward 
codes from, say, 1996 will match some 1991 and some 1998 codes. There are also ward names which can be found in the BSAS data technical appendices (to type 
in) 1983-1990 which are relative stable over time and for which a matching file exists to 1995 ward codes. There are some further complications due to 
errors/inconsistencies in ward codes in the BSAS data as detailed in the web Appendix.
192
year const pcd pcs ward wa co lacode locauth vars
1983-
1991 const wardname
1993 sector pcslocauth
1994 censparl sector censusdc pcs const locauth
1995 censparl sector locauth pcs const locauth
1996 censparl sector ward censuscc pcd wardname const
1998 pano postcode pcd const wa
1999 postcode lacode pcd lacode
2000 concode postcode ward lacode pcd const ward
2001 conname postcode ward lacode ward const pcd
2002 conname postcode ward lacode ward const pcd
2003 concode lacode const lacode
2004 conname 1 lacode const lacode
2005 conname 1 lacode const lacode
rename geographic variables to consistent names
Variables typed in from technical 
appendix
key variables to merge to postcode data (NSPD)
For early years, no geographical information is available in the actual BSAS data, only a numbering of the different geographical areas (spoint) for 
which the names of the parliamentary constituency and ward can be found in the technical appendices. However, many parliamentary constituencies 
have changed names and boundaries in the intervening years.
year varsO varsl vars2 vars3 vars4 stepl step2 step3 step4 mergedatal_______mergedate mergedaU merge_data4
1993
1994
1995
1996
1998
1999
2000 
2001 
2002
2003
2004
2005
pcs cons1 pcs local pcs local pcs locauth c drop con drop con drop con drop consl const_lacode_pcs_l const_laco const laco const_lacodc_pcs_199 
pcd ware ped ware ped ware ped ware ped ware drop con drop con replace c drop consl const_wardname_p< const_war« const_war const_wardname_pcd_ 
co wa pc co wa pc co wa pc co wa pc co wa pcd drop con replace c drop consl const_ward_pcd_20 const_war< const_war< const_ward_pcd_2000
pcd lacode 
pcd const wa
ward cor ward pcd const ward 
pcd ward const
const lac const2 lacode C:\data\const_lacode C:\data\cor C:\data\cor C:\data\const_lacode_0
const lac const2 lacode C:\data\co C:\data\const_lacodc C:\data\cor C:\data\const_lacode_05a.dta
const lac const2 lacode C:\data\co C:\data\const lacode C:\data\cor C:\data\const lacode 05a.dta
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Table 5.4: Religion and Ethnicity in BSA Survey Data
Panel A
Black Indian
Pakistani or 
Bangladeshi
Chinese or 
other Asian White Total pet N
Church of England 16.6 1.8 0.6 3.1 36.3 34.9 14348
Other Christian 34.2 2.6 0.6 6.2 8.9 9.3 3826
Roman Catholic 11.6 5.5 0 12.5 9.4 9.3 3828
Methodist 5.2 0 0.3 1.4 2.9 2.9 1193
Muslim 6 9.3 95.1 21.5 0.2 1.3 553
Hindu 0.1 46.4 0.3 5.5 0 0.7 277
Jewish 0.1 0.5 0 0.7 0.6 0.6 231
Other non-Christian 1.1 22.6 0.3 12.1 0.5 0.9 356
No religion 25.2 11.3 2.7 37 41.2 40.1 16507
Total pet 2.3 1.3 0.8 0.7 94.9 100
N 941 549 329 289 39011 41119
Panel B
Black Indian
Pakistani or 
Bangladeshi
Chinese or 
other Asian White Total pet N
Church of England 1.1 0.1 0 0.1 98.8 34.9 14348
Other Christian 8.4 0.4 0.1 0.5 90.7 9.3 3826
Roman Catholic 2.8 0.8 0 0.9 95.4 9.3 3828
Methodist 4.1 0 0.1 0.3 95.5 2.9 1193
Muslim 10.1 9.2 56.6 11.2 12.8 1.3 553
Hindu 0.4 92.1 0.4 5.8 1.4 0.7 277
Jewish 0.4 1.3 0 0.9 97.4 0.6 231
Other non-Christian 2.8 34.8 0.3 9.8 52.2 0.9 356
No religion 1.4 0.4 0.1 0.6 97.5 40.1 16507
Total pet 2.3 1.3 0.8 0.7 94.9 100
N 941 549 329 289 39011 41119
Note: BSA Survey data 1986-2005. Panel A reports the percentage of each ethnic group that belong to the different 
religious denominations, whereas Panel B shows the percentage of each religious denomination that is made up of 
the different ethnic groups. Thus Panel A shows that 16.6 percent of Blacks belong to the Church of England as 
opposed to 36.3 percent of Whiltes. Conversely Panel B shows that 98.8 percent of Church of England adherents are 
White and only 1.1 percent are Black.
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